Italy.

New York Times 100 years ago today, October 17, 1912:
    The conclusion of peace with Turkey leaves Italy in a position of marked advantage for the present and opens up the prospect of a position of still greater importance in the future. The change is promptly recognized by the German Foreign Minister, who regards the chances of localizing the war in the Balkans as distinctly improved by the Italo-Turkish agreement. Versions of this agreement differ somewhat, but, according to a statement of Kiamil Pasha, the Turkish Premier, reported from Constantinople, Italy is pledged to associate herself with the Powers in trying to end the war speedily. It is a fair inference that this pledge is given in the interest of Turkey, otherwise it would not have been sought by that Government. If it has actually been given it is a confirmation of the view taken in these columns since the negotiations assumed definite form, that they would result in some understanding as to European Turkey to the advantage of the Porte. Clearly, if Italy is to try to aid in ending the war speedily, it will not be to the injury of Turkey.
    We have spoken of the possibility of a position for Italy of greater importance than that she now occupies. The Triple Alliance, to which she is a party, expires next year. When the question of renewal conies up the value of Italy will have been considerably enhanced. That is to say, she will have interests of great importance in the Mediterranean which will bind her to France and Great Britain, and she will be proportionately less eager to cast in her lot with Germany and Austria-Hungury. To persuade her to do so, she will have to be granted more advantages than she has in the past secured from the Alliance. It may easily turn out that the other parties to the Alliance cannot offer her adequate inducements to join them. In that case the whole situation in Europe will be notably modified; the balance that has been worked out, and that only a year ago seemed fairly effectual may be seriously disturbed, and a realignment may become necessary. An incident occurred last month that throws some light on this prospect. The French Government ordered a third squadron from Brest to the Mediterranean, with the scarcely concealed intention of carrying out an understanding with Great Britain that the North Sea should be left to the care of that Power. The German press immediately argued that the movement was meant as a menace to Italy. For a moment the Italian press was influenced by the suggestion, but it was not long in recognizing that Italy had interests in in the Mediterranean that depended largely on the friendliness of France and of Great Britain, and that the transfer of the squadron was made in the friendliest spirit. It remains true, however, that it was not made in the interest of Germany, and that it was an indication of the changed relations that may develop in the near future. It is probable, however, that these changed relations will make for peace. Even if the extreme assumption be made that Italy, moved by the need of perfect safety in the Mediterranean, should remain outside the Alliance and should reach a complete understanding with the parties to the Triple Entente, there would be little danger of aggression in consequence, and the possibilities of disturbance of the peace would be strengthened.