Seek Rear Defense For Coast Forts.

New York Times 100 years ago today, May 19, 1913:
War Department Studying Methods of Security Against Land Forces.
SIX-INCH GUNS ARE FAVORED
Secretary Garrison Calls Attention to Necessity of All-Around Artillery Fire In These Strongholds.
Special to The New York Times.
    WASHINGTON, May 18.— A new system of coast defense — new in the sense of strengthening the present system — probably will be the outcome of consideration that is being given to the subject by Mr. Garrison, Secretary of War, and his military advisers. The proposed change is based on the theory that the present coast defenses are critically weak in not having means of repelling attacks by landing forces of an enemy in the rear.
    Mr. Garrison holds that one great coast artillery system is necessary, but without adequate co-operation from a mobile army is likely to be of little value in war. The Secretary of War does not go so far as to say that our coast defenses in case of foreign invasion would be an element of misfortune, inasmuch as successful attack from behind the forts would enable the enemy to use our own big guns against an American fleet coming to the rescue. Some military experts have held to this idea.
    For five or six years the problem of rear defense has been treated in various ways. The use of militia for this purpose has been the usual solution, but the Secretary apparently looks beyond this expedient for help from the regular army.
    One means of defense is the use of wide-tired machine guns and field artillery to be pulled over the sands of ocean beaches for attacking landing forces. Secretary Garrison now suggests the use of 6-inch guns with all-around fire to be used in batteries commanding and defending the rear approaches to the forts.
    Comment on the subject by Secretary Garrison was called forth by an article published recently concerning the landing defense of the coast fortifications.
    "It is perfectly true," he said, "that many of the seacoast defenses would find serious difficulty in defending themselves by their own garrisons against a land attack by a numerous force, and it is also true that they have been constructed, in many instances, without any reference to an attack coming from the land side, but, as was natural, in view of their purpose, almost wholly with a view to giving protection to the cities and harbors behind them against an attack by a hostile fleet.

Need of Coast Guard.
    "This being their principal function, pretty much everything else was subordinated to this end, and in many cases fortifications were so placed in the effort to secure the best field of fire over the sea front and channels as to render their defense from land attack extremely difficult. It can be said of many of them — in fact, most of them except those which are on islands — that their defense in case of any serious attack from the land side must rest upon bodies of mobile troops assigned to this duty. Such mobile troops would probably be drawn, to a great extent, from the militia.
    "The coast artillery troops, while available for a certain amount of duty as militia, are especially trained for work with the big guns, and cannot well be assigned to other work without seriously jeopardizing the efficiency of the work for which they are maintained, so that, as stated above, in case of a land attack it will be necessary to assign considerable bodies of mobile troops to defend these works.
    "Before the advent of the modern gun and the construction of works involving great outlay of money insufficient attention was given to the problem of their defense from land attack, and as a result many of them are so situated and constructed as to be susceptible to serious attack by even moderate forces from ships.
    "With a view to correcting this defect, lines of land defense works have been laid out, and necessary instructions prepared for their prompt construction in case of threatened war. In future construction, it is believed that much more attention will be devoted to making each individual group of works reasonably secure against land attack, even though unsupported by troops other than its own garrison. Certainly the construction should be of such a type as to enable a defense sufficiently long to permit arrival of assistance from Coast Guard troops.
    "But, after all, this whole question brings up very forcibly the folly of depending upon fortresses alone. Their usefulness is very much restricted unless there is an adequate mobile army. The real purpose of seacoast defenses is to prevent hostile fleets bombarding cities behind them, occupying the harbors whose entrances they are designed to close, or bombarding fleets taking refuge in these harbors. Their guns are of a heavy type necessarily, too heavy, in most instances, for work against troops. Their function is to fight armored ships.
    "Their flanks and rears must be protected by mobile troops, as must the cities which lie behind them, in case the enemy decides to land at a point outside the range of the guns and make his attack upon the city from a point overland. It would not be practicable with the present mounting to turn great guns constructed for this purpose against bodies of troops operating in the vicinity of cities. This is work which can be done only by the mobile army.
    "In short, all systems of coast defense which look to security through fortifications alone are destined to be of little use in time of real war. The fortifications are only a part of the defense, and while they are entirely adequate for the purpose for which constructed, they are fixed defenses, effective only over the area within range of their guns; beyond this range an enemy is entirely free to operate, unless he is opposed by mobile troops. "It was to demonstrate the fact that the great mass of fortifications guarding Boston was helpless to prevent the capture of that city by land attack that the Massachusetts manoeuvres of 1909 were held. The attacking troops were landed at New Bedford, and occupied Boston from the rear. This is feasible at any of our seacoast cities, unless the coast defenses are supplemented by an adequate mobile force. The well-trained and armed soldier on his feet is the determining element, and any country which trusts itself to defenses unsupported by a mobile army is destined to disaster. Each helps out the other, and both are absolutely necessary.
    "The department is now considering the installation of guns up to six-inch calibre with all-around fire, with a view to helping out in the defense of the works from land attack, and it has paid much more attention than heretofore to the construction of batteries which, have a well thought out and prepared system of defense against land attack."