An Unprepared Nation.

New York Times 100 years ago today, December 10, 1912:
Army's Chief Says War Would Find Us Pitiably Weak.
War Department.
Office of the Chief of Staff. Washington, Dec. 7, 1912.
To the Editor of The New York Times:
    I would bring to the attention of the American public through The Times the military policy which the War Department has indorsed relative to the distribution of our army with a view to its strategic stationing and its economical maintenance; the necessity for a reserve of trained men sufficient to fill up to full strength our regular army; the desirability of a similar reserve for the militia composed of men who have served in the militia and are considered qualified; and the need of military instruction in our higher schools and colleges — in other words, a rational preparation of our citizens for the discharge of their moral and constitutional military obligations.
    The United States has not yet engaged in a war with a first-class power prepared for war, except under circumstances in which the United States received valuable assistance at a critical time from a friendly nation, as from France in the War of the Revolution, or when her opponent has been engaged in war with another nation or nations, as was the case with our second war with England, England at that time being engaged in a great struggle with Napoleon. People as a rule do not realize this fact; they are prone to consider our wars with Great Britain as easy victories, and to forget that the arrival of the French land forces and the co-operation of the French fleet were vital factors in bringing to a favorable conclusion the War of the Revolution. They are generally uninformed as to the real facts of our second war with Great Britain. The war on land, taken as a whole, was disastrous.
    The war with Mexico was successfully conducted, but it was not a war with a first-class power. The war with Spain was a war with a country even less prepared than ourselves. During the civil war both the North and the South developed splendid troops, but it took a relatively long period to do so. The development took place on each side more or less uniformly, so that neither side had at any time a force greatly superior in training and experience to the other. This, however, was a war among ourselves, and has little to do with such wars as may occur between ourselves and a first-class power. It did result in one thing, however. It gave us an unorganized reserve of from 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 men trained in the best of all schools — the school of war. This reserve we thought little about at the time, but it formed a most valuable military asset for approximately twenty years after the war. In other words, we had during this period in the population a sufficient  number of trained men to fill up our army and form so strong a volunteer force that any country would have hesitated to engage in war with us.
    This condition has entirely passed away. The responsibilities of the country have greatly increased, owning or holding territory in various parts of the world, and its liabilities of war have been greatly increased; but we have made no adequate preparation to meet them, and until recently no legislative attempt has been made to provide for building up a reserve. Undeveloped military resources are about as valuable in the crisis of sudden war as would be undeveloped gold mines in a Wall Street crisis.
    When it is remembered that in time of war with a first-class power it will be necessary to mobilize about 600,000 men; and when one remembers that the regular army in this country in all probability will not exceed 60,000 men, of whom 20,000 are coast artillery immobilized in the various fortifications, and that the militia could at best furnish not more than 75,000 or 80,000 fairly well instructed troops, and that we should have to raise not less than 450,000 men and not less than 15,000 officers, it will be seen that something must be done in time of peace, and that it is folly to drift along lacking the moral courage to face the problem squarely and prepare to meet it in a rational manner. Throwing it aside with the declaration that there will be no more war, or if war comes somehow or other, we don't know how, we will get through it successfully, is an ostrich-like policy, little in keeping with the intelligence of our people.
    Our lack of a military policy and absence of general military instruction have not operated to reduce our criminal rate; our murders are several times heavier than those of the so-called military powers of Europe. We cannot assume that this is due to an inherent moral superiority of these people. There must be something in the conditions under which these people live, and it is not unreasonable to think the higher regard for law and order is due, in part at least, to the instruction and training which the men of these countries have received in the military service. Nor is it believed that they have lost anything in an economic way. It is generally conceded by those familiar with the subject that the generally short military instruction, with its physical setting-up, its instruction in personal hygiene, in the prevention of disease, its instillation of habits of obedience and respect for authority and the flag, and the habit of doing things WHEN, and AS, told, has resulted in a very decided economic gain through this improvement in all-around efficiency. Again only those who have seen it can appreciate the wonderful force toward tying people together and making a nation of them which results from their all having something to do in common, especially when this something is a period of training which fits them to play their part properly in the defense of their country.
    Switzerland, through her system of military calisthenics in her schools and gradual leading up to military instruction, is enabled to give thorough military instruction to all her men, with a very slight temporary interference with their economic careers, which is more than compensated for by the resulting increase in their economic efficiency. There we have a nation where every man is thoroughly trained to discharge one of the most important duties of a citizen, viz., the duties of a soldier in time of war. This condition has been reached with little or no interference with his ordinary pursuits. With the exception of troops assembled for short concentrated periods of instruction, there are no troops constantly under arms. The officers, non-commissioned officers and instructors are constantly at work on various portions of the active army assembled for the purposes of instruction. Switzerland can turn out 220,000 men in forty-eight hours, and she has behind this body some 300,000 more who have been trained and are still of a military age. The whole establishment is maintained, for less than $6,000,000 per year. No people more law-abiding and self-respecting exist anywhere. Every Swiss takes pride in having received the training which will enable him to be of the most service to his country in case of war.
    This is a feeling which does not, unfortunately, exist in this country, and it is time we took some steps to cultivate it.
    I want to state most emphatically that we see at present no indications of war involving us. But we must judge the future by the past; and it is folly to talk about wars being over until we see that mankind has been thoroughly reconstructed, and that the necessities and ambitions of great peoples will be kept in abeyance when they can be gratified by the use of force, a force whose exercise is necessary to their expansion and development.
    With reference to the officers we shall need some 15,000 or more in addition to those of the regular army and militia. It is believed that this body of officers could be very largely secured through appointing each year as Second Lieutenants in the various line branches of the regular establishment 500 or 600 of the young men who graduate from those schools and colleges where officers of the regular army are detailed as military instructors. These young men would be appointed on the recommendation of these officers. When appointed they should receive the pay and allowances of Second Lieutenants, and be junior to other Lieutenants of the regular establishment. At the end of a year they would be discharged with a certificate of fitness, if qualified, for officers of volunteers or other new organizations. Service for a year would not greatly interfere with any young man's career, and he would leave the service materially better off. The work being done is in the line of a sound and rational preparation for a condition which we know, from the experience of the past, will some day inevitably confront us, one which we are at present unprepared for and one which, if we are not prepared for, will overwhelm us with disaster. Wars of to-day come suddenly, and no time is given for the preparation which should be made during time of peace. We do not want long service in the army. We want service long enough to instruct thoroughly the men who enlist. We then wish to replace them, holding them for a number of years in a reserve under conditions which will insure their not being called to the colors or otherwise disturbed as a result of their being reservists except in case of war, and for not to exceed ten days every two years for purposes of instruction.
    We can maintain, conservatively, ten reservists for what we can maintain one man on the active list, and it is a wholly unjustified waste of money to continue men indefinitely in the service or until retirement; then retire them on pay which runs, roughly speaking, from the pay of two to the pay of more than four young vigorous men in the first period of enlistment. This is the old system and one we are trying to get out of. It was all right as long as we had the Indian question and needed an army which partook more of the character of a police force than a modern military organization. Long service then was valuable so long as the men were physically fit. Men learned frontier conditions and the habits of the enemy they had to meet; but those conditions have passed away, and we are now confronted with the certainty at some time of a real war with a first-class power. We have never had such a one, and we should make reasonable and intelligent preparation while we have time. The preparedness which will result will be the strongest guarantee for peace.
    This is not a plea for universal military service. It is a plea for a much more widely spread system of military instruction and the building up of a reserve of men, officers and materiel so that we may be reasonably well prepared for the inevitable when it comes. In my own mind, however, there is no question but that a short period of military instruction, with its resulting increased respect for the flag, the constituted authorities and inevitable better observance of law and order, and the economic efficiency which would result therefrom, would tend to the general betterment and strengthening of the Nation.
                    LEONARD WOOD.