The Basis Of Peace.

New York Times 100 years ago today, June 10, 1913:
    The tide of hopeful feeling throughout Europe has run so strong and high during the past fortnight in connection with the celebration of the wedding of the German Emperor's daughter, that a certain reaction is pretty sure to follow. Yet there is much evidence that this feeling was justified, both by the celebration and the utterances of which it was the occasion and by the experience of the last six months. The experience has been significant and marvelous and such as no statesman of any country would have dared to predict. For more than half a century Turkey has been looked upon as the key to the peace of Europe, and any serious disturbance of its status was expected to lead to a general conflict. Turkey has practically been wiped out in Europe by a wholly unlooked for coalition of her neighbors in the Balkans, but, though Europe has seemed to be on the verge of widespread war at least three times, peace has been preserved. And the recent utterances by the sovereigns in Berlin expressed at once confidence that peace would be kept and a definite purpose to maintain it. These are facts which we think justify the hopeful feeling that has prevailed.
    In the remarkable change that has come over the spirit of Europe the German Emperor has had an effective influence, and has deserved the warm praise that he has received. He could not have kept the general peace alone and unaided; but it could not have been kept without him; and he could not have secured the aid needful if he had not sought, or accepted, it in a loyal and enlightened spirit. The aid came chiefly from Great Britain, from the Power which at the approach of the Balkan crisis was the special object of suspicion, jealousy, resentment, and apprehension in Germany. It was a great thing for both nations and for the world that their foreign relations were in the hands of a man like the Emperor William II. and a man like Sir Edward Grey. It is too early to know which one of these singularly broad-minded and strong men had the greater influence in the policy that united the Powers and kept them in line during the storm and stress of the last half year. The achievement was so great and the obstacles overcome so formidable that there is credit enough for both.
    To the German Emperor fell the delicate and difficult task, at home, of restraining the ardor of the war party, the party whose watchword has been "now or never," and whose hot desire has been to take, or make, occasion for a struggle with Britain. At the same time, the hardly less difficult task was imposed of restraining Austria, whose own war party, with like watchword, longed to settle the Slav question, and the question of an outlet on the Adriatic by force of arms. Even within the last month, before King Nicholas of Montenegro had been persuaded to surrender Scutari, the war party in Vienna was in the ascendant, and it seemed certain that Austria would break the concert of the Powers and strike a blow that would bring on the dreaded conflict. Undoubtedly it was at this point that William II. made his authority tell. But even his authority would hardly have been decisive had he not had the complete and energetic support of Great Britain, whose Government also made its influence felt in St. Petersburg and in Paris, and, indirectly, perhaps, but effectually, in Rome. The result was what we know. The Powers remained in control of the Albanian situation, Scutari was given up, not to Austria, but to them. The preliminary treaty of peace was signed in London, and the imperial wedding and the Kaiser's jubilee were celebrated in the reasonable assurance of unbroken peace for Europe.
    The central fact in this remarkable series of events is the change in the relations of Germany and Great Britain, and that change is one from half-concealed animosity, not necessarily to amity, but to fairly generous rivalry. The two empires, most powerful on land and sea, the most wealthy, intelligent, and progressive, have slowly and painfully and amid much peril come to feel that they have no essential reason for quarrel, and that the rivalry which is inevitable between them can be sustained by peaceful methods and to the advantage of each. In that fact lies the basis for the general hopefulness which may, as we have said, suffer some reaction, but which is really justified.