An Intra-Balkan War?

New York Times 100 years ago today, May 28, 1913:
    The Balkan Allies are suffering from too great success. Had they won from Turkey no more than they planned and hoped for at the outset they would have had no trouble in dividing and digesting the spoils. In their wildest dreams they did not expect that Turkey would be reduced to the insignificance in which it is now sunk. Their original demands on the Porte showed this plainly. Now that they have conquered and occupied practically all the Peninsula, now that Turkey is hemmed in at Constantinople, with but a narrow strip of Europe to protect her, and now that the Allies are sure of a naval base on the Aegean and on the Black Sea, commanding the flanks of the Tchatalja lines, the division of the territory arouses new appetites and creates unexpected jealousies.
    Naturally, Bulgaria is the centre of these. The Bulgars have, with aid from the Servians, the extent of which is disputed, conquered pretty much all of Macedonia, and occupy the richest portion of the east and southeast of the Balkan Peninsula. With Adrianople as a strategic centre, King Ferdinand can look forward to the time when it will be practicable for his army to advance on Constantinople, from which it would take a united effort of all the Powers to bar or to dislodge him. That, of itself, in the eyes of his allies, constitutes an immense advantage, for which, after the fashion of modern European diplomacy, they urgently demand "compensation." Toward the southwest the Bulgarians aspire to the possession of Salonika also, and this is hotly, even with arms, opposed by Greece. West and northwest lies the undefined territory of Albania, in the delimitation of which not only the Greeks and the Servians and the Montenegrins are deeply interested, but Austria and Italy as well. In this situation Servia is reported to have demanded a revision of the original alliance, and Greece has actually come to blows with Bulgaria.
    It seems pathetically foolish that the Allies, having accomplished so much, should put their future in peril by a desperate quarrel among themselves. Such a proceeding throws the immediate plans of the Powers into confusion, and, of course, opens anew the possibilities of division among them. The concert of Europe, such as it is, has been the outcome of the existence of a strong Balkan Alliance, with which no one Power, or group of Powers, was ready or able to deal. If the Allies insist on getting into a fight among themselves, it will be almost inevitable that the Powers will be tempted to seek their selfish aims by the aid of one or the other side.
    Fortunately the machinery that was devised to secure the adjustment of the varying interests of the Powers while the Allies were still united and formidable continues. The group of Ambassadors at London has not and is not likely to be broken up. Its members have had much valuable experience. They have worked out vexatious and complex problems suddenly sprung upon them with surprising success. They have carried on the business of an international clearing house with patience, candor, and, apparently, with growing mutual good will. They have been able to discover methods of disposing of dangers that it seemed impossible to escape. In the new situation all this will be of immense help. The dissensions of the Allies make the Balkan question more than ever a European question. We have a right to infer that the forces that have made for peace in the perilous months since the war broke out will be adequate to the new task.