Sea-Power.

New York Times 100 years ago today, October 6, 1912:
Its Importance and Its Decadence in England
THE EVOLUTION OF SEA POWER. By P. A. Silburn, D. S. O., M. P. of the Union of South Africa. Longmans, Green & Co.    To bring before the people of the British Empire the importance of sea power and the command of the sea, Major Silburn, a member of the Parliament of the South African union, has written a history of the fleets of the world from the galleys of Egypt and Phoenicia to the superdreadnoughts of Great Britain and Germany. Perhaps to an observer on this side of the Atlantic his reference to "the growing indifference of a large section of the people of the British Empire toward the navy" may seem to predicate a fact, Which is certainly not self-evident, but it does not detract from the interest of his work to a very much larger circle of readers than British subjects.
    For Major Silburn has examined naval history, not to recount its exploits, but to analyze its elements. He has considered the value of naval alliances, the importance of the personal equation on warfare at sea, the influence of land defenses and coaling stations on maritime strategy, and so on, and in doing so he has gone into some of the half-forgotten trails of history. The Englishman, when he speaks of sea power, generally has in mind Trafalgar and the Nile, and the splendid records of men like Nelson and Howe. Major Silburn finds the less glorious pages of history more valuable for his purposes and concerns himself far more with the Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century and the interesting play of politics and strategy which governed the operations of Torrington and Tourville to the campaigns in the English Channel in 1690-92 than with any of the naval wars in which Great Britain has been completely victorious.
    For his object is to estimate the essentials of sea power and to show in these days of intense naval rivalry the factors which in times of stress in the past have turned the scale of victory. So the difficulty of securing proper co-operation between allied fleets may be displayed better by citing a half-forgotten coalition in the seventeenth century than by dwelling on any renowned victory, and the value of a "fleet-in-being" has its best illustration in the story of the defeat of Torrington at Beachy Head in 1690 and his withdrawal from action in good order so as to preserve some kind of a squadron to guard the shores of England.
    Of course, a work with such a pronounced didactic purpose as this is always open to the suspicion of marshaling historical facts in order to suit its aim, but nevertheless the testimony Major Silburn has collected as to the value of a homogeneous navy is particularly interesting at the present crisis in the naval development of the British Empire. Australia has pledged herself to the creation of an independent squadron, of which the strength will be by no means negligible, and Canada is hovering between the desire to have a home navy for its politicians' amusement and the sounder policy of a direct contribution to the resources of the British Admiralty. Major Silburn has no doubt whatever as to the merits of these two methods. He cites case after case to show that a naval force must be homogeneous to be efficient and all personal jealousies between commanders absent to produce results. Not only was Nelson himself a naval genius of the first order, but his Captains at the Nile were "a band of brothers," ready to support him to the utmost, from whom it was impossible to conceive such reluctance as spoiled the reputation of several Admirals in the muddled eighteenth century wars.
    Another chapter full of significance deals with the extreme importance of naval ports and coaling stations. England, of course, here possesses an immense superiority over any possible rival, provided always she can preserve a "fleet-in-being." Doubtless if Germany were to crush her in the North Sea, her "points d'appin" would fall one by one into the hands of the enemy; but, supposing the contest between these rivals was long drawn out, the little splashes of red to be found all over the map would give the island empire an incalculable advantage. As Major Silburn points out, there is many a naval war fought out in Cabinets which never sounds its guns across the sea, and the fact that the Kaiser's Admirals can count their foreign bases on the fingers of one hand will be a deterrent against the outbreak of war till there seems a reasonable chance to annihilate the British fleet at the outset.
    In an interesting passage Major Silburn shatters an illusion of childhood. Readers of Marryat and other sea stories will remember how the British author gloated over the fact that the English fleet ever attacked from windward and thus proved the superiority of their courage over the French. Mr. Silburn now comes and declares that from the scientific standpoint such tactics were very poor judgment and might indeed be compared to the frontal attack in a land battle. As the English ships bore down on the French line to leeward they were necessarily in column and somewhat disordered, and the French could concentrate their fire on whichever vessel they chose. When the English fire grew too hot the French under cover of the thick smoke could easily draw off to reform their line out of range and indeed retained throughout the liberty of fighting and retiring. Curiously enough the naval tactics of the English were the exact reverse of those brought to such perfection by Wellington in the Peninsular war. He generally fought in line, at first on the defensive, and shattered the French columns of attack. Nelson fought in column on the offensive and drove through the French line. The methods were radically opposed, but in both cases the British won.
    Aside from the obvious purpose of Major Silburn's work — the arousing throughout the British Empire of the desire for one homogeneous navy kept up to the highest point of efficiency — there is much for those interested in sea power but not particularly in the fortunes of Great Britain. Its analysis of the elements that make for the command of the sea, its reminders of little-remembered history, and its lessons for the future make it a work thoroughly well worth reading by all students of international affairs.