The Peace Negotiations Between Italy And Turkey.

New York Times 100 years ago today, November 24, 1912:
Stumbling Block in the Way Was the Sovereignty of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica — Italy's Position Set Forth by Baron di San Severino.By Baron Bernardo Quaranta di San Severino,
(Graduate of the Naples University and of the Royal Oriental Institute of Italy.)
    The stumbling stone of the laborious peace negotiations between Italy and Turkey, patiently and perseveringly conducted during the last three months on the shores of the Lake of Geneva, which were to bring to a close a war valiantly fought on both sides for one year and seventeen days, has been, without any doubt, the question of Turkey's recognition of Italy's political sovereignty over Libya, proclaimed by the King's decree of annexation of Nov. 5 last, and ratified by the unanimous vote of the two chambers of the Italian Parliament in February.
    Italy could not possibly renounce absolute sovereignty over the new colony, nor allow any limitation of its scope, while on the other hand Turkey could not, according to the dictates of the Koran, recognize the cession of Mussulman territory to the infidels. The almost unsurmountable difficulty of conciliating these two extremes justifies the slowness of the proceedings and the hundred days of arduous and painstaking labor spent by our envoys, the Hon. Bertolini, the Hon. Fusinato, and Commander Volpi, and the Turkish delegates, Naby Bey and Fahr-ed-din Bey, over the negotiations begun at Caux and brought successfully to a close on Oct.   15 in what will be henceforward called the Hall of Peace in the Beau Rivage Palace Hotel.
    It is interesting to note that the eagerly sought for "formula," (which for so long harassed the minds of the five plenipotentiaries and gave such feverish work to the telegraphic wires between Ouchy, Rome and Constantinople, while in Tripolitania two armies were clashing in bloody battle), was at last found, through the suggestion of our own plenipotentiaries, after the appearance on the scene of that brilliant and successful diplomat, Rechid Pasha, former Turkish Ambassador to Rome, in the original proposal of autonomy to the two provinces in question, put forward in July by Prince Halim Pasha.
    The "preliminaries of the peace of Lausanne," signed on Oct. 15, have embodied the famous formula and with it, so as to be forever after inseparable, the "Firman" of Mohammed V., the decree of Victor Emmanuel III., the treaty of Lausanne, the "Irade" for the islands of the Aegean Sea, and the "Irade" granting amnesty to Idris.
    But, it has been asked, has Italy truly obtained from Turkey full and complete political sovereignty over Libya?
    "We do not see how it could be put in doubt. The fact of non-recognition of European conquests on the part of Turkey is not new. If the title to the sovereignty upon territories once belonging to Turkey were to rest upon the official recognition of the Sublime Porte, then Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, Crimea, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Erythraca, &c, would not be to-day respectively English, French, Russian. Austrian, and Italian territories. Turkey, therefore, even in this case, does not officially recognize our conquest of Libya, does not impose our rule upon our new subjects, but does not, on the other hand, impugn it. She simply ignores it, and, making use for the last time of her sovereign rights to renounce her sovereignty on the land she is obliged to give up in order "to not prolong the war with Italy, which had become disastrous." (these are the textual words,) she grants autonomy to these two former Turkish provinces, abandoning them, apparently, to their destiny, while the decree of our King, (which forms a part of the preliminaries signed on Oct. 15.) solemnly confirms the Italian sovereignty over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, proclaimed since Nov. 5 of last year.
    Nor can it be said that the presence in Libya of the Naib-ul-Sultan, (Vicar of the Sultan,) in the person of Scemsi-Eddin Bey, (ex-Minister of the Wakufs — Pious Foundations — at Constantinople, ex-representative of Turkey at Teheran and Budapest, and delegate of the Sultan,) is an obstacle to our absolute sovereignty in that region. For have not the United States, Germany, England, France, and all other civilized nations their Consuls in Tripoli, whose business it is to protect American German, English, and French interests and the subjects of those nations residing in Libya?
    Moreover, the Naib-ul-Sultan is even less than a foreign Consul, because he is paid by Italy out of the local revenue. He must, therefore, be persona grata to the Italian Government, and his only attribution will be to protect the interests of Ottoman subjects in our new colony. He is, therefore, an official sui generis, whom we have consented to call Vicar of the Sultan instead of Consul, out of regard for Turkish susceptibilities.

Religious Sovereignty and the Cadi.
    The Cadi will represent in Tripolitania the Sheik-ul-Islam, (the wise man of Islam:) he will superintend all religious functions, (weddings, &c.) among the Mussulmans, and will appoint the local religious chiefs, the Naibs.
    Just as the Pope delegates his Bishops in all foreign countries, so will the Sheik-ul-Islam appoint the Cadi in Libya. The men who wield religious authority in the Mussulman world, while called by different names, as Mufti in Bulgaria, Reis-ul-Ulema in Bosnia Herzegovina, are all vested with the same character. The name changes, its attributions remain the same.
    In our particular case, since the Cadi is invested with an eminently religious character in the eyes of the Mussulmans, his emolument could evidently not  be paid  by  the  Christians;   it is, therefore, the Sultan who provides his stipend. The Cadi will also have the qualifications of a Judge, inasmuch as regards the Wakufs, (Pious Foundations.) This same clause was inserted in the treaty of 1909 between Austria-Hungary and Turkey, following upon the annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina, The Italian Government has endeavored to follow as closely as possible the lines of this treaty in all those points which regard the practice of the Mussulman religion and the administration of the Wakufs In Libya.
    We have been glad to note that the European press has unanimously approved Italy's liberal conduct. It would have been impossible to adapt our laws in ecclesiastical matters to a community composed almost wholly of Mussulmans. To do so would have meant to place an insuperable barrier between us and our new subjects and to delay — if not altogether prevent — the pacification of the Arabs, who will now not have the pretest of our religious intolerance to encourage them in their resistance. Then, after all, as I had occasion to say in one of my last lectures in the United States on this subject in the Spring, this war has never been a conflict between the Cross and the Crescent, and we have from the very beginning proclaimed absolute freedom for every form of creed and religious liberty for all — Mussulmans and Jews alike. Italy's broad tolerance is well known and is proved by the fact that the Jews are in Italy a most respected community, and that they occupy several of the highest posts in our administration.

The War Indemnity.
    Italy, as was to be foreseen, has entirely absolved Turkey from the payment of the indemnity of war she might have exacted, but the fulfillment of which would have been very doubtful, as our Prime Minister, Signor Giolitti, has very pertinently observed, owing to the disastrous conditions of the Turkish treasury, which are no longer a secret and with which her numerous creditors are well acquainted.
    It has been hinted in some quarters that it is we, the winners in so many bloody battles, who are in fact going to pay an indemnity to Turkey, (Article 10 of the peace Treaty of Lausanne.) Such a contention is absurd.
    If, on the one hand, the dignity of Italy as a nation could never have allowed her, after a victorious campaign lasting one year, to consent to the stipulation of any such pact, on the other hand Turkey could never have accepted a war indemnity from Italy without increasing the malcontent of all parties against her Government, which would have been accused of selling the sacred land of Islam for the gold of the infidels. Even apart from these reasons, however, such an assertion cannot be upheld for a moment.
    Article 10 of the Treaty of Lausanne is very clear. It is well known that the Ottoman public debt is an international administration, in which all the great powers, including Italy, are co-partners.   Now, Premier Giolitti has recently confirmed the engagements entered into by the Italian Government since Oct. 12 of last year, which bound us not to forfeit the obligations Turkey had previously contracted toward that administration. Italy, therefore, gives nothing whatever to Turkey herself, but agrees to pay a couple of million lire, or to capitalize that sum into one payment, to the administration of the Ottoman public debt, because Turkey was under obligation to pay that amount to this body as the annual contribution of the two provinces now taken over by Italy. It is only natural that, if we take over the provinces, we should also become responsible for the liabilities contracted by them before our occupation.
    As a matter of fact the duty we thus take upon us is much less onerous than that assumed by Austria in 1909, when she paid Turkey for the Ottoman crown lands of Bosnia Herzegovina, which she had de facto occupied for over thirty years, no less a sum than 60,000,000 lire.

The Islands of the  Aegean Sea.
    It has never been our intention to keep the islands of the Aegean Sea, so valiantly taken by Gen. Giovanni Ameglio. At the very time of this occupation we explicitly declared that we were taking them simply as a means, not as an end in itself. We did not, in fact, establish any administration of our own in the islands, but simply let them govern themselves. We declared we were taking them as a security, and that they have proved themselves to be such is shown by the treaty itself, which declares they will be   turned   over   to   Turkey  only   when the complete evacuation of Turkish troops from Tripolitania and Cyrenaica will be an accomplished fact, and even then under the explicit understanding that full amnesty will be given to the inhabitants of those islands who rose against the Turks, and that the most necessary and urgent reforms be at once put into execution. Nor has this course been without precedents, for in every war a great deal of the territory occupied by the conqueror during the operations of war is subsequently restored to the vanquished foe.
    As to the evacuation of Libya by the Turkish officers and troops, it has been said in some quarters that the Turkish General in Chief, Enver Bey, would decidedly refuse to obey the orders of the Sultan in leaving the country. Such a course on his part is hardly conceivable, as it would only make out of a distinguished officer, such as he is, a rebel to his sovereign and to the new power which has taken possession  of Libya; but, even were such a thing to happen, we do not see to what practical results such useless resistance would lead, since Italy is naturally prepared to go ahead unwaveringly with the colonial war, if called upon to do so.
    Moreover, the obligation assumed by the Sultan toward Italy is explicit. Turkey declares herself henceforward responsible for every form of contraband, be it public or private, of the Ottoman subjects in those provinces and engages herself to discountenance every and any assistance which the Ottoman subjects might give to the rebels. This obligation, loyally carried out, deprives the rebels of the means of offering any further resistance. At all events, if the Italian troops have been able to keep in check the Arabo-Turkish forces when they were amply and constantly reinforced by supplies smuggled through the Egyptian and Tunisian frontiers, they will certainly be able to subdue those smaller forces which, separately and on their own account, might refuse to put down their weapons and bow their heads to the accomplished fact.
    We are confident, however, that this will not be the case. Already at Zuara, Misurata, Zanzur, Homs, and Tripoli the Italian and Turkish commanders have met and, through the assistance of Capt. Castoldi and Lieut. Allino, (who have rendered such signal services as interpreters to the Commander in Chief during the war,) important interviews have taken place to make the necessary arrangements for the passage of the Ottoman troops through the now Italian territory on their way back to Turkey, while the propaganda of pacification among the natives, begun with so much success by some of our able officials, among whom are ex-Consul Chevalier Piacentini and Capt. Bianco, proceeds with great alacrity.
    We know that we may still have to face a colonial war, like Germany in her African colonies, France in Algeria first and at present in Morocco, like England along the northwestern frontiers of India, until we shall have entirely subdued those native populations.
    But we know also that alongside of our military action there will be a vast field for a patient work of penetration among the natives, and the success obtained by Italy on this line during this year of war shows how much can be done in this direction. Every day large numbers of Arabs pass over to our cause, and this movement toward us is in constant increase. The Arabs begin to understand at last that their interests lie side by side with ours and that Italy will open to them a new era of peace, welfare, and prosperity.

International Recognition.
    It has been most gratifying to Italy to witness the prompt and spontaneous recognition by the other powers of her political sovereignty over Libya, and we are especially grateful to Russia, who, only a few hours after the signature   of   the   preliminaries   of   peace, signified her recognition. Russia had already, during the whole period of war, given us unquestionable proofs of her sincere friendship and good-will, and M. Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, had shown himself during this year of hostilities one of the strongest promoters of peace between Italy and Turkey. He was, in fact, in February the author of the proposal for a joint action of the powers to bring about the formal recognition of Italy's decree of annexation of Nov. 5, 1911, and in Italy every one sees in this attitude of Russia the result of the patient work of Senator Tommaso Tittoni, who, while Minister for Foreign Affairs, was so successful in fostering the cordial relations of our country with Russia and Austria through the meeting he arranged between   the  Czar  of   Russia  and   King Victor Emmanuel at Racconigi, and his no less famous interview with Count von Aerenthal at Desio, both of which events contributed powerfully to increase the reciprocal feelings of friendliness with these two nations.
    Austria, in fact, has also been one of the first powers to recognize our conquest. This policy of rapprochement, begun by Senator Tittoni with Count von Aerenthal, and so successfully continued by our present Minister for Foreign Affairs, Marquis of San Giuliano, could not possibly have given better results. Our cordial relations with Austria, also under Count von Aerenthal's successor, Count von Berchtold, are in fact well known and are confirmed by the visit paid by the latter to the King of Italy on the royal estate of San Rossore only a few days after the conclusion of our peace treaty with Turkey.
    Following closely upon Russia and Austria, Germany, Bulgaria, Servia, Switzerland, Roumania. France, the United States, Belgium, Peru, Portugal, Holland, Colombia, Sweden, Japan, Paraguay, in one word, all the civilized nations, have spontaneously and promptly recognized the fait accompli, while the foreign Consuls in Tripoli have offered their official congratulations to his Excellency, Gen. Ottavio Ragni, the present Governor General of the Province of Tripoli.
    France has been one of' the last among the powers to recognize Italian sovereignty over Libya, and this circumstance has given an occasion to those who seek every opportunity of sowing   discord  among  nations  and  of alarming Europe to prophesy imminent strained relations between France and Italy, bringing up afresh the differences which had arisen for the capture of the Manouba and Carthage. Unfortunately for these dissension-mongers, nothing of the kind is going to take place. There has been no hostile intention, no ill-will on the part of France. The delay was simply due to the absence from Paris of the French Prime Minister, M. Poincare'. France could have no reason of willfully delaying in following the example of the other friendly nations, when she is the very power which has officially most warmly indorsed our going to Tripoli.
    It has also been said that France wished to first make sure of the rectification of the now Italo-Tunisian border line and of that of the Tripolitan hinterland, but France's full and whole-hearted recognition, which took place immediately upon Poineare's return to Paris, has put a stop to these unwarrantable insinuations.
    With reference to the question of the border line it will be remembered that a Franco-Turkish Commission had last year marked the boundary between Tripolitania and Tunis from the Ras Ajir, on the Mediterranean, to the Oasis of Ghadamas. The outbreak of the war prevented the delimitation of the remaining western and southern boundaries of the Tripolitan hinterland. And while at that time Turkey claimed as her own the Oases of Janet, Bokron, and Tibesti — according to the communication of Oct. 30, 1890, as forming part of the Tripolitan hinterland — France, on the other hand, claimed these oases as her own, going back to the Anglo-French boundary delimitation of Aug. 5, 1890, and March 21, 1899.
    But no secondary question, such as the above, the resolution of which is not necessarily immediate and may be had at any time, could have been sufficient reason for not recognizing, or delaying in recognizing Italian sovereignty over Libya, especially on the part of the very power who had loudly voiced our rights on Tripoli, and when, as the Journal writes, the understandings of 1893 and 1900 between Italy and France are founded on the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Libya and were the starting point of the diplomatic action that has allowed Italy to put into execution her African policy.
    Surprise has been expressed in some quarters that Italy has not joined the quadruple alliance of the Balkan States and that she did not take legitimate advantage of the situation to press forward with energy her own campaign. Italy has also been accused of having deserted the  Balkan States in their struggle against the Turk. Still, whoever is acquainted even superficially with the directing principles which have inspired Italian policy in the Balkan Peninsula for the past twelve years cannot feel surprise at Italy's present attitude, and the important collection of Senator Tittoni's Parliamentary addresses during the. six years he was at the head of our Foreign Office. (1903-1909,) which have just been published under the title "Sei Anni di Politica Estera," and which throw full light on Italy's foreign policy, contain precious elements which could be read with profit by those who have suggested Italy's joining in the Balkan crusade.
    Italy's policy of respecting the Balkan status quo was particularly confirmed by our present Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Marquis di San Giuliano, in his note to the powers, (which included Greece, Montenegro, Servia, and Bulgaria,) where he explicitly reaffirmed his determination to keep the Tripolitan question entirely distinct from the more complex, more involved, and more general   Balkan   problem,   and  it  is  well known that the Italian Government had even recently discouraged the joint action of the Balkan States against Turkey. It can hardly cause surprise, therefore, that Italy, consistently with her well-established line of action, should have — even after the formation of the quadruple Balkan alliance — kept the two questions   well   distinct,   thus   avoiding complications that could have seriously endangered the peace of Europe. One must not forget that the object of our campaign   was   the  conquest  of   Libya.
    It was not and could not be a war of adventure, nor could it, therefore, lose its extra-European character on account of recent European complications.
    Italy has refused to take even legitimate advantage of the increased difficulties of Turkey's position on account of the league formed against her, and it has been most gratifying for us to read the unanimously favorable comments of the European press, which has not failed to notice that Italy — especially during the last phase of the long and tedious Swiss negotiations — did not, on this account, make her conditions any more onerous toward an enemy handicapped by the Albanian revolt, by her diminished prestige, by her impoverished treasury, by her internal conditions, and last, but by no means least, by the new developments of the Balkan question.
    Italy has been firm in demanding with her ultimatum from the hesitating and temporizing Turkish Government a prompt decision on the only conditions acceptable by Italian dignity, but while she backed her ultimatum with orders to Admiral Viale to keep himself in readiness to sail with his squadron for the Aegean Sea, she maintained on the other hand unchanged those same conditions of peace made before Turkey had been overtaken by the threatening armies of the league, and Italy's fairness, magnanimity, and correctness have been acknowledged by the Turks themselves.
    Still, far from having deserted the cause of the noble and valiant Balkan populations, our country with this peace and with her enhanced prestige after her successful campaign can now bring considerable weight to bear in the European concert of nations and add her action to that of the other powers toward securing a satisfactory settlement of the Balkan question. Our peace with Turkey will be the best guarantee of the peace of Europe and, also for this reason, it has been greeted with joy and satisfaction by the press of the whole world.

Italy's Task After Her Conquest.
    Italy  is  now  conscious of  the task that    awaits     her    and   of   her    duty and responsibility toward her new subjects and the conquered land. It is only a few days since the treaty of Lausanne was signed, and already new companies are being rapidly formed for the study and betterment of Libya, for the development of her mineral and agricultural resources, for medical researches upon the pathology of that region, for the construction of buildings, aqueducts and railways, and for the study of the problems affecting the Mussulman world, all of which aim to prepare the way for our emigrants in these new Italian lands. The Italian newspapers are printing popular translations of the Koran and new reviews are in project on the lines of the French Revue du Monde Mussulman, chairs of Mussulman law are proposed in  our  universities,  all  of  which will serve to render more popular the Islamitic studies and to foster the friendly relations between Christians and Mussulmans in Libya, thus leading to a better understanding of our new subjects through their habits and religious beliefs and to greater efficiency in bringing the blessings, the light, the prosperity and civilization of Italy into those regions left for so many centuries in  neglect and servitude.
    Italy feels conscious, truly conscious, of her high civilizing mission, and the Arabs themselves realize through the benefits of the progressive work already accomplished among them in the past year that she is in earnest. A few days ago the Cadi of Tripoli, the venerable Mussulman Chief of that city, in the presence of the Italian Governor, after the proclamation of the "Firman" of Mohammed V. and of the decree of the King of Italy, addressed to his countrymen in Arabic, amid frantic applause, these significant words:
    "This date,"' he said, "should be written in golden letters on the book of history; it marks the beginning of our moral and civil redemption, of our progress in every branch of public and private life. No domination has ever caused us to enjoy these benefits, no nation that has reigned, from the Phoenicians downward, has done what Italy has accomplished in one single year of war."
    Time will say that the civilizing work of Italy has justified our war; the impetuous and bloody military conquest will soon be followed by the patient, fruitful penetration of civilization, and we will show the world in peace as well as in war that it was our right to bring back to Africa the glorious Roman Eagles and to resume our natural place on the other shore of the Mediterranean, the "Mare Nostrum," Our Sea.