Aeroplane's Value In War Is Proved.

New York Times 100 years ago today, December 6, 1912:
Gen. Wood and Other Officers Discuss Frederick Palmer's Dispatch to New York Times.
INTEREST IN NIGHT ATTACKS
Belief That French Have Given Special Study to Subject and That Allies Have Benefited by It.
Special to The New York Times.
    WASHINGTON, Dec. 5.— The summary of the military methods and results in the Balkan war which Frederick Palmer sent to The New York Times from Sofia last night was the subject of much comment among army officers here to-day. With few exceptions officers stationed in Washington have studied every move of the war from day to day, and hardly an office in the War Department is without its war map stuck full of red and blue pins indicating positions held by the contending forces.
    It is the first real war since the development of the aeroplane — "the first aeroplane war," as one officer expressed it — and on that account there is the liveliest interest in it. At the same time, to each specialist there is food for thought in what the various arms of the service on both sides are doing.
    The use of the night attack, the power of infantry in bayonet charges, the remarkable daring of cavalry in small detachments, and the value of modern artillery fire have each and all been discussed at length. Mr. Palmer's dispatch was read to-day by many who knew him in Cuba and the Philippines, and by some who gave him a close view of some sharp fighting.
    "The résumé," said Major Gen. Leonard Wood, Chief of Staff of the army, "is extremely interesting, coming from a man who is known as a most trustworthy war correspondent. His conclusions in regard to the aeroplane are of the first value. In a nutshell, it looks to me that throughout this Balkan war the efficiency of the aeroplane has been confined to scouting and dispatch carrying.
    "The one particular advantage of the aeroplane is its ability to pass over the enemy's lines, get in behind his front, and see where his troops are, where his supplies and ammunition trains are, and so work out almost mathematically just what his intentions are — look into his mind, as it were, and read his plans.
    "All that is in the domain of the military aviator, and it is work of the highest importance. As a fighting agency I doubt the aeroplane's value. It is true that considerable quantities of high explosives could be dropped from aeroplanes, but never. I think, with anything like accuracy. Cities might be set afire from aeroplanes when situated as Plevna was in the Russo-Turkish War, when the line of defense was far out from the city. In that case the aeroplane could be used to drop combustible substances and set fires where large quantities of ammunition or food supplies were stored, and so do great damage.
    "It is also conceivable that in a country where means of communication are bad dispatches and even messengers might be carried by aeroplanes when they could not be carried by any other means. It is conceivable that in some situation of great stress the aeroplane might be used to carry an officer to a command that was separated by mountains or water and in need of a skilled and expert commander. There were many lessons for us in the Russo-Japanese War, and there will be many in this war when we finally are in possession of full and accurate information of movements, and can get some idea of the strategy of what has been perhaps the shortest and most remarkable campaign in history."
    Brig. Gen. Enoch Crowder, Judge Advocate General of the army, was pleased to read Mr. Palmer's conclusions as to the distinctive causes, of the success of the allies in the Balkan war. Gen. Crowder was one of the American military observers in the Russo-Japanese war.
    "I have been separated from active military duty and so busy with the work of the Judge Advocate General's office since 1904 that I am not prepared to talk of the Balkan campaign." said Gen. Crowder. "I fully appreciate, from what little I have been able to read of the operations in Turkey, the force of the conclusions in Mr. Palmer's dispatch. He is a man who always strives to get the fullest information, and he is an accurate observer. I remember on more than one occasion how he chafed at the difficulties encountered in getting news during the Russian-Japanese war.
    "I could not make any very valuable comparisons between the methods in this war and the Russian-Japanese war. The use of the aeroplane has greatly increased the value of scouting and has demonstrated that wars hereafter must include expert aviation as a most important factor. The mention of night attacks recalls how signally the Japanese employed this method of fighting. We concluded that their army had been specially trained for it.
    "How far other armies had taken up the matter we have not known. In our own army, I imagine, but little has been done. It seems possible that the French have given that form of fighting special study, and that the allies have had the benefit of it, with some substantial training of their troops. The Russian-Japanese war was really fought in the night. It is clear that there is a great advantage in it if one side has had training and the other has not." " We have studied this war from the beginning with great pains because of the use of the aeroplane," said Brig. Gen. James Allen, Chief Signal Officer of the army. "I think the operations amount to a demonstration of the value of aeroplane scouting. In connection with cavalry the aeroplane is a most important agency in planning movements of troops. The information that the military aviator can get of an enemy's position and intended movements adds vastly to the effectiveness of small detachments of troops, either cavalry or infantry, at strategic points. I fancy the results do not make it entirely clear that the aeroplane can be used for fighting purposes.
    "The Signal Corps Aviation School at College Park, Maryland, conducted a few experiments in automatic gun firing and dropping of projectiles from aeroplanes. An automatic machine gun was fired from an aeroplane on the College Park field, demonstrating the possibilities of aeroplanes for offensive warfare. This was the first case known of the use of a machine gun from heavier-than-air flying machines. Other experiments have been conducted there with various signaling systems and a device for dropping explosives. Later this device was taken to Europe, where it won the first prize in the competition conducted by the French Army, the winning record being 12 out of 15 projectiles (15 pounds each) hitting a target 60 feet in diameter from an altitude of 656 feet; also 8 hits out of 15 on a target 125 by 375 feet from an altitude of 2,624 feet."
    Lieut. Col. Henry T, Allen of the Cavalry Section of the General Staff said:
    "From the information received, not as definite as it should be, we have learned that the Bulgarian cavalry has in large measure accomplished its share of the indispensable duties of warfare by its clever screening, its reconnaissances far to the front of the main army, and, above all, by seizing and holding strategic positions that had important bearings on the campaign.
    "On one occasion in the recent campaign the Bulgarian cavalry got behind the Turkish lines and seized an important place, Cereskeoz, and held it effectively, thus making a splendid demonstration of the value of cavalry in securing strategic positions. War experience in this respect has but confirmed what peace manoeuvers have indicated for many years — notably so our own manoeuvers in Connecticut last Summer.
    "Aeroplanes are now a valuable asset in reconnaisance, and should, when a greater degree of perfection is reached, be a most valuable aid in supplementing cavalry in one of its highly important rôles. I am not surprised that Frederick Palmer, who is an unusually capable war observer, reports that Bulgarian troopers were kept busy guarding communications, acting as a screen, and enveloping the enemy's infantry.' "