Russia and Austria.

New York Times 100 years ago today, October 30, 1912:
    There is every reason why Russian statesmen should rejoice at the success of Servian arms as reported in The Times yesterday morning, but it does not help the prospect of peace to make an open show of joy thereat. Servia lies on the flank of the route Austria hopes some day to take through Albania to the Port of Salonika, and so gain access to the Mediterranean through the Aegean. That is an outcome of the war in the Balkans which the rulers of Russia would not like at all unless an offset could be obtained elsewhere in the Peninsula. The stronger Servia shows herself to be and the more she is able to contribute to the driving of the Turks back to the shores of the Bosporus, or beyond, the more difficult will be the realization of Austrian hopes, the more practicable the long-cherished plans of Russia. The main fact in the situation is that the aims of Russia and those of Austria, so far as they have been defined or indicated, are almost hopelessly opposed. The problem of the peace of Europe lies largely in their reconciliation.
    Of the claims of the two empires, those of Russia seem in themselves the more reasonable. With a vast territory stretching across the northern part of Europe and Asia; with a population which, though backward in many ways, judged by modern standards, is steadily advancing in the arts of production, Russia has no great port open the year round to the ocean pathways of commerce. Holding the northern shore of the Black Sea, her access to the Mediterranean is blocked by tile Turkish possession of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Over and again she has waged war to clear her way of this obstacle, and twice at least she has been balked of the fruits of hard-won victories — once when her conquering armies held Constantinople under their guns. And all her disappointments have been inflicted upon her, not by her immediate foe, but by the jealous Powers of Europe. Every general agreement dictated by these Powers has been followed by violations in the interest of Russia's rivals, the latest being the annexation of     Bosnia and Herzegovina in open contempt of the Treaty of Berlin. Austria, on the other hand, already has access to the Adriatic at the Port of Trieste.
    It is not, however, likely that the relative reasonableness of the claims of the rival Powers will have decisive weight in the adjustment that will finally be made. That will primarily be determined in great part by the "good old rule of man with man" by the relative force each possesses or can command. By this rule Austria at present has the advantage, because her own military strength is great and is well in hand, and because she will probably be backed by Germany. It was the swift massing of German troops on her borders that compelled Russia to submit with such grace as she could when Austria tore up the Treaty of Berlin. Will a like threatening attitude be assumed when the present crisis has to be faced in a conference of the Powers, and will it have the same effect? That, so far as can now be seen, is the crucial question in the situation as it exists.
    Much, it may be said, depends on the result of a war not yet decided. But whatever the final outcome, the Balkan problem will never again be the same. If the Balkan League fail in driving the Turks into and possibly out of Constantinople, they will begin again the preparations that have amazed Europe. If Turkey be not utterly defeated she will not be allowed to resume unchecked sway over her European provinces. And she will never again be available, as she has been in the past, to bar the way of Russia to the open seas. If Austria, backed by Germany, seeks that result, either war or the fear of war, of a general conflict in which all Europe will be involved, is likely to determine the result. The hope for peace lies in the fear of war, and in our judgment it is a reasonable hope. When the responsible statesmen of Europe are presented with the dreadful responsibility of actual decision we are confident that they will decide for peace. When they measure the cost of war, its cruel losses, its limitless destruction, with its uncertainties, and compare these with the utmost possible advantages to be gained by victory on the one side or on the other, we believe that they will decide for peace and find the means to maintain it.