New York Times 100 years ago today, May 17, 1913:
Capt. Sims Explains Why Theft of Plans Is Not Consequential.
Naval War College, Newport, R. I., May 15, 1913.
To the Editor of The New York Times:
Special dispatches from Washington of the 14th instant related the circumstances of the theft of "duplicate sets of battle fire-control plans" for the new battleship Pennsylvania.
Secretary Daniels stated that these plans "would be of no particular value to any one wishing to obtain naval information not generally made public." Notwithstanding this statement the Washington correspondents were very much alarmed, and declared that the department's statement seeks to minimize the importance of the theft; that important fire-control apparatus was contained in both sets of drawings; that they are of special value in the eyes of a naval expert, being "the brain and nerves of the fighting organism"; that such knowledge in the hands of the enemy's experts "would be fatal in almost any fight where the Pennsylvania might meet a vessel of anywhere near equal fighting power''; that "marksmen with such information would be able quickly to direct a shot that would disable the ship and make it impossible to direct her fire."
Judging from my experience of over six years as Inspector of Target Practice in helping to develop "the brain and nerves of the fighting organism," and two years in command of a battleship, I do not hesitate to say that the sensational assertions above indicated contain more errors to the square inch than I have ever before seen crowded into an equal space; for no matter how complete were the plans of the fire-control wiring, they would be, as Mr. Daniels states, of practically no value to an enemy. They might be of possible use in saving trouble in making out similar details for himself, but that they would in any sense aid an enemy in battle against the ship is wholly absurd, and for the following very simple reasons:
1. As a matter of ordinary every-day common sense, there are no wholly essential fire-control instruments or wiring in any battleships in the world that are not below the protective deck, under water, and behind very heavy armor.
2. All the exposed wires on the masts and elsewhere are aids to fire control, but are in no sense essential. They are for the purpose of facilitating and accelerating the transmission of orders, which orders can, however, be sent with nearly equal efficiency without them.
3. The wires necessarily extend nearly the entire length of the vessel, so that there can be no special vital point for the enemy to attack.
4. There are not, and never can be, marksmen possessing such supernatural powers as to "be able [with such information] quickly to direct a shot that would disable a ship and make it impossible for her to direct her fire."
5. Even supposing the marksmen to be entirely accurate in their aiming, and the fire-control officers to be equally accurate in their estimate of the distance, the speed and course of the enemy, the effect or wind, &c., there are no guns (including the powder, shell, rigidity of mount, accuracy of sights, &c.) capable of performing such a miracle of precision in shooting at battle ranges, that is, at distances of from five to six statute miles.
The fire-control wiring is in no proper sense the brain and nerves of the fighting organism. There is no part of it that can perform any of the functions of a brain. That is performed by the gray matter in the heads of the various officers concerned. The apparatus and the wiring are the tools they work with; and the public may rest assured that ships are not deliberately designed to have any essential part of these appliances hanging overboard. We are paying about $400 per ton for armor for the special purpose of protecting just such vital implements. An inspection of the plans would simply show the kind of tools we work with, but without a knowledge of how they were used they would not be very intelligible. But even it the enemy were in possession of this knowledge as to their use, it would not diminish in any degree the fighting power of our ship. The very worst that could result would be that the enemy might try to imitate our implements (assuming that he did not have better ones of his own) and thus be on equal terms in this respect — provided, of course, he were equally well trained.
Generally speaking, the fire-control apparatus in all navies is sufficiently well known. Nearly all the systems are articles of commerce. Such tangible objects cannot long be kept secret. Moreover, secrecy in respect or them is of little value at best. The only matters pertaining to battle efficiency of which secrecy is highly important are contained in the heads of our officers, that is, our methods of gunnery training, of controlling gun fire in action, of the results we are achieving, &c.; and these, to the frequently expressed and utter astonishment of foreign officers, are very fully explained in numerous articles that have been, and still are, appearing in the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute.
In so far as concerns the disappearance of the plans in question, we may safely conclude that it will be wise to proceed with the building of the Pennsylvania.
Probably the man who took the plans did not do so because he knew they would be useful to an enemy, but because they were stamped with the omnipresent word "Confidential." The function of this word is to screen vital information from the enemy, but the result of its use is more often to keep essential information from our own service. The word is, however, of the greatest use to naval and military attachés. Once upon a time one of the former came into my office and asked me to give him something to send to his Government. I passed him out a report that had been printed for general circulation. He said: "This is of no use to me; can't you stamp it 'Confidential'?" I did so, and he went away happy, saying: "They'll think I'm a hell of a fellow."
WILLIAM S. SIMS,
Captain, United States Navy.
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