Huerta's Spokesman Tells Problems That Face Mexico

New York Times 100 years ago today, June 29, 1913:
    Señor Emeterio de la Garza, Jr., Writes for The Times of the Difficulties Confronting the Present Administration and Gives a Graphic Picture of Mexico City's Days of Tragedy.
    The article printed below is by Señor Emeterio do la Garza, Jr., who has been commissioned by Gen. Huerta, head of the Government of Mexico to endeavor to give the American people a clearer idea of what kind of man Gen. Huerta is and what kind of problems he is facing in his administration of the neighboring republic.
    Señor de la Garza was in the city or Mexico throughout the bombardment of last February when his residence was wrecked by artillery fire. He was one of the delegates who went to the American Embassy on the invitation of our Ambassador and conferred there on behalf of the Madero government with the delegates representing Gen. Félix Diaz, leader of the anti-Madero revolt. When Huerta and Diaz came to an understanding, Señor de la Garza threw in his lot with the former against Madero.
    Señor de la Garza sums up the object of his mission in these words:
    "A prompt solution of Mexico's problems by Gen. Huerta is impossible. The American people ought to understand that."

By Emeterio de la Garza, Jr.
    THE time has come when I, because others do not know or do not dare, have to explain to the American people, whom I regard as the greatest and most just people of the world, the real situation in which we find ourselves, and I will say it regardless of diplomatic conventions, official statements, and friendly considerations, because the time has arrived when we have to decide fundamental problems, to protect the greatest national and international interests, and to save the country.
    Three hundred years of Spanish rule in Mexico cannot be counted toward education, progress, or civilization; on the contrary, they were years of slavery, ignorance, and fanaticism. The struggle for independence was severe, and civil wars followed in its wake for sixty-three years.
    It was an ocean of blood — fighting for principles, for religion, for nationality — fighting between the Creoles and Indians, between liberals and conservatives, always disputing the control of Mexican public affairs.
    In 1876, Gen. Porfirio Diaz became President of Mexico and began a new era which, even if in the beginning it was not peaceable, was nevertheless the start of modern methods and strong military and political measures intended to establish Mexico on a new basis.
    The Diaz regime lasted thirty-five years. Many good things and great material and industrial progress were accomplished while he was President, but, as a consequence of his many years of power, he became so terribly despotic that the country could not stand him any longer and was anxious for the change long due in justice to humanity.
    Then the revolution of Madero, which arose from outraged public opinion, made not a bloody but a necessary change. Madero or anybody, provided there was a change! — and it was Madero because he and his family had the money necessary to finance the revolution.

A Good Man But Incapable.
    Madero was mentally, morally, and physically incapable of ruling the country. We all knew that before political movements were started. His own family knew it, and in several public statements they let Gen. Diaz and the Mexican people know that they were not in accord with what Madero was doing. The sudden retirement of Gen. Diaz, which belied his ostentation and demonstrated his weakness, gave Madero full control of the situation — a very great surprise to him, to the government, and to the country, but not to us, who foresaw it long before. I wrote and published a book predicting the whole change one year before Madero took any active part in the politics of Mexico.
    In a day he found himself a hero. He sincerely believed he was a victor, while the people rejoiced because of the change, and were entering on a new life. So Madero was proclaimed President of Mexico in a blaze of enthusiasm — Oh! let us call it an election — he actually received twenty thousand votes from a population of eighteen millions. It was a sort of delirium rather than anything else.
    When the people of Mexico found that they had put in the chair a man who did not have any of the qualities necessary to rule the country, not even the physical aspect to command respect, their only thought and purpose was to seek how to remedy their great mistake. You will be surprised to learn that, three months after Madero had become President of Mexico, twenty-three out of the twenty-eight of his fellow-revolutionary leaders were either in jail or arrayed in arms and in the field against him.
    Madero was a good man; an exceptionally good an for making a propaganda of altruistic ideas; he was a believer in democracy, a mystic and a puritan, and he had at heart the welfare of his people. I have not an unkind word to say against the man. He did what he could — he attempted more than he could do — his only fault was the acceptance of an office which he ought to have known was beyond his power and, I dare say, beyond his ambition.
    He was altogether radical, and the old conservative society of Mexico, the good and intelligent people of Mexico, and the methods and conditions of the country could not stand the shock. When Madero took possession of the Government of Mexico he did not have men capable of forming a government, and he gave the cabinet offices and the most delicate duties to the members of his family, not because of their ability, but because he believed them loyal, which created a very peculiar state of affairs, since they attempted to rule Mexico as they had administered one of their old "haciendas." This, of course, could not be done.

Orozco's Rebellion.
    Orozco, Madero's lieutenant and right-hand man, was the first who raised arms against his old friend. Madero had to rely on the Federal Army, which he had so bitterly fought and opposed, to save him and his new government. The army was faithful, quickly responded to the call of duty and, commanded by the Minister of War, Gen. Gonzales Salas, advanced to meet Orozco and his troops. They had a very bloody battle at Rallano, where neither got the better of the other, but each, contrary to usual military custom, thought itself defeated. The Minister of War, not being able to endure his supposed defeat, committed suicide on the field. The shock of the news of this battle caused such alarm and anxiety throughout the whole Republic that the people lost all their confidence in the Madero government and believed it could not last three days more.
    Then Madero and his government placed themselves in the hands of Gen. Victoriano Huerta, the bravest and most celebrated man in the army, who promptly reorganized the disbanded army and advanced to meet Orozco, who had marched south as far as Conejos, near Torreon. Gen. Huerta gave battle at Conejos and defeated Orozco altogether.
    Then the revolutionists returned to Rallano, where Gen. Huerta met Orozco and again crushed him. Then Orozco fortified himself in the Cañon of Bachimba, his last stronghold, which he believed to be impregnable.
    Gen. Huerta followed his enemy to the foot of the mountains at Bachimba, defeated him absolutely, and later drove him out of Chihuahua and Ciudad Juarez.
    I need not state that after such great victories Gen. Huerta was the man of the hour, the hero of the army, and the most popular man in Mexico. He was first and above all the savior of the Madero government. Yet, on returning to the City of Mexico, he received as his only recompense a cold reception and an immediate discharge.
    He retired to his home in poverty and distress, but the army could not forget the outrage nor its General, and since that moment every soldier in Mexico desired to see Gen. Huerta in the place where he belonged — where he is.
    The unsuccessful revolutions of Gen. Bernardo Reyes and of Gen. Félix Diaz had taken place about that time, and both were in prison, a thing which also hurt the army.
    The whole country was in a state of revolt. Zapata, another of Madero's strongest lieutenants, had risen in the State of Morelos. The Congress, lately elected as Maderistas, was, as a whole, inimical to the young and incompetent President, because of his continuous errors; under such conditions and in such times a plot was started on the ninth of February, 1913, against the Madero government.
    Gen. Manuel Mondragon, inventor of the celebrated Mondragon gun, who had been in command of the artillery of the Mexican Army for twenty years, had convinced his subordinates that it was necessary to free Gen. Reyes and Gen. Diaz from prison. So they went to the prison of Santiago, in the City of Mexico, freed Gen. Reyes, and put him at the head of the movement. Then Gen. Reyes went to the penitentiary of the City of Mexico and freed Gen. Félix Diaz, with the understanding that Reyes was to make an attack on the National Palace, while Diaz and Mondragon were to seize the arsenal. Reyes was shot and killed just as he was entering the National Palace — thirteen machine-gun bullets entered his body. Diaz and Mondragon, without knowledge of Reyes's death, were successful in seizing the arsenal.
    Madero, having been awakened and notified, called Gen. Huerta, who was living at the time as a private citizen in his home, and begged him to save him once more. Gen. Huerta once more placed himself at the orders of the government, proceeded with Madero to the National Palace, and prepared a plan of defense.
    Then an artillery duel began between the two opposing forces at the National Palace and the arsenal, and a fearful and horrible scene ensued.
    The continuous bombardment lasted from Sunday, Feb. 9. until Tuesday, the 19th, ten bloody days. During all that time everything was closed — banks, churches, hotels, shops, and houses. We had no money, food, or sleep; no tramways, taxicabs, carriages, telephones, electric lights; no policemen, courts, or authorities — nothing!
    Up to the tenth day no regular battle had been fought between the two combatants, who had only engaged in local street affairs and were just taking position. Yet up to that day the Red Cross Society and the police stations reported 6,400 dead, more than half of them being non-combatants, women or children, who had been forced to go into the streets, starving to death, for food.
    On Sunday morning, the 16th of February, just a week after the trouble began, I was with Gen. Huerta in his military headquarters at the National Palace, discussing the general situation, and I learned from him that at the request of the Diplomatic Corps, headed by the United States Ambassador, Hon. Henry Lane Wilson, an armistice had been agreed upon, which was to expire at 2 o'clock on the following Monday morning. Mr. Gustavo Madero came in at that time, and soon after Vice President Pino Suarez and Señor Jaime Gurza, Minister of Communications and Public Works.
    We were speaking of the best means to protect the telegraph offices, when the Military Attaché of the American Embassy in Mexico, carrying in his right hand a big American flag, and followed by Dr. Ryan, called on Gen. Huerta, asking for an interview on urgent matters and that somebody who could speak English should be present during the meeting. Madero, Pino Suarez, and Gurza left the rooms, and I was about to follow their example when Gen. Huerta asked me to remain and act as interpreter.

Wilson Asks Armistice.
    The Military Attaché began by saying that His Excellency, the Ambassador, was pleased and thankful because an armistice had been granted, but, unfortunately, it had been granted on Sunday, and that did not cover the necessities of the city and of the people, especially of foreigners desirous of moving or of leaving the country; that his idea was to give the city a business day, during which banks, stores, and shops might remain open, and all kinds of transactions be possible. Therefore, in the name of His Excellency, the American Ambassador, who was acting as the representative of the whole Diplomatic Corps, Gen. Huerta was requested to extend the armistice through the next day, Monday, Feb. 17, until 8 P.M.
    The attaché furthermore stated that he had spoken with Gen. Félix Diaz at the Arsenal, and that he was willing to extend the armistice through Monday if the Government would agree to it.
    I translated all this into Spanish to
    Gen. Huerta, who promptly gave a favorable answer. Then the attaché said that he was also instructed in case of agreement, to request Gen. Huerta to appoint two delegates, who should meet two representatives from Gen. Diaz at the American embassy in order to hold a conference and to fix the details of the extended armistice, as both parties were claiming that the other's soldiers had taken advantage of the suspension of hostlities. Gen. Huerta named Gen. José Delgado and myself as the Government Commissioners, and the Military Attaché, Gen. Delgado, Dr. Ryan, and myself left the palace for the embassy.
    When we arrived there we were met by the Ambassador in person, who thanked us. The Military Attaché and Dr. Ryan proceeded to the Arsenal to report to Gen. Diaz that the Government had consented to extend the armistice and that its delegates were at the embassy waiting for his Commissioners. Soon after the attaché and Dr. Ryan came, accompanied by Mr. Fidencio Hernandez and Col. Barrios Castro, and the session began, the American Ambassador presiding.

Madero Will Not Listen.
    Mr. Hernandez and I exchanged credentials. He, on behalf of the Arsenal troops, and I, on behalf of the Government, did all the talking. The credentials issued by Gen. Diaz, which Mr. Hernandez presented to me, included full powers to negotiate peace and to settle the whole armed rebellion. The credentials that Gen. Delgado and myself had were only for the purpose of fixing the details of the extension of the armistice during Monday, the 17th of February, up to 8 P.M.
    Mr. Hernandez found some objection to the limitations of our credentials and I, while admitting them, requested him not to break off the negotiations because, the city having taken in good faith the announcement of the extended armistice, the streets were full of people moving from one part to the other, and it would have been an awful thing to resume hostilities, the Government having pledged itself to suspend operations until 2 A.M. I also suggested that if the representatives of Gen. Diaz would kindly wait at the embassy a couple of hours Gen. Delgado and myself would go to the palace and bring as broad and ample credentials as they had, because the limitations of our credentials were due, in my judgment, to the fact that the Military Attaché of the embassy had only spoken to Gen. Huerta of the extension of the armistice, and had never said a word regarding peace or settling of the general difficulties. This the Military Attaché, who was present, confirmed before the Ambassador. The idea seemed to suit all concerned, so Gen. Delgado and myself left for the National Palace, promising to return within two hours with full credentials.
    When Gen. Delgado and myself arrived at the National Palace we found President Francisco I. Madero there, together with Ernesto Madero, Minister of Finance, and Gustavo Madero, who, though not having any official title, was the power behind the throne.
    I explained to the President what we had done at the embassy and that we had returned to get credentials similar to those furnished to the other parties, of which I had a copy. President Madero positively, emphatically, and wrathfully answered me that he would not hear or listen or in any way consider such a proposition. I told him most respectfully that we were not asking for credentials to negotiate or to arrange peace, but just in order to hear the propositions that Gen. Diaz and his representatives were willing to present. But the President would not consent to it.
    Then Gen. Delgado told Mr. Madero that the Government could find out certain interior conditions of the Arsenal by listening to these peace propositions, and he recommended that credentials should be granted to us, as an advantageous military measure, but President Madero again refused to consider the case. Then Gen. Huerta spoke for himself, telling the President that even in the case that he considered the peace propositions from the Arsenal as an insult to him, he ought to listen to them, because such action would in no wise be to endure the insult.
    The President then went to another room with Messrs. Ernesto and Gustavo Madero and Gen. Huerta. Soon after they returned, and the President absolutely refused to issue such credentials as were asked for, thereby closing the matter. I went as far as to tell the President that I regarded it as a matter of honor to return to the embassy, because we had pledged our word to go there and the representatives of Gen. Diaz were waiting for us, but I got no satisfaction.
    The President furthermore stated that he had been told that the troops of Gen. Diaz had during the early part of the armistice advanced and placed a machine gun on the top of a house in advance of their former position, and that he did not consider himself any longer obliged to respect the armistice until 2 A.M. next morning.

The Armistice Violated.
    He issued orders to Gen. Huerta to open fire at once, the time being 4 P.M., Sunday, regardless of the printed notices which the Government had affixed in prominent places and circulated all through the city, to the effect that the armistice was effective until 2 A.M. Monday.
    I had not yet left the National Palace when the guns of the Government began to fire. The armistice was violated at that hour by order of President Madero, and firing continued until noon on Tuesday, the 19th of February.
    On the eighth day the news reached the City of Mexico that American battleships had arrived at Vera Cruz and Tampico on the Gulf, and at Mazatlan and Acapulco on the Pacific Coast, and that marines were about to land and proceed to the City of Mexico to protect the legations. We all realized that if the bluejackets should arrive, trouble would begin right there. Intervention would have become a fact within twenty-four hours.
    Madero, who was insane, would not stop to reason and had given orders to all the garrisons protecting the other cities and States of the Republic of Mexico to come immediately to the capital, thereby leaving the whole Republic in the hands of revolutionists and bandits. These, immediately after the Federal troops had departed, entered the cities and began to loot and massacre, throwing the whole country into a state of anarchy.
    Under the circumstances, Pedro Lascurain, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Madero Cabinet, decided to call the Senate to a special session. There he reported the state of affairs and asked in the name of the country and of God that some solution be found for the terrible situation. The Senate, after deliberation, concluded that a meeting of the best military men of Mexico should be held immediately to report on the measures to be taken. All our best Generals got together and, after a thorough examination of the case, unanimously decided that in order to take the arsenal it would be necessary to attack with a force of no less than thirty thousand men, of whom fifteen to twenty thousand would undoubtedly perish in the assault, and that it would be necessary at the same time to dynamite the whole central part of the City of Mexico in order to reach the arsenal, which is a one-story building, surrounded by high buildings; otherwise the attacking parties must approach through the streets, where they would be wholly at the mercy of artillery so placed as to command every street.

Madero Arrested.
    The Senate, in view of these reports, and judging the attitude of Madero as that of a most despotic and cruel tyrant, or of a crazy man, arrived at the conclusion that he must resign.
    They went in a body to see the President, who refused to receive them. Then they called on Gen. Huerta, Commander-in-Chief of the Government forces, and asked him repeatedly to take hold of the situation and save the city and the country from a national calamity which would, in a few hours, involve us in an international war. Gen. Huerta hesitated for a long time, but was finally convinced that it was the only possible solution, that his sacred duty to the country required him to take charge.
    Knowing very well the tremendous responsibilities that would be his, and the blame that friends and enemies were sure to place on him. Huerta decided to arrest Madero, Pino Suarez, and the Cabinet if need be. Col. Jimenez Riverol and Izquierdo were ordered to ask the President in the name of the army for his resignation, and, in case of absolute refusal, to arrest him.
    They went to the President's rooms and explained the case to him. He drew his revolver and fired, starting a general shooting affray, which ended in the death of Cols. Riverol, Izquierdo, and Marcos Hernandez, and the wounding of others.
    Then Gen. Blanquet, now Minister of War, went to Madero's office and arrested him at the point of his revolver. By that time Congress was in session, the Diplomatic Corps had got together, and everybody was in a state of excitement.
    Gen. Huerta proceeded to the arsenal and invited Gens. Diaz and Mondragon to come to the National Palace and end the fighting. When this was announced to the people there was jubilation in the City of Mexico. People marched through the streets, kissing each other, bells rang out, all felt as if they were beginning a new life. No national celebration, no religious festivity, no event of any kind, has ever been more greatly enjoyed and applauded than the end of the atrocious bombardment.
    Madero and Pino Suarez tendered their resignations. It has been said that the resignations of both were obtained by violence. I repeat what I have said before — that of course a belligerent, having been defeated, does not spontaneously accede to the dictation of the conqueror, but, this being admitted, it is very different from employing personal violence or threats to enforce the consequences of defeat.
    Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez were visited personally and frequently by the Ministers of Spain and Japan, by Mesdames Madero and Pino Suarez, and by Ernesto Madero, late Secretary of the Treasury, and they all speak of the resignations without any mention of force or violence. Madero and Suarez would certainly have complained to those visitors of any violent acts against them, but no such claims have ever been heard of. Pedro Lascurain, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Madero's best friend, and the man in whom be trusted so implicitly as to make him head of his Cabinet and send him to the United States on a confidential mission, was the bearer of Madero's resignation to Congress.
    Had there been no such resignation, or had it been forced from Madero by personal violence, Mr. Lascurain, in behalf of his protector and friend, could have denounced such a crime to Congress, which was by no means under the control of Gen. Huerta, who at that time was not invested with any superior office or power.
    I am sure that Congress would have willingly acceded to any of Mr. Lascurain's requests, as the majority of the representatives were elected as Maderistas.
    To allege that force or violence were employed to secure Madero's resignation is not a reflection on Gen. Huerta, who was not then President, nor even a member of the Cabinet, but is equivalent to alleging that Madero himself, his friends and his family, Mr. Lascurain and the Cabinet, the Supreme Court and Congress, were all implicated in the plot.
    I am not especially partial to Gen. Huerta, nor am I a blind supporter of the new government. I am not an enemy, but a friend, of the Madero family. I am a Mexican and a patriot, and I sincerely believe that the present government of the Republic of Mexico is the only and the best political organization left in the country -- a legal and a good government, under the circumstances. Furthermore, I think that Gov. Carranza, though he is a good friend of mine and a man of principles and of high standing in Mexico, is thoroughly mistaken in the attitude that he has taken, because, even admitting all the alleged grievances against President Huerta and his government. Carranza has no right to ruin his country and throw Mexico back two or three generations; to wreck trains, burn bridges, cut telegraph and telephone wires, sack towns, and destroy property. These are no arguments against the government of Huerta, nor do they entitle him to call himself a constitutionalist.
    If he thinks that President Huerta is guilty of any crime, he can impeach him before the Congress of Mexico, before the courts of Mexico, before the Congress and courts of all the nations of the world, before public opinion, and demand universal condemnation. He ought to get the proofs together and publish them widely and openly, so as to call him to account. But he has no right to make Mexico, his country, suffer for the errors of any politician, because, no matter what has happened, Mexico, as a whole, is not to blame for it.
    He does not show much love for his country by his actions. Personal ambition seems to be the predominating motive. Félix Diaz has renounced personal ambitions for his country's good. De la Barra proposes to leave his country for its benefit. Carranza appears to think that the way to avenge Madero is by killing thousands of innocent people, led like lambs to the slaughter, with no knowledge of why they are killing their brothers or being killed by them.

Carranza's Attitude.
    Carranza appears to think that the way to enforce constitutional laws is by burning, wrecking, looting, stealing, and spreading death and desolation broadcast. This is the reason why I cannot be in accord with, or be a political friend of, or lend any aid to Gov. Carranza and his followers. Besides, it would not do any good to the country should Carranza win. Such a result would be followed by three or four more revolutions. He has not discovered the formula for solving the many and great problems which pacification of Mexico involves, and, if he cannot accomplish, good, he ought not to seek the destruction of the whole, the more so when he has proved himself unable to prevent his men, who sarcastically call themselves constitutionalists, from killing and looting.
    The pacification of Mexico involves problems more difficult than in any other country. Do you suppose that the men who are now living the irresponsible lives of soldiers on two pesos a day, with rifles, horses, and women at their disposal, drinking and looting, and winning what they call glory, will return to the peonage system at 50 cents a day? Cannot you see that the victory or defeat of Carranza cannot restore peace in Mexico?
    On the other hand, can the government of Huerta, or any other government of Mexico, accomplish any fundamental thing or restore peace, with a neighboring country furnishing its enemies with arms, ammunition, money, and moral support, and not enforcing the neutrality laws?
    You want us to restore peace immediately, as a condition for obtaining your friendship. Furthermore, you want us to hold elections -- not any kind of elections, but that sort which you call elections, according to your ways and methods, your principles, your level of political education!