The Turkish Awakening.

New York Times 100 years ago today, October 7, 1912:
    One obvious practical result of the Balkan combination against Turkey is that it enables the Porte to make terms with Italy without division at home or serious loss of prestige in Europe. Indeed it is not easy to see how Turkey could have got from any other source a service so solid, so sorely needed, and so timely. It may well turn out that this removal from the path of the Turkish Government of a peril so pressing and so serious will be the most important element in the complex situation in the Near East.
    The gift to Turkey was not intended by the givers — far from it. When the Balkan combination was first undertaken the case of Turkey seemed hopeless. Her Government was in a state of confusion. The Young Turks had been overthrown by a military conspiracy of the same sort that put them in power. Their successors could neither carry on the war with Italy nor make any peace that would not create anarchy in the country and light again the baleful fires of civil war. When the menace from Bulgaria, Greece, Servia, and Montenegro became serious, the informal peace bargaining in Switzerland seemed futile. It was allowed to drag on with the effect, perhaps with the intent, of stimulating the Balkan confederates. The latter believed, and were encouraged to believe, that Turkey was drifting to a state of increasing weakness, ending in helplessness.
    But as her neighbors became more aggressive and entered on open preparations for war, the Government of Turkey unexpectedly, and with great vigor, took up the gauntlet, announced that it would mass a strong army on the southern border of Bulgaria, called up the reserves from Asia Minor, hinted at an understanding with Roumania, and, most significant of all, pressed swiftly the negotiations with Italy. The response at home was prompt and general. The war with Italy was forgotten. The Turkish people, including the followers of the Committee of Union and Progress, rallied to the Government. Discord and the spectre of civil war were replaced by unity and hot patriotism. The chance for the Balkan confederation to strike a decisive blow against Turkey, distracted at home and friendless abroad, was practically lost. If there is to be war in the Near East, it will be a very different war from that which the eager and confident confederates looked forward to. The effect on the Powers of Europe of this change in the situation will be considerable. Without discussing that phase at present, it is well to note the change. It makes the prevention of war somewhat more probable by the united action of the Powers because more needful to them.