If War Came It Would Find Us Sadly Unprepared.

New York Times 100 years ago today, March 9, 1913:
Major Gen. Leonard Wood Points Out What He Considers the Shocking Present Military Weakness of the United States.However, the Army Is Rapidly Approaching Real Efficiency After Lessons Learned from Texas Mobilization.By Edward Marshall.
     The army of the United States is rapidly approaching real efficiency, according to the man who knows best — Major Gen. Leonard Wood. This is definitely good news at this particular time, when so many dire possibilities are known to lie concealed in the unfortunate conditions now existing in the country to the south of us, for various of the well-informed have expressed the firm opinion that Mexican intervention would be an infinitely more difficult task than the light-hearted American public seems to fully realize.
    Our army has not been in an ideal condition. When the announcement of the mobilization at San Antonio was unexpectedly put upon the wires two years ago, consternation reigned throughout the force, as Gen. Wood and others deeply interested in the experiment had been sure it would. The troops dribbled into San Antonio confused and worried; some of them never got there; those which did arrive were not always well equipped.
    Since then much has been done. That much remains to be accomplished is a certainty, but the improvements which already have been worked seem almost magical to any one who understood the sorry situation of two years since. Some time ago — indeed, well before Mr. Taft had left the White House and Mr. Wilson had gone in — I had a talk with Major Gen. Leonard Wood, the Chief of Staff, upon this subject. Of course, he would not speak of Mexico at all. But in a general way he granted that, despite improvements in the situation since the San Antonio manoeuvres showed the world a sight so utterly unworthy of us, we remain a nation utterly unprepared for war.
    "The United States has never proved itself as a military power," said Gen. Wood. "I called attention in The Times, some months ago, to the fact which military men do not forget, but which civilians do not remember, that the United States has never fought a war with any first-class power prepaired for war, save when it had assistance of great value, as when France helped us in the Revolution, or when the enemy was simultaneously engaged in other warfare. During our second war with England she was weakened by the fact that she was at the same time warring with Napoleon. The two other wars which we have fought successfully have been with powers not of the first class—Mexico and Spain. "Our civil war showed that our men, both of the North and South, can fight when trained — and that war trained them. But we did not take advantage of the training. Though the war had given us what might have been constructed into an organized re serve of from 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 men, we thought little of it, and let it die as the men died or became old. It was a valuable military asset for, say, twenty years after the war ended; its value is now gone, or practically gone, while the responsibilities of the Nation have enormously increased, with a consequent increase in its liability to war.
    "Outside conditions on this Continent, including the Panama Canal, have greatly altered our relations to the world at large. While I would be the last to say that we are more exposed to war than we have been, I feel it a real duty to repeat my statements of the definite necessity for readiness. "War with a first-class power would call for the immediate mobilization of about 600,000 men. Our regular army includes not more than one-tenth that number, and the needs of the Coast Artillery absorb one-third of these. From our militia we could not expect to draw more than 80,000 well-trained troops. This would leave us, in event of war, with a shortage to exceed 450,000 troops, and of not less than 15,000 officers. We are too intelligent a people to long tolerate a situation of that sort, after we are once aware of it. "i cannot too emphatically state that at the present moment there is no especial reason to expect an early war, but wars come suddenly in these days. "Nations have no time in which to train their men to fight after it becomes apparent that a conflict is inevitable. The Nation which feels real security must have trained men ready for emergencies. Seventeen days after the recent declaration of war in Europe an attacking party had gone 70 miles beyond the hostile frontier — and the issue was practically settled. "We have done the best we could with the material which we have had at hand, but it is a matter of plain common sense and sound financial judgment to emphatically better the existing situation, a task which lies easily within our power. In the army, as it stands. we have made various improvements. "We have so districted the country that we have in each department a tactical division — which is a distant advance in general efficiency, although the divisions are not, in all instances, complete. There are now four departments, each containing certain complete brigade units. The regiments, of course, are at peace strength, about 850 men, against the war strength of 1,900 men. Each division has its complete divisional cavalry, one regiment; but we lack sufficient field artillery to give each division the two regiments with which each should he supplied. This would require eight regiments, and we have four and a half."
    "You consider that a serious matter?"
    "Our shortage in this arm is our most serious military deficiency today. We now make it up, as well as we can, by using the artillery of the organized militia. Under the plan of organization which was recently approved by the President we are in a position to point out deficiencies which exist in our divisions and to ask Congress to provide the units now necessary to complete each division, whatever they may be. That is to say, we now have a definite organization to complete.
    "If this plan should be carried out and the missing units be supplied, we would have in the United States four military divisions, one of cavalry and three of infantry, one division divided between Honolulu and Panama and the equivalent of one division in the Philippine Islands.
    "In other words, we now have a well-outlined frame on which an efficient army may be built along logical and scientific lines. Brought up to war strength, a division amounts to 20,000 men, in round numbers, divided between nine regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, two regiments of field artillery, and the auxiliary troops, consisting of the signal troops, engineers, medical corps, &c. The division organized upon the peace basis includes about 11,000 men. Under the plan now in process of being worked out our foreign garrisons are to be at war strength at all times. This already is the case in the Philippine Islands, and we are gradually bringing it about in the Hawaiian Islands."
    I asked the General about transport. " We are fairly well equipped with ordinary regimental trains," said he, "suitable for the regular regiments at peace strength. In case of war we would have to go into the market and buy extensively to provide both wagon and pack trains, but in the United States this material is always quickly available. We have studied motor trucks and should use them as extensively as possible for any war which might occur within the boundaries of our own country. We are continually trying new ones out, and have found some of them very satisfactory. We are not at present properly equipped with them, however, and should require an additional supply."
    "Would not the sudden necessity for moving the army calamitously interfere with the ordinary activities of the railways? Would it generally tie up commercial freight shipments on the lines most seriously involved?"
    "No," said the General. "Our regular army is so small that it and its equipment might be handled, even at the crucial time when crops are being moved, without seriously affecting the conduct of the Nation's business. The movement of the regular army of the United States would present a smaller problem to the railways than is presented to the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad at the time, for instance, of a Yale-Harvard football game."
    I asked about the Medical Corps, which was so disorganized in Cuba and which showed such wonderful improvement at San Antonio.
    "The Medical Corps is now all right," said Gen. Wood, who, through the fact that he himself had a physician's training, has naturally been especially interested in its development and is particularly competent to gauge the measure of its progress. "The policy of bringing into the medical reserve as officers large numbers of physicians of high standing in civil life has been very effective. At present we can draw upon a large list of very competent medical men, all to some extent familiarized with military necessities and equipped and otherwise ready to meet most military manoeuvres. The supplies are ample and of the highest quality and in accordance with the latest knowledge. No declaration of war, no matter how sudden, could find the regular army in a state even approximating in its medical unpreparedness that which was revealed at the time of the Spanish war's outbreak. Indeed, the medical department of the regular army is in really good shape to meet emergencies."
    "And the Quartermaster's department and the commissary?"
    "These two departments and the pay corps have now been combined in one department, and so the delays incident to their old organization could not again mar their work. In the days of the Spanish war little or no systematic organization existed.
    "What steps toward the organization of a reserve have already been taken?"
    "The new law gives us a seven-year enlistment — four years with the colors and three years in the reserve, with a  chance to pass to the reserve in three years. This is obviously the reverse of what it should be. The period of service in the reserve should be twice the period of active service. But we have secured the recognition of the necessity of a reserve, and that is the great thing."
    I asked the General how the new plan proposes to make use of the National Guard in time of war.
    "Nothing could be more striking than the general improvement which during recent years has occurred among State troops," he answered. " Participation by selected National Guard officers in the manoeuvres of the regular army has spread interest and definite military knowledge among National Guardsmen and brought the regular and the civilian soldiery of the country into a very desirable contact. They now know each other and respect each other, and the respect will grow as knowledge grows. Nothing could be more desirable.
    "Very great improvements have been worked in general army organization. At the time of the latest manoeuvres the department needed to send out but one order to the division commander, which was:
    " 'Move your division.'
    "The only other order from headquarters was that requiring the camp to be put in readiness. Under the old system a similar movement of troops would have required thirty or forty orders from headquarters, with all the complications which such a multiplication of commands implies."
    "Do you look forward to a policy of friendliness toward the army under the new Administration?"
    "Yes. The Democratic Party has not shown itself unfriendly to necessary military measures in the past, so why should any one now expect it to be hostile to them? It is well to remember that our present seacoast defense system was started by Secretary Endicott, and the board known as the Endicott Board, and that the new navy was begun during Grover Cleveland's Administration, while William C. Whitney was Secretary of the Navy. I am inclined to believe that the Nation as a whole more intelligently understands the real necessity for military preparedness than it has before at any time since the civil war.
    "Instruction camps will play a large part in our military scheme in future, as they now do in European countries.
    "The advantage of giving the militia training in instruction camps, if it can be arranged so that the militia can participate in them, is too obvious to dwell upon. "Our brigades, as now stationed, are not as closely gathered as we would like to have them, but we shall do all we can to get the elements of brigades within easy marching distance of each other, so that we may assemble them at a minimum of cost, for practical instruction, during several months of the Summer. Assuming that we have good officers as instructors, we may feel sure that the working of our militia soldiers with their professional brethren will be genuinely effective. Nothing more, remarkable has been recorded in our military development than the betterment of the last few years in the earnestness and ability of our militia officers.
    "It is planned to hold the various instruction camps each in a different place, so that each will present a problem differing from that of all the others, based upon the country in which the operations are conducted and simulating those of actual warfare. Each commanding officer will be held responsible for the development of his own unit. We are endeavoring to make sure that every infantry officer shall know what a good infantry soldier ought to be, and so in all branches of the service; that every Captain shall be really aware of the highest company requirements and generally capable of bringing up his men to meet them; that every Major shall be fully cognizant of a battalion's ultimate of merit, and so on, the Colonels for their regiments, and thus up to the highest officer in the army.
    "We are, however, endeavoring not to prepare the instruction orders in too great detail. We never want an officer to stop his individual thinking, or to believe that his superiors, whoever they may be, are doing his thinking for him. The efficiency of an army depends very largely upon the efficiency of each unit in it.
    "In the regular army we have arranged to assign recruits to the various regiments twice annually, which will enable each organization to give its new men systematic training. They will be able to advance in classes, so to speak. By the old system of sending men to their commands as they enlisted the same general disadvantages accrued as would come to a public school which took in pupils whenever they chanced to come along and worked on them as individuals, without the advantages coming with classwork. This has been a big move toward efficiency.
    "We have also relieved line officers of a great deal of the 'paper work' with which they hitherto were burdened, and this has made it possible to throw upon them a far greater burden of the work which line officers are properly supposed to do.
    "Nothing could be more important than to impress upon the country the great truth that nothing in the world can, in the defense of the country, take the place of the able-bodied man, upon his feet, with his gun in his hands and ammunition in his belt.
    "A population desiring peace, but remembering the advice of Washington that the best way to secure peace is to be prepared for war and sufficiently instructed in the art of the soldier to be ready to serve efficiently when the rights of the country are attacked, is a nation's best defense and safeguard. This principle is illustrated in the general training and instruction of the male population of European countries, given them with the minimum of interference with their economic career.
    "Their efficiency in dally life has been greatly increased by it, and the country has grained, not lost, by that training. Their respect for law and order is greater and their civic discipline is better. What we want here is the instruction of a sufficient number of men to properly discharge the duties of soldiers in case war is forced upon us, and we want to give this instruction with a minimum of interference in their economic and industrial careers. We don't want militarism or a big standing army; we want reasonable preparedness in case of war. And seacoast defenses cannot be really effective without a mobile army to act as complement to them.
    "The functions of seacoast defenses are largely completed when the forts have once been built. This may sound like heresy and seem to indicate that I belittle them. Far from it. No man has for them a higher regard. The mere presence of seacoast defenses will prevent the bombardment of a city from the sea, and the fact that they protect a harbor will ever make that harbor a refuge for shipping or a fleet in time of need. We must have them. They are great protection, but they are not sufficient without a mobile army. They can scarcely be considered adequate defenses even of the cities which they guard, save as they are considered as auxiliaries to a mobile army. In the hypothetical attack on Boston, during the manoeuvres of 1909, we landed a large army beyond the reach of the city's coast-defenses, and walked into Boston by the backdoor, as it were. The forts could not prevent that. Only a mobile army could. Seacoast defenses cannot possibly defend unless there also are the men with guns to walk around and fight when comes the time for fighting, yet without them the men with guns, the mobile army, could not prevent bombardment of the city or the destruction of the merchant-fleet, which had gone for refuge to its harbor. The Coast Artillery Corps is the most complete branch of the army to-day.
    "When the foreign garrisons are completed — that is, the forces in the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands and at Panama — about sixteen regiments of infantry, about three-and-a-half regiments of field artillery, and about ten regiments of cavalry, will be left at home. We shall be very short of field artillery and infantry. This shortage can be made up only by the creation of new organizations or dependence on the State Militia, which would leave this force without necessary equipment if called out. "The department has saved a good many regiments for service in the home territory of the United States by filling up to maximum, or war strength, those organizations stationed abroad, for if we tried to supply the garrisons we contemplate in Panama and Hawaii and to maintain our present strength in the Philippines with regiments maintained at peace strength, we should, under our present plan, have practically no infantry left for home service." After our talk had ended I did a little figuring, with this result: Gen. Wood expressed the opinion that the home forces ought to be brought up to four divisions of nine regiments each, three of infantry and one of cavalry. This would require the addition to our present forces of eleven regiments of infantry and the increase of our present four and a half regiments of field artillery to eight regiments, which would be required to adequately complement three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry and leave some for the reserve. Under the present plan we have eleven and a half regiments of cavalry in the United States, of which three would be required as divisional cavalry. Thus, we have cavalry enough for one cavalry division and an independent brigade, but are left with a sad shortage of infantry and field artillery.
    I asked the General to tell me something of the plans which now are before Congress.
    "The department has now before Congress a new volunteer law which would cost the country nothing and would enormously increase the efficiency of our volunteer system, besides greatly facilitating the enrollment of volunteers," he replied. "It has strongly urged the passage of this measure, and hopes to see it made into a law during the next session. It not only means economy, but an increase of efficiency. We are also anxious to materially increase the number of cadets to enter West Point annually. That institution is carrying a few more than 500 cadets, and could carry 700 at a very slight increase of expense, amounting, practically, only to the pay of the cadets. The place is there, the classes and instructors are there, everything is there for the accommodation of these additional military students. Not to have them there is a real waste. We need more officers from West Point in the army.
    "We are doing everything we can for the militia, sending to it the best men we can pick out of the regular army officers and trying to get the State troops to take up the same reserve idea for the militia which we have for the regular army. When we accomplish this the country will have ready for the call to arms a good body of reservists, reasonably well trained and ready to fill up the organization.
    "The necessity of this becomes apparent after a moment's consideration of the facts. If we were called to war to-morrow with a first-class power we_ would have to find 450,000 men and about 15,000 officers. Where could we get the latter or the former? At present we could not get them only by accepting a large body of raw men, utterly untrained. That method is not at all in keeping with the ideas of the times or with a proper regard for the lives and interests of our people.