Military Lessons Taught By The War.

New York Times 100 years ago today, December 5, 1912:
Aeroplanes Cannot Yet Drop Bombs with Accurate Aim, Says Frederick Palmer.
CAVALRY IS STILL USEFUL
Advantage of Night Attacks — The Need of Providing Infantry with Intrenching Tools.
By FREDERICK PALMER.
Special Correspondent of The New York Times.
Special Cable to The New York Times.
    SOFIA. Dec. 4.— The news of the signing of the armistice was not known in Sofia till this morning, but had been generally anticipated. It has been a day of drizzling snow and rain. There are no signs of celebration of an event that probably means the end of the war, the triumph of the national cause, a territorial addition, and economic benefit for every individual in the future great development of the country. Such a calm attitude is disappointing to journalists who want to write about cheering crowds and excited men standing on tables in cafes and directing the singing of national songs, but there is nothing of the kind. There have been from 8,000 to 12,000 killed in the seven weeks' fighting, and people are considering the cost rather than a celebration, as every one has some relative at the front, and is waiting, in the absence of official lists, for letters to learn whether their relatives are alive or dead.
    Many superficially wounded, returning home on furloughs, bring the first news to their villages of comrades killed. One of these, with whom I talked on the way from Mustapha Pasha, explained how he had to tell two wives in his village of the death of their husbands.
    Now, after the conclusion of the armistice, we may consider the lessons, in view of accumulated facts and observations, of the first war with big masses of troops in a campaign of literally Napoleonic brilliancy accomplished with modern arms.
    The number of their casualties, which the Bulgarians consider a quite secondary matter, is not yet officially stated, but is generally estimated at between 50,000 and 75,000 killed and wounded — about one in six. This is a low ratio, owing to the small calibre of the Turkish Mauser bullet.
    The average man's first question is as to the result of the use of the aeroplane in a big war. Thirty aeroplanes of different types were located on the green pasture levels of the Maritza Valley. There were frequent flights both by Bulgarian officers and professional aviators who had military observers with them. The altitude was never lower than 1,000 feet, and usually between 1,200 and 1,500 feet, out of danger of rifle fire.
    One aeroplane, which went up 1,000 feet, received several bullets, but the results were not serious enough to compel it to descend. Its aviator was later killed by a mischance — a bad landing near the hangars.
    It was demonstrated that bombs dropped from aeroplanes readily set fire to a city or to large inflammable buildings, but could not be dropped with accuracy enough, keeping at safe heights from infantry fire, to hit battery positions or small bodies of troops. The results in reconnaissance work were not as sensational as has been reported in regard to some European manoeuvres, but were highly important. It was easy for the trained military observer, though not for the professional aviator, after familiarizing himself in a number of fights with the terrain, to detect new battery positions, infantry trenches, or any considerable number of troops in open country, though not under cover of trees or streets. Where a first flight leaves the observer in doubt as to the nature of an object, a return flight usually brings a definite conclusion. There were no aeroplanes with the army which fought its way to Tchatalja.
    Although so much has been heard of the work of the Creusot guns and the infantry, it should not be implied that the Bulgarian cavalry, on account of the paucity of its numbers relative to the whole force, was inactive or that anything occurred to show that cavalry has become a superfluous branch. There were no old-fashioned cavalry charges or sabre-to-sabre conflicts with the enemy's cavalry, but the Bulgarian troopers were kept very busy guarding communications, acting as a screen, and enveloping the enemy's infantry. Cavalry is still valuable in reconnaissances, for the aeroplane is unable to fly low because of its vulnerability.
    The advantage of night attacks owing to the confusion of the defenders' aim due to flashes of shell bursts and rifles was demonstrated, with such valorous troops as the Bulgarians. Though the Bulgarians fixed bayonets at 1,000 yards and the wisdom of their officers alone held the men back, relatively few soldiers ever came to actual bayonet attack. Those who did were the exception, but they proved that good bayonets and thorough bayonet drill are still important. When the contact came the Bulgarians had confidence in their training, while the Turks were clumsy. It was the difference between a good dueling swordsman and an amateur. Strategic points in a line will continue to be taken by the bayonet.
    European observers agree that the Bulgarian infantry in rushing positions in face of automatic rapid firers and before the enemy's batteries had been silenced or weakened performed prodigies of valor, which could hardly be expected of other European soldiers.
    The lessons for our country are the importance of a soldier carrying intrenching-tools ready for use in making cover, and the need of ample field artillery, so important in preparing a way for infantry attack. Artillery cannot be trained in a hurry.