New York Times 100 years ago today, February 16, 1913:
Her Political Situation Internationally Is More Desperate Than It Ever Has Been, and Her Fate Is in the Hands of Russia, England, France and Japan.
By Frederick McCormick.
Under all the rapidly developed circumstances in Eastern Asia since 1900, and since the Manchus established constitutional government, China's political situation internationally is more desperate now than it has ever been, and her fate as a territorial entity, or as a nation, is sealed unless she can prove to the cold, calculating chiefs of the Chancelleries of Europe that as a mere collective human organism she is a terrific and terrible piece of political dynamite.
Japan — I mean those influences which are the force and substance of Japanese expansion, continental empire, and Greater Japan — has given China up. The capitalistic allies interested in the industrial and commercial development of interior, or unpolitical, China have given China up in so far as she claims to be the successor of the Empire of China of 1911 and before. China is a still heavier political responsibility to the powers. Such is China's international situation, which is virtually all the situation she has.
The validity of this conclusion is proved by the attitudes of the powers regarding formal recognition of the Republic of China. China seeks, through recognition by the powers, to rewrite her treaties and to escape the disadvantages which her geographical position, international relations, her own weakness, mistakes, and general misfortunes have given her in the past, and still give her. China assumes that thereby she will be on the way to enjoy the position enjoyed by the great powers.
This question appeals strongly to the people of the United States with a singleness of meaning — but it is a question of China's situation with respect to four other powers who entertain misgivings regarding her. Four considerations are involved in this question: First, it is the oft-considered "Chinese question" behind a new mask hold up by the Chinese leaders and their sympathizers; second, sympathy is almost wholly with China; third, there is no visible prospect that China will attain certain ends she has in view, and last, China is confronted by unknown and dangerous possibilities.
China's Historical Setting.
From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century China became, in turn, alarmed, because Russia was taking the Amur regions, England conquering India, France invading Indo-China, and because Japan was encroaching upon Korea. A course of politics and "pacification" of China by these four powers began, and resulted in Russia planting her flag in Chinese territory — in some places hundreds of miles inside China's original borders. England planted her flag beyond India, along the border of Tibet, on the Burma-China frontier, upon Hongkong, and at a port in North China. France took Annam and Tongking, and planted her flag at a port on the southeast coast of China; and Japan took Loochoo, Formosa, and Korea, and planted her flag from Formosa to Central Manchuria.
China was thus surrounded by four powers whose frontiers join and dominate her own. These powers are there still. China's historical setting is just the same now as before the revolutionary rebellion of 1911. Her fate is in the hands of Russia, England, France, and Japan. Other nations can have little influence over China's destiny, and only China herself has the power to save herself.
China and the Powers.
I will try and show the machinery by which this drama of China and the frontier powers is worked. In the first instance it was trade that attracted and brought the frontier powers together in Eastern Asia. Germany came into eastern China from the sea, and there was a disturbance of balance the outcome of which showed the aims of these powers to be territorial first, and industrial rather than commercial. The five agreed upon partition, and accordingly divided China into spheres which, respectively, gave them regions wherein until 1903 they did not interfere with each other. In 1903 France and England found their economic designs and interests in conflict in southwestern China, and they thereupon formed a coalition for their joint advantage.
Although England was the creator of the "open door," this coalition was a monopoly in the eyes of Germany. The latter, in 1908, therefore, took a hand and broke into the compact which thus became a triangular monopoly. The United States had superseded England in the defense of the "open door," and finding herself excluded by the capitalistic powers of Europe she, in 1909. broke into the compact, which became a quadrilateral one, a capitalistic and political alliance of great powers.
Two Forces Confront China.
In this coalition spheres of influence disappeared — the effects of the Russo-Japanese war in defeating Russia's attempt to extend her special rights in China seemed to bury spheres of influence. The contending forces of partition and conservation of China crystallized and assumed full form. The foreign influences least dangerous to China centred in the capitalistic policy which stands for the development of the country on the basis of conservation and equality for all. The godless political influences, which are more truly the reliance of Kings and chancelleries, assembled under the banners of the frontier powers. England and Japan joined in an alliance placing the British and Japanese flags along the frontier of China from the Pamirs to the Ussuri province of Eastern Siberia, a line broken only by the French frontier between Burma and the China Sea. France joined Russia in an alliance placing the French flag with the Russian along China's frontier from the Pamirs to Korea, and placing the Russian flag with the French from Kuangtung to Burma. These four flags were almost simultaneously moved forward inside China's borders to the capitals of every adjoining State on the land frontier, and they are permanently flying in most of them. European politics was thus solidly established in China — with Japanese support — and China's destiny made a part of European politics.
The first "Chinese question" was one of trade, the second, one of territory and frontiers. It then broke out as one of finance and industrial development of China's resources: first, between England and France, as stated above; then between these two and Germany; then between these three and America. It broke out anew among these four capitalistic powers, and the two non-capitalistic powers, Japan and Russia. This is the aspect of China's position that shows her destiny to be in the hands of four powers, unless she can save herself by her own unaided efforts.
The Manchurian Allies.
Japan did not destroy special rights in China, claimed by Russia, but on the contrary, re-established them. On July 4, 1910, Japan cemented special rights among the four frontier powers, and re-established spheres of influence by a convention with Russia, in opposition to equal rights and the integrity of China's territory and jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Japanese placed the flags of Japan, England, Russia, and France everywhere along and within — far within — the frontiers of China, and around all China by land and sea. The four nations are now the Manchurian allies — their alliance being the outcome of the Manchurian question. China's destiny was thus made a contingency to Japan's leadership in Eastern Asia.
The other influence politically reckonable, in China's fate, is the Capitalistic Alliance. The first great force, the disintegration of China, is on the frontiers; the second, conservation, is in the heart of China. The first works from the outside in, the other is trying to save the heart and whatever members of the Chinese body it can.
The Capitalistic Alliance made a great stir in the world, and the financiers began to claim that the economic interests of the powers would prevail over their political interests, would eliminate war, and save China. Two of the Manchurian Allies were in the Capitalistic Alliance, and two of them were out of it. The two latter, Japan and Russia, became apprehensive as to the fate of their political interests. They proceeded to break into the Capitalistic Alliance, admission to which was not barred by principle, and on June 20, 1912, the four allies, France, England, Germany, and the United States, admitted them to a participation in loans to China and in the latter's industrial development on such terms as they could accept. Russia declared against the expenditure of loans to China to the detriment of Russia's special rights in North Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Western China. Japan declared against loans spent to the detriment of Japan's special rights and interests in South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia. Japan's prestige in these developments since the Russo-Japanese war shows that she is the leader of the Manchurian Allies, and perhaps of the Capitalistic Alliance in the end.
Attitude of Japan.
During the progress of this drama in the Autumn of 1911. China opened a domestic revolution, which complicated Japan's position among the powers and obliged her to take into consideration the possibility of a more revolutionary change in her relation to China than previously. She had to prepare for the dissolution of the Chinese Empire, of which she was so convinced that she undertook the enormous task of bolstering it up, as an empire, or even as a republic—a truly staggering undertaking — as an alternative to the unthinkable complications and dangers of sudden partition by the powers. The North and South, in China, in the revolutionary rebellion and war of 1911-1912, owe their unity to terror of Japan. The Imperialists and Republicans united because of fear of Japan. China's domestic revolution brought to an acute stage China's foreign relations. In January, 1912, Japan stepped in. She had sounded the Imperialists at Peking on the question of Japanese aid for China, and failed. She then approached the republic of China for an agreement embracing neighborly aid and offensive and defensive alliance to build up the East for Asiatics and establish Mongolian morale and efficiency. All their traditions the Chinese reformers peremptorily east to the winds, and the Chinese Republic at once closed with Yuan Shin-Kai and declared to the world their utter confidence in him, a man whom they had previously regarded as an opportunist, trimmer, and a traitor. Failing in an agreement with China, Japan immediately proceeded, with Russia, to extend the joint policy of their two governments to keep pace with the opening revolution and with the new international situation partly brought about by the secession of Outer Mongolia. In July, 1912, Japan sent Count Katsura to St. Petersburg, after the six-power agreement was signed at Paris, to establish a new understanding with Russia occasioned by, and deducible from, their agreements to maintain their special rights in North China and Mongolia, the alienation of Outer Mongolia, and to participate in loans to China. The result was a delimitation of their respective spheres in North China and Mongolia, and a memorial understanding respecting the progressive and orderly alienation of Chinese territory.
Japan's situation from every point of view is such that there is no compact as to policy and action, made with any power, which will ever justify her, from a political standpoint, in missing the main chance and missing the main role in Eastern Asia, such as she has attained to in the Manchurian Alliance, and also in the Capitalistic Alliance. Japan occupies the favored position as well as the responsible one. It can be seen how terrible to Chinese reformers and patriots must be this leverage over them by a powerful, and, to them, aggressive and irresistible nation. Japan holds the key to China's fate.
China's Present Condition.
The state of China has hardly been realized in the West. It is that of a danger zone — the greatest in the world — to the powers. China has been a law unto herself and is obliged to find a position of advantage for herself. Her handicap is serious. China is obliged to enact her part in the world upon the terms and with the pace set for her by the nations of the West whose prosperity, wealth, and power have reached the zenith. At the start, the Republic of China is without efficient labor, is cursed by ignorance, has no common language or means of inter-State, or even, in many places, inter-neighborhood intercourse; no systematic currency or taxation, no internal national credit, no adequate communications, no money capital with which to elevate her economical plane so as not to be ground down by rich opposing nations. Her forests are impoverished, and her rivers are annually wrecking vast areas of crops and drowning thousands or leaving them to starve. With her frontiers crumbling China has no trained officials, and she refuses counsel and advisory aid.
It will take ten or twenty years to form a government, and longer to make it a centralized one such us her situation, demands she should have to-day.
Had China entered the school of nations even half a century ago, when Japan came into the international theatre, she could have worked but her problems in detail, and the "Chinese question" would not have existed. But she is at last to enter the school of nations, she stands alone against the world. Civilization is her opponent, and even the massive oligarchy of the Flowery Republic may well be staggered at such a situation. Its dangers are to be read in the opinions held in the chancelleries of the great powers. Amid vast plans for depredation upon Chinese preserves devised for the future by some of the allies, China the republic, wanting recognition and equality, is lost. The plans are something which she cannot fully realize. Powers like the United States, Germany, and the lesser countries, can exercise little influence over the Chinese policies of the frontier powers — the Manchurian allies — and there are now no virile Manchu or other Tartar tribesmen to assume leadership in China as was the case in 1644, nor to whip the frontier aggressors as was the case when the imperial armies whipped the Russians. China can no longer expect more than commiseration and sympathy from these stronger outside people.
Recognition of the Republic.
I speak from the standpoint of one who believes that until now those native Chinese who bear the tremendous burdens of state and therefore the safety and future welfare of the Chinese nation, look upon independent recognition of China by the powers as not only premature but extremely dangerous for the Chinese Republic, for which the majority of the powers entertain a sincere and benevolent anxiety. The position of the United States in Chinese affairs is that of a mediator, not a leader, and she cannot take independent action without limiting or annulling her usefulness to China and to herself. Furthermore, those Chinese who bear the responsibilities of the new Republic, and who constitute the few who may be spoken of as "in the know," not only do not desire unrelated and, therefore, premature, recognition by the United States, but shun it.
At the same time, recognition of the Chinese republic by our Government inevitably approaches. Should such recognition occur before all the preliminaries of establishing a fixed government are carried out, there is no reason to believe that the United States will not be accompanied in this by other powers. The question will not have been expedited by those merely sympathetic elements in our kindred political organism, nor because China resembles any other State whatsoever in history, nor because her circumstances are like any other set of circumstances in history, but because her situation is unlike anything else in history or present politics.
The powers see that there is nothing in recognition of China by them that can alter by a hair's breath her international situation, her position in the world. China's condition and situation are not make-believe, as many friends of China and China's reformers think, but serious reality. So far as outsiders can do anything for China, her situation is fixed by the terms by which she is completely invested by the Manchurian allies, the capitalistic allies, and the other powers, restrained as a firebrand and controlled as a danger pit. She is bound by protocols, conventions, treaties, ententes, alliances, contracts, rapproachments, agreements, that long ago annulled her powers as a free agent. China can read her recognition at all times, whether as empire or republic, as it is understood by her opponents, in the protocol of 1901 settling the Boxer war, in the commercial treaties of eleven and more powers, in the Anglo-Japanese and Franco-Russian offensive and defensive alliances of 1902 and 1905; in the Russo-Japanese understanding after the Russo-Japanese war, and particularly in the Russo-Japanese agreement of 1910 establishing in a fixed way special rights and spheres of influence, to say nothing of other political and financial compacts of the Manchurian allies and of the capitalistic allies. This recognition described by all the facts recorded and established therein, is not one that can be erased by a formality. There is nothing that the powers can do that will in any degree change China's situation; that is solely in the hands of China.
The Money Question.
Many Chinese and their sympathizers believe that recognition will enable the Republic of China to get money and that it will place China in a position of vantage free from the exactions and the leading strings of the powers. The questions of recognition and money in China, are not one and the same, but there is a connection between them. It is a political connection, and as politics between China and the money-lending powers is in the hands of the powers, it is impossible for China to use the question of recognition exclusively for her own advantage to get money. From the moment large sums of money such us China requires are accepted by her, recognition must necessarily follow, urged on by those foreign financial, commercial, and other interests that stand to benefit by marketing the bonds or in China's spending the loans, and in which a favored position in Chinese eyes is of prime importance. American commercial interests have already taken this position.
In these ways the question of recognition of the Government of the Flowery Republic is connected with that of loans. China's future as a territorial entity, and a nation, is, therefore, not a question of recognition so much as finance. It is because it is so largely one of finance and of credit that the future appears as hopeful as it does. The revolution has had no power to affect the basis of China's credit, namely, the docility and industry of the people, the social persistence of the Chinese race, the assets of great natural resources in the country, and the fact that China is in the hands of the great powers. Whatever her political fate may be, these bases of credit remain the same. Even before the spectre of partition that has been steadily moving across China she can say to the creditor and investor, "The great powers become more extensively and securely my guarantors."
Working Out China's Destiny.
China's chances to work out her destiny are by no means bad. There is an idea that China has grown old and that her civilization is in decay whereas, under the system which she developed in the past, she has reached the pinnacle of earthly glory so far as she has ever known earthly glory. After the Mongols extinguished the powers of conquest in western Asia, China was free to absorb the so-called barbarian tribes remaining on her borders, and she steadily grew and progressed until she is larger, greater, more prosperous than ever before, exhibiting a greater proportion as well as a larger number of contented if not happy human beings than are to be found elsewhere on the globe. At the outset of her revolution she is at her zenith under a matchless though ancient and obsolete system, and is ready to make a new and more rapid advance. She has a full appreciation of her past and has received great gifts from the West. This is to her the true Golden Age, and a proper use of her powers and resources can make of her that political unity and potential political terror which now seems absolutely essential to her political survival, her reinstatement in the world.
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