Panama Unguarded Might Be Seized.

New York Times 100 years ago today, October 27, 1912:
Admiral Mahan Believes Only a Greatly Superior Navy Can Hold the Strip.
JAPAN'S EYES ON ISTHMUS
Quotes Count Itagaki on Opening Up Pacific States to Relieve Pent-Up Population.
To the Editor of The New York Times:
    An editorial article caught my attention in your issue of Oct. 10, which says:
    The United States needs a navy commensurate with its responsibility for its own defense and for its primacy in the affairs of the Continent. The United States also needs, in common with the world, a means of facilitating commerce through the Isthmus of Panama. But these needs aro independent of each other, each standing on its own merits.
    From the above The Times proceeds to argue that the size and force of the United States Navy, being determined by requirements of the country's own defense, and of its primacy, are not to be affected by the necessity of defending the Panama Canal. In the judgment of the editorial article the neutrality of the canal is assured by the words of the treaty with Panama and of that with Great Britain.
    The conclusion is in my judgment untenable. Granting even that the treaties with the two States named imply more than an engagement on the part of the United States to assure and to secure the neutrality of the canal, and pledge also Great Britain and Panama to an active support of that neutrality, their pledges do not involve any other State. This, the editorial appears implicitly to recognize, for it adduces the general interest of the world in sustaining not only the neutrality but also the inviolability or the canal.
    The last few weeks in the Balkans have attested sufficiently that a recognized general interest of the European States has not been able there to insure either neutrality or inviolability. But in addition, the Canal Zone being United States territory, it is evident that its seizure would be a legitimate act of war, of so determinative a character that a neutral State interposing would assail the belligerent in a most critical instance, and become itself belligerent. Nor that alone; a certain sense of right would deter such neutral unless its own interests were so essentially affected as to necessitate intervention. This would not be the case if seizure were prompt and the transaction amounted to no more than transfer of ownership without prolonged interruption of traffic. Even were traffic long interrupted, it can by no means be safely assumed that other nations would interfere. The history of the blockade of the Southern coasts during the war of secession, and the persistence of Great Britain in respecting our belligerent right therein, notwithstanding the suffering of large numbers of her people, give evidence that a neutral nation may endure much before abandoning its neutral attitude.
    There can be no security for the canal except the organized force of the United States, or a general international guarantee, such as that of Suez. The latter we have abandoned; on the general ground, I presume, that it is inexpedient to sanction foreign intrusion in the American hemisphere even for so desirable an object. If we refuse the one horn of this dilemma, we have to accept the other. And we have accepted it. The assumption of the editorial article that "our ports and military arrangements are matters of police protection against lawlessness of any sort" is inadequate. Works with fourteen-inch guns and troops running far into the thousands form a provision not against lawlessness — i. e., enterprise of piratical character — but against the attacks, internationally lawful, of a hostile State.
    The ultimate and only certain provision is a superior navy. If a navy for other defense is sufficient to secure Panama, then so far the canal may be regarded as adequately defended; but this is only to juggle with words. The extent and distribution of our coast line make the canal, which is now part of it, at once the most important to the general interest, and through its isolation the most exposed. It is intrinsically the weak link of the chain. That the navy should be efficient for the defense of either coast, not of one only, depends upon free pass-age to either from the other by tenure of the canal. The fortifications and associated troops are to insure this hold upon the canal while the navy may be absent on its mission of action in either ocean; but neither works nor troops will insure ultimate security if the navy be inferior to the enemy's.
    The insistence of The Times upon a competent navy has been so opportune and intelligent that I have regretted the necessity of criticising here. One bearing of the Panama Canal upon National defense may be illustrated to those unfamiliar by noting that the population of our large Pacific Coast States is less than 20 to the square mile, that of Japan over 300. Yet we refuse Japanese labor immigration. Let me cite here remarks attributed to Count Itagaki, a Japanese statesman, now over 70 and with a past career such that his name appears in the last Encyclopaedia Britannica:
    We have no claims to present to Americans except those of free access to the labor market, of our right to have a free hand in the economic development of the country, that they lay aside their racial prejudices, that they discard the view that America belongs to them alone. Let them recognize that it is common property and for the common convenience of the entire human race. We put forth only the claim that Heaven has decreed that every human being is entitled to a part of the immense territory of the American Continent. * * * We shall demand of her to give up her racial prejudices and deal freely and impartially with all. * * * Especially must we see that America is opened up. * * * We, as Japanese, standing upon unassailable ground, must do this righteous deed for the whole world. As a vegetarian race, we Japanese lead more simple lives than meat-eating Americans and Europeans. Increase of population by higher birth rate will enable us to gain a positive victory in the struggle for supremacy, and, while maintaining our rights, the expansion of our race will be accomplished. — (Army and Navy Journal, Sept. 14, p. 38.)
    The influence of Count Itagaki upon the thought of his nation has caused him to be styled the Rousseau of Japan, and it is evident that the views above quoted must commend themselves to his people. The American reply is that the question is not fundamentally one of race but of political and social traditions and ideals rendering political assimilation impracticable for a long while to come; thereby constituting for us an internal political problem of the most difficult character. The difficulty doubtless will be enhanced by those conspicuous race marks which prevent the Eastern Asiatic disappearing from notice into the general body of the populations, but the fundamental reason lies far deeper.
    Whatever party takes over the Government under the coming election, it is to be hoped it will recognize that the question of naval increase is not primarily naval, but one of definite National policies which have the indorsement of the people in general of both parties, but which can be sustained only by the provision of adequate organized force. Such provision makes for peace, not for violence. To the truth of this our social conditions testify. We have incidental murders, burglaries, riots, various breaches of the peace; but society as a whole is at peace because its organized force is so vastly superior to that of the criminal class. Similarly, inadequate armament may induce aggression, but adequate armament deters.
            A. T. MAHAN.
            Quogue, L. I., Oct. 25, 1912.