Only a Miracle Will Avert War.

New York Times 100 years ago today, October 6, 1912:
Special Cable to The New York Times.
    LONDON, Oct. 5— War in the Balkans is to-day regarded as almost a certainty. Only one of those miracles which Emperor Francis Joseph is reported to have said diplomats are able to work can prevent the outbreak, and the difficulties in the path of the peacemakers are tremendous.
    How far the diplomats themselves share Francis Joseph's opinion may be gauged by the reference which Premier Asquith made to the situation in his speech at Ladybank, Scotland, to-day and by the interview obtained by M. Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, by the Paris Temps.
    Mr. Asquith, while saying that he had not yet lost all hope that the unspeakable calamity of war might be averted, declared it had been a long time since the international horizon wore so clouded and threatening an aspect.
     M. Sazonoff stated that the risks of war in the Balkans was a matter which defied forecast, and in regard to which extreme reserve was necessary. He went on:
    "I do not wish to make any prophecies, but shall express my thoughts by saying that we shall find ourselves in the presence of a definite result in the three days immediately before us. Europe has found herself and is making a loyal attempt to prevent war. If that effort, in spite of all, remains insufficient, it is permissible to state that a feeling of one's duty will guide the chancellories. The peace of Europe finds a strong guarantee in this unanimity."
    The war fever has now seized the Turkish people, who are as anxious to try conclusions with the Balkan league as the Bulgarians, Servians, Montenegrins, and Greeks are to attack their Moslem foe.
    Exactly what effect the signature of peace between Italy and Turkey would have upon the situation is a matter of varied conjecture, but one result seems certain: that the Turkish Government, having lost Tripoli, would be little likely to abandon Macedonia.
    Undoubtedly the fact that Turkey was already engaged in one war counted in the calculations of the Balkan league. Such naval operations as peace with Italy would enable the Turks to undertake are not, however, very formidable, nor could the troops released from Tripoli be brought into play for a considerable period, so the altogether complete success of the negotiations is unlikely to exercise much sobering effect on the league's ardor for war.
    The chances are also against the diplomats of the great powers. The eleventh-hour move by France is generally believed to have been made too late. To-day is the anniversary proclamation of Bulgarian independence as a kingdom four years.ago, and the coincidence may be sufficient to precipitate hostilities.
    Servia also is wrought to the highest pitch of warlike enthusiasm.

Promises Will Not Suffice.
    The league will not rest content with promises of reform from Turkey, which on its side has demonstrated by its note to the powers, reserving freedom of action, that it is in no tolerant mood.
    Consequently, while the great powers desire to maintain peace, the practical steps taken to preserve it are not thought at the present writing to be likely to prove effective. The chief hope left in diplomatic action is that it will succeed in localizing the war.
    Some doubt is expressed, however, as to the good basis for the report that M: Sazonoff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister, have arrived at complete accord. The conflicting Austrian and Russian interests in the Balkans point to an ultimate clash. The Balkan confederation was, in a sense, the creation of Russia, and Russia, after her war with Turkey, proposed a much larger distribution of territory among the States than was ultimately conceded under the Berlin treaty. Autonomy for Macedonia was a point included in the confederation of the Balkan States which was disliked by Austria, which objects to seeing a solid block of territory, probably under Russian influence, placed across her path to Salonica.

Danger, Whatever the Outcome.
    General as are the assurances that the war, if it begins, will be localized, they do not apply to the real danger point in the general European situation. Suppose war comes and the victory rests with Turkey, as some experienced soldiers, like Gen. Von Der Goetz, the German strategist, and Gen. Sir Alfred Turner believe will be the case. Will the status quo, which is the only policy upon which the great powers can now really agree, be possible?
    On the other hand, in case Turkey was worsted, Great Britain could not view with equanimity any serious curtailment of the Ottoman dominions, particularly if it was made in such fashion as would meet with the acceptance of Austria by not balking the latter's ambitions in the direction of Salonica.
    The British attitude in the present situation is causing no little conjecture. Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, would seem to have washed his hands of the business when he bade good-bye to M. Sazonoff at Balmoral. At any rate, it is matter of wide comment that Sir Edward is not at Downing Street in these critical days, but is rusticating in Northumberland. Great Britain, it is officially announced, is entirely agreed with France and Russia in the policy in preventing the war, if possible, and localizing it if it starts. Beyond this is nothing.
    Surprise is expressed over the fact that England is not taking the lead in the action of the powers. In some quarters it is suggested that Sir Edward is pursuing a policy of "masterly inactivity." In other words, he is watching events with the idea, if not the hope, that they may so develop as to bring about a conflict between certain great powers, which might be to John Bull's advantage. With Austria and her ally, Germany, at loggerheads with Russia over the Balkans, Great Britain might fish in troubled waters with profit, argue some observers.

Germans Suspect England.
    While such suspicions of Sir Edward exist at home, it is not surprising that they should prevail in other countries.
    A Berlin dispatch says:
    "The impression has taken firm root in Berlin that Great Britain is blocking collective action by the powers. It seems to be based chiefly on allegations to that effect, emanating from Paris.
    "The German press has promptly identified itself with them and with the reasons advanced for Great Britain's alleged attitude, namely the desire not to jeopardize her newly-won position in Constantinople by espousing any action, injurious to Turkish amour propre, or doing anything which would in any way offend the susceptibilities of the millions of Moslems who are British subjects.
    "Paris dispatches, emphasizing Great Britain's reluctance and lukewarmness, are reprinted conspicuously in tonight's papers, together with the detail that Sir Edward Grey's retirement to the country, instead of remaining in Downing Street, is additional evidence of British indifference to the peace action of the powers."
    In this connection it is worth noting that M. Sazonoff in the Temps interview was quoted on this point as follows:
    "I will further express my opinion by saying that, whatever the risks of to-morrow, to-day the Franco-Russian alliance and the Triple Entente are perfectly ready to fill the pacific role for which they have been formed, and by which the triplice is animated."
    It may seem like hair splitting to discern in this remark any differentiation between the action of the Franco-Russian alliance and the action of the Franco-Russo-British entente, but it is argued that diplomacy is addicted to these fine shades of meaning.
    The diplomatic correspondent of The Sunday Observer admits a remarkable change in the attitude of the British Government, which is favorable to the Cabinet of Ghazi Mukhtar, and which fears the interference of the powers may bring back to power the Committee of Union and Progress.
    This authority argues that the representations, which the powers will make to Turkey and the Balkan States, form a collective note, which, owing to the diverse interests of the signatory powers, will be necessarily vague and inefficient Consequently he thinks there is little ground for optimism.

Russia's Move Significant.
    An interesting statement is made regarding the strategic importance of the Russian mobilization in Poland. By it the period which Russia would require, in the event of a German attack on France, to bring the Western armies of Russia into contact with Germany is reduced by half.
    The German plan of campaign, decided upon after the recent increase of the German Army to twenty-five corps, is to hurl an overpowering force direct at the heart of France, while using an auxiliary army to make a subordinate attack through Belgium, or simply to occupy French attention on the east while the enormous main invasion burst through Belgium into Northern France. If possible, Germany would use practically the whole of their twenty-five array corps against the twenty corps of the French army. That is, the German general staff calculates on being able to strike France with practically the entire German army before Russia can co-operate with her French ally by invading Germany's eastern frontier. This German plan could be carried out in fifteen days, while Russia would require thirty days to place a dozen corps on the German frontier. Thus a crushing blow might be delivered to France before it was necessary to guard against Russian danger on the eastern frontier.
    The German plan, according to an authority responsible for these details, has been vitally affected by the Russian mobilization in Poland, previous even to any threat of hostilities.
    That such matters have been discussed is evidence of the pessimistic views taken of the professed intention of the great powers to build a ring fence around the Balkan States and let the combatants fight it out, if they cannot be prevented from fighting at all.

Speculating on First Move.
    With hostilities in the Balkans much less remote, the military experts have ample latitude to speculate as to what will be the character of the operations in the southeastern peninsula. The consensus of opinion is that the first contest will be in Thrace, between Turkey and Bulgaria, and not in Macedonia, as the other Balkan kingdoms will count for little at the outset.
    The objective of the Bulgarian army will be Adrianople, which will be a sufficiently tough nut to crack. Adrianople is within thirty miles of the Bulgarian frontier. It has a most extensive series of fortifications, including over fifty works, some of them of considerable size.
    After Adrianople the main defense of the Turks is the famous lines of Chatalja, about 23 miles west of Constantinople, which extend from the sea of Marmora to the Black Sea and cannot be turned. This is the view of Col. Repington, the military correspondent of The London Times.
    Another expert, who fought as a volunteer in various Balkan wars, says:
    "The main movement of the Bulgarian army must be to dash southward to cut off Salonica from Adrianople. Part of the Bulgarian army will mask Adrianople, refusing battle until compelled, while the larger part will strike from Phillipoppolis toward Djuria and Seres.
    "Three-fourths of the Greek army will be concentrated in Thessaly and will simultaneously make for Elassona, the headquarters of Turkish troops in Turkish Thessaly.
    "The Greek fleet will bombard Salonica, and the single line of railway by which Turkey feeds her Macedonian troops will be cut. The Macedonian army will then be left to its own resources in an unfriendly country, where every non-Osmanli villager will be either an armed guerilla or a wandering spy.
    "The Macedonian army is largely recruited from the warmer climes of Anatolia and unaccustomed to the severities of a Balkan Winter. It has been worried and harassed for months past by the continuous trouble with Albanians and the Bulgar guerillas, and now, attacked in full force by the fresh and enthusiastic Servian army, it will be gradually demoralized and defeated in detail.
    "The Turkish troops at Salonica and Elassona will have to fight the Greeks on the west and south and the Bulgars on the north and east. No reinforcements can reach them, if the preliminary move of cutting the railway is accomplished, till the Adrianople army corps, which alone can be reinforced from Constantinople and Asia Minor, has decisively defeated the main Bulgarian army.
    "Everything turns upon this, and probably the only great pitched battle of the war will be fought somewhere to the north or northwest of Adrianople, probably at Mustapha Pasha.
    "What will be happening in Epirus meanwhile? Well, had it not been for the restraint of the great powers, Greece would have occupied Janina in 1897. German strategists condemned Turkey's utter inability to defend Epirus in 1897 as the principal weakness of Edhem Pasha's dispositions.
    "The whole population from the Gulf of Arta up to Janina is enthusiastically pro-Greek, and with a few Greek gunboats keeping the Turkish fortress of Prevesa busy. It should not need more than 10,000 Greek troops to occupy Turkish Epirus, or at least up to Janina."
    As already stated, this optimistic view of the Balkan league's prospects is not shared by many military experts.