British Navy Ratio Not Quite Germany's.

New York Times 100 years ago today, February 23, 1913:
Nevertheless Reports of Reichstag Debate Show a Distinct Bettering of Feeling.
JAGOW'S WORDS FRIENDLY
Hoped It Might Be Possible to Work Hand In Hand with England on Basis of Identical Interests.
Special Cable to The New York Times.
    LONDON, Feb. 22.— The summary of the discussions of the Reichstag Budget Committee, which was officially published this week, confirms the good impression caused by the reports, circulated a couple of weeks ago, concerning an improvement in the Anglo-German naval situation.
    The official statement shows that the first brief reports failed to do justice to the importance of Admiral von Tirpitz's statement, also that the utterances of Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Secretary, were in an even more conciliatory tone than the world had been led to suppose. In fact, the full reports make the prospect of a real rapprochement between Great Britain and Germany perceptibly brighter.
    In the words of Herr von Jagow the German Government now perceives not merely that it has points of contact of a sentimental kind with England, but also that identical interests are present, and that the hope may be indulged that on the basis of these common interests it may be possible to work in the future hand in hand with the neighbor on the other side of the North Sea.
    Admiral von Tirpitz hinted at the possibility of a naval "understanding" with Great Britain, but when one examines the naval standards which the British and German Admiralties assign as the possible bases of such understanding, it becomes evident that the two Governments are fundamentally at issue.
    Winston Churchill said that the ratio of sixteen British dreadnoughts to ten German would be satisfactory for the present, because the British predominance in older battleships was greater than that, and, he indicated clearly that as the value of these older vessels was diminished by the march of events, the British superiority in dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts would have to be increased. In fact, he explained in detail the extent of the increase contemplated and the policy by which it would be brought about.
    The question, therefore, arises: What did Admiral von Tirpitz mean when he assented to this 16 to 10 ratio as appropriate from the German standpoint? German publicists and the German press seem to have assumed that he contemplated a 60 per cent British superiority over the whole of the battle fleets, which is not at all what Mr. Churchill had in mind. Admiral von Tirpitz on his side said: "I consider the 16 to 10 ratio acceptable. This ratio already exists, for we have eight British squadrons against five German, that is, 16 to 10. Mr. Churchill gave the number of ships. I count in squadrons of eight ships each. That is simpler and clearer."
    On this showing Admiral von Tirpitz does require that the 16 to 10 ratio shall apply to the whole battleship fleet, not merely to new construction, and he appears satisfied.
    This ratio does, in fact, exist at the present time. The British critics point out that if the Admiralty is satisfied with this position it is because for the most part British vessels are, ship for ship, markedly more formidable than their possible opponents.
    That cannot be said to anything like the same extent of the craft laid down since the dreadnought era dawned, and, as one paper says:
    "It again reminds us that the circumstances which render the 16 to 10 ratio acceptable to Great Britain at this moment are purely temporary. If Germany is to continue building warships as powerful, or very nearly as powerful, as our own, the ratio will have to be increased, and even though Mr. Churchill's programme of two keels to one be not carried out in its entirety, it will have to be increased substantially, which means that if Admiral von Tirpitz hopes for a permanent arrangement on the basis of existing numerical ratios, he is not likely to obtain what he desires."
    It is generally acknowledged, however, by the broader-minded press of both countries that the statements made before the Reichstag Committee and their reception in England show a distinct amelioration of conditions, and that an atmosphere of good-will now prevails which brings the possibility of an arrangement such as Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman proposed within the range of practical politics.
    Yet, as the German Foreign Secretary has stated, the new-found friendliness of Great Britain and Germany is a tender plant, and its growth cannot be forced unduly.
    To some observers "the new spirit" awakened in France is merely another term for Jingoism, and President Poincaré's appeal to military patriotism and the appointment of M. Delcassé to St. Petersburg are signs of the times as unpleasant as the improved relations between Germany and Great Britain are satisfactory.