The Game In The Balkans.

New York Times 100 years ago today, July 27, 1913:
    It is hardly a month since the Czar of Russia, alarmed and angered by the quarrelsome conduct of Servia and Bulgaria, addressed a personal telegram to the sovereigns of these two nations. He spoke of the preparations for "a fratricidal war which might tarnish the glory won in common"; he pointed out that it was his "right and duty to appeal directly" to the rulers, and concluded his summons to arbitrate with a warning that aroused angry comment in the Viennese press and not a little anxiety in other capitals:
    I believe it my duty to notify your Majesty that a war between the allies could not leave me indifferent. I wish to make it clear that the State which began such a war would be responsible for its effect on the Slav cause, and I reserve complete freedom as to the attitude Russia would adopt regarding the eventual results of so criminal a struggle.
    What aroused resentment at Vienna was the frank avowal of the Czar that he acted, not in the interest of the peace of Europe, but in that of " he Slav cause," in the name of which he proposed to hold the rulers of the two Slav States "responsible." And the threat with which he closed his remarkable appeal related, not to what Europe might do if the "fratricidal struggle" was undertaken, but to the "attitude of Russia." The appeal was entirely in vain. Bulgaria, while professing willingness to arbitrate, on the one hand insisted that arbitration should be confined to the terms of the treaty made before the war on Turkey, and on the other hand pressed forward her troops in an effort to cut off the Greeks from the Servians. Servia, without refusing to arbitrate, would not consent, and strengthened her junction with the Greeks. Almost before the Czar knew, not merely was "war" begun, but Bulgaria was checked and practically defeated. Rumania sent her armies across the Bulgarian frontier toward Sofia and Bulgaria was paralyzed.
    The question now arises, What will the Government of the Czar do? What use will it make of the "complete freedom" which the Czar reserved? What will be "the attitude of Russia"? And what will be the effect of the unexpected course events have taken on the other Powers? That Russia is puzzled and hesitant is evident. The Czar's "coup" — "bold, but necessary and decisive," as it was described in the French press — utterly failed of its immediate purpose. The implied threat was disregarded. It is not easy to see what, by isolated action, he can do toward carrying out any policy he may have had in mind. But now comes the report that Austria has notified Servia and Greece that fighting must cease, and that she will not allow Bulgaria to be further humiliated. It is generally believed that Austria egged on Bulgaria in its quarrel with Servia and Greece. Austria, having steadily worked to weaken Servia, saw the opportunity to reduce her to practical impotence by war with Bulgaria and may well have hoped to deal more readily with the latter, whose racial feeling is less strong than its care for its own interest. Further, Austria had reason to hope that Bulgaria, attacking Servia, would strain her relations with Russia, and thus the "Slav peril" generally would be lessened.
    The swift change must be a matter of acute concern in Vienna. Austria has now to deal not with Bulgaria, as the dominant Government in the Balkans, but with a victorious Servia, and the peril which is so constantly regarded is greater rather than less. If Russia is troubled by the consequences of its false step, Austria has even greater reason for concern. Yet there is a hint that the two Powers are acting together in the notice to Greece and Servia.