The Balkan "War."

New York Times 100 years ago today, October 10, 1912:
    Prince Nicholas of Montenegro seems to be playing the part of "an old man in a hurry" — a rôle for which he has shown no bent in the past. Naturally the query arises: Is he serving the interests of his son-in-law, the King of Italy, and pricking the sides of the Turks, who are a little slow in coming to terms on Tripoli? In any case he has injected a new element of complexity into a situation already very mixed.
    There are however, two general facts that stand out fairly clear in this situation. One is that the Powers of Europe are formally agreed that no more territory shall at present be taken from Turkey, and have so notified the Governments both of Turkey and of the four States — Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece. The other is that these four Governments are united in demanding reforms in European Turkey, especially in Macedonia, Albania, and Crete, amounting to practical autonomy, under a Christian Governor General. If the Powers are sincere, and if they can maintain united action, it would be reasonable to infer that the integrity of Turkey would, in form, be observed, and that substantial reforms — if not autonomy, a long step in that direction — would be the outcome. Nor would the hasty action of Montenegro, even if it were followed by a war between the confederation and Turkey, necessarily prevent this outcome. If in the war either side should gain a decided success — a result probable for Turkey alone — or if it should prove a drawn game, the Powers could still intervene, whenever they could agree to do so, and dictate terms.
    The difficulty is in the agreement. It is now thirty-four years since the Powers met in conference and tried to fix upon a policy which they would enforce in the Near East. In the interval nearly every important provision of that policy has been violated. Eastern Roumelia has been added to Bulgaria and Bulgaria has become independent, Bosnia and Herzegovina have been annexed by Austria-Hungary. Nearly one-fourth of the European territory embraced within the sovereignty or the suzerainty of the Sultan has been lopped off by his powerful neighbors, or with their connivance. At no one of the crises leading to this series of losses have the Powers which framed the Treaty of Berlin been able to unite in enforcing it. They now face a new and formidable attack on Turkey. What reason is there to suppose that they can shape its ultimate outcome? Not, we fear, very much.
    Bulgaria has invoked the Twenty-third Article of the Treaty of Berlin, and it is on that basis that the note of the Powers rests. What does this article require or permit? Very little. The Sublime Porte engages to apply to Crete, with some changes, a plan ten years old at the time, and never acted on. "Analogous regulations, adapted to local requirements," are to be "introduced into other parts of Turkey in Europe." Before any of these plans are promulgated the "'Sublime Porte shall take the advice of the European Commission appointed for Eastern Roumelia." It all reads like very ancient history. The commission whose "advice" is the only means of controlling Turkish action went out of existence years ago. If the Powers are really to influence the course of Turkey it must be on grounds not connected with the Treaty of Berlin, on grounds of actual duty or interest. The chances that they will do so are not good. Undoubtedly they will localise whatever war takes place, if they can. If they succeed they will, at the proper time, interpose and secure from Turkey new promises of reform. Whether these promises will be any better kept than those made from time to time in the last forty years is extremely doubtful. The real interest of the Powers, the only thing they care very much about, the thing that is most needful to them until their plans develop elsewhere, is to maintain the statu quo in the Near East. To secure this they are likely, for the present, to take the promises Turkey is ready to make and not trouble themselves needlessly with enforcing their performance.