The Situation In Europe.

New York Times 100 years ago today, March 17, 1913:
    The Times's dispatches from the European capitals disclose a confused and obscure situation, involving some elements of the gravest importance, the final effect of which it is impossible to predict. The latest development in the Balkans is the announcement of the terms on which the allies propose to insist. They are extreme and the great Powers are reported to regard them as impossible. The points most criticised are the surrender to the allies of Scutari, which the Powers had intended to make the capital of the new State of Albania; the possession of a part of the coast of the Sea of Marmora, which would gravely affect the passage of the Dardanelles; and the payment of a heavy indemnity by Turkey, impairing the security for the Turkish debt held by the subjects of the Powers.
    Certainly there is nothing in the course of the war since the armistice was ended that sustains these demands. The only serious advantage won by the allies is the capture of Janina by the Greeks. Scutari still holds out. Adrianople maintains its heroic resistance, already longer than that which made the siege of Plevna famous. The lines of Tchatalja have not been broken. No substantial progress has been made in the occupation of the Peninsula of Gallipoli. All that we know of the operations of the allies is that their armies remain in the field. Their effective position has not materially changed since the war was renewed. In these circumstances, it would seem that their defiant exactions are intended to excite discord between the Powers rather than as a basis of immediate negotiations for peace. The Powers, so far as official information goes, continue to be engaged in united effort to bring about a settlement, and there is not much ground to infer, if the allies try to awaken discord, that they will succeed. But the uncertain feature of the situation is the extraordinary war preparations undertaken by Germany on the one part, by France on the other, and, though less definitely known, by Russia also.
    The latter may be regarded as the logical and inevitable consequence of the former, and the former are held in Germany to be made necessary by the progress of events in the Balkans. The rise of the Balkan Alliance into an organization with unexpected and very great military efficiency not only interferes with whatever plans of expansion in that region the Triple Alliance may have had, but greatly and seriously affects the military value of Austria as an active member of that alliance. It is not unreasonable for the German Government to represent its preparations for war as primarily defensive in purpose. If it is assumed — as by the Military Party in Germany it is assumed — that Russia on the east and France on the west, with the aid of the British fleet in the English Channel and on the North Sea, may and probably will attack Germany at some time, then the weakening of Austria by a new, strong, and possibly hostile force in the Balkans makes imperative the increase of available strength by Germany. It is the consciousness of these possibilities that renders the situation so puzzling to the responsible statesmen of all the Powers. Yet there is in the very scope of these disturbing possibilities an element of hopefulness. The nearer Europe draws to the reality of a general conflict the more terrible are its consequences seen to be. Especially the burden of preparation grows heavier, and every class feels it more directly and distressingly. Serious men in every nation are asking whether, since to prepare for war is so sore a trial, it may not be possible to secure a general peace. This sentiment is showing itself in Germany, in defiance of the Government policy. It is manifest in France, especially among the more intellectual class. It is active in England, where there is no really bellicose feeling. The hope is by no means unreasonable that it will save the world from the unthinkable horror of a general conflict.