The Nation's Fleet.

New York Times 100 years ago today, March 3, 1913:
Secretary Meyer Appeals for an Efficient Force on the Sea.
    The Secretary of the Navy,
    Washington, Feb. 28, 1913.
To the Editor of The New York Times:
    I would make the following statement to the American people through The New York Times about the needs of the navy:
    The battleship fleet should be maintained with twenty-one ships in the active fleet and twenty in the reserve fleet. Those in the active fleet should not exceed 10 years of age, and those between 10 and 20 years old should be placed in the reserve fleet. We should have four torpedo boat destroyers to every battleship, and in addition scout cruisers, submarines, supply ships, colliers, and minor auxiliary vessels.
    The building programme each year should be sufficient to replace those battleships which have reached 20 years of age, as all expert authorities consider them after that period obsolete and useless, even to the reserve fleet.
    As an example of our building programme as compared with that of Germany, on the completion of the Pennsylvania, just contracted for, the United States will have fourteen dreadnoughts and Germany will have twenty-six.
    In order to reduce expenditures needless navy yards should be abolished and sold.
    But in order that the fleet should be maintained at the highest efficiency and with the greatest economy it is important that the naval organization should be so established as to bring that about. It was with that object in view that changes were made during the present Administration.
    The changes made in naval organization during the present Administration are comparatively simple in principle, The former organization was not complete. For the performance of certain important duties no provision was made. Briefly, the defects of the organization were:
    (1) The lack of a branch dealing directly with the operation, or military use, of the feet.
    (2) The lack of an agency to aid the Secretary in co-ordinating the work of the department.
    (3) The lack of independent inspections.
    The sole reason for the existence of the naval establishment is the employment of effective power upon the sea. To this end the organization and administration of the department, the preparation of personnel and material, the navy yards and other subordinate units are, after all, only contributing agencies. The most important work of all is the organization and employment of the fleet. No bureau is charged with this military duty and it devolves on the Secretary himself. To remedy this defect, an experienced naval officer has been detailed to advise the Secretary in regard to these matters.
    The duties of the bureaus provide for the construction and maintenance of the ships and for their personnel. Under existing law the orders of the chiefs of bureaus are considered as emanating from the Secretary and have full force and effect as such. With this authority vested in several men, the necessity of some agency to harmonize and co-ordinate the work is apparent. The reports of various Secretaries of the Navy contain ample evidence of this need. To aid the Secretary in co-ordinating the work of the department four experienced naval officers have been detailed as aids and responsible advisers to the Secretary. These four aids, constituting a council, have no executive authority and serve in an advisory capacity.
    Independent inspection is essential to efficiency. Inspections should not be made by the branch that provides the object inspected. Formerly, reports as to failures of services or the material were almost always made to the branch responsible for the service or material, and dealt with by it — a manifestly unsound method. Independent inspections have been provided, and an aid advises the Secretary in regard to them.
    There is substantial agreement that the present organization of navy yards providing for a hull division and a machinery division is logical and sound. A question has been raised as to how far it is advisable to give seagoing officers responsibility for industrial work at the yards. In considering this question it is necessary to keep steadily in mind the ultimate object. That object is to maintain an efficient and effective force upon the sea. A battleship is in reality a large machine shop and is crowded with complex and intricate mechanical devices. Officers serving on board ship must operate the machinery, including auxiliaries of all kinds. Shop experience gives them familiarity with its construction and details, and enables them to act intelligently in maintaining it in good condition, and also to effect repairs. The practical experience on board ship offers opportunities for improvements in design. Vessels are expected to be as nearly self-sustaining as possible. In time of peace, this is an economy in the cost of repairs, and is at the same time a good training for war. In time of war it is as essential for a ship to be able to keep the seas as it was in the days of Nelson.
    Concrete cases may be cited to illustrate the value of shop training and mechanical knowledge. Just before the battle of Santiago, the Oregon had damaged one of her thirteen-inch guns during a bombardment. She received a signal from the Admiral that the damage could be repaired at Guantanamo, some miles to the eastward. The ordnance officer of the ship, who had had considerable shop experience, hearing of this signal, went to the Captain and informed him that the damage to the gun was being repaired, would be finished that night, and there was no occasion for the ship to leave her station. In consequence, the orders were revoked. If the ordnance officer had not had this shop experience, in all probability the Oregon would not have taken part in the battle of Santiago. Considering the part borne by the Oregon in the battle, and particularly her part in the pursuit and capture of the last ship of the Spanish fleet, who will measure in dollars and cents the value of this officer's shop training, or say how much less complete the American victory might have been had the Oregon been absent that day? It mattered little that we had many facilities at navy yards for the repair of this gun. The Oregon was engaged in the blockade of the Spanish fleet at Santiago and it was important that the ship remain at her station.
    In his official report of the battle of Santiago, Captain Philip, who commanded the Texas, calls especial attention "to the efficiency of the two turret guns, due to the alterations recently made by Lieut. F. J. Haessler, of this ship."
    During the cruise of the battleship fleet around the world, the starboard high-pressure cylinder of the Kansas was found in bad condition. Repairs were imperative, but the fleet was scheduled to leave Colombo in three days. The fleet had remained intact for one year, had made its runs on schedule time, and any failure in this fine record would have been a keen disappointment to the country, as well as to the officers of the fleet. The starboard engine was compounded, and the Kansas left with the fleet on schedule time. How the repairs to the main engines were effected at sea on the run from Colombo to Suez, the Kansas taking part in the daily tactical exercises of the fleet, and how successfully the work was accomplished is told in an interesting article in The Naval Institute for September, 1909.
    Seagoing officers have always had large responsibilities in industrial work at navy yards, with the exception of a period of ten months, from Feb. 1, 1909, to Dec. 1, 1909. After this experience the department restored to seagoing officers the participation in industrial work at navy yards which formerly obtained, but with a more logical organization.
            G. v. L. MEYER.