The Powers And Peace.

New York Times 100 years ago today, December 22, 1912:
    The first official word from the Powers since the Ambassadors met is decidedly, practically it is decisively, for peace. The "autonomy" of Albania and a commercial port for Servia on the Adriatic may be taken as marking the end of the bitter quarrel between the latter and Austria which for a month has been the point of danger. The agreement as to these does not necessarily mean that there will be no more fighting in the Balkans, but it makes fighting much less likely, and it may be held to secure the localization of any further operations.
    Some fear is felt that "autonomy" for Albania may mean the recognition of Turkish sovereignty in that region, and so meet the stubborn opposition of the allies. It is more likely to mean a quasi-protectorate by Austria-Hungary and Italy, and even if the claim of Turkey is nominally recognized, the administration of the country will probably be put into the hands of these two Governments. And this fact brings out the influence of Italy in the recent difficult situation in a manner that has not generally been recognized. On the surface it has seemed as if Austria-Hungary were the most active and determined of the Powers, and as if the dual Empire had gained pretty much all that it set out to gain. Italy has not only acquiesced in Austria-Hungary's policy, but has given it open support. Only last week the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs announced in Parliament the adherence of his Government to the renewed Triple Alliance and its readiness to back its allies in strict fulfillment of the terms of the alliance. It is to be noted, however, that at the same time the tone of the Austrian Government became markedly more moderate. Its sources of dispute with Servia began to disappear, and the "rattling of the sabre" died down in the scabbard.
    In these circumstances it is worth while asking if the pledge of Italy to back Austria may not have been in return for a pledge that Austria would not take the aggressive, and would, in all important matters, consult Italy as well as Germany. In other words, it is quite possible that the maintenance of peace in Europe may have been not only the implied but the explicit condition of the renewal of the Triple Alliance. Certainly peace is vital to the interests of Italy. With her newly acquired possessions in North Africa, free use of the Mediterranean is absolutely necessary for her, and in any wars in which Great Britain and France were hostile to her the Mediterranean would be closed to her navy, if that navy itself were not destroyed. So plain is this that it is inconceivable that the Italian Government would enter into any engagement that would expose her to the risk, to the practical certainty, of such disaster. If the agreement with Austria-Hungary has been based on this obvious fact, it is reassuring to reflect that its beneficent effect will not be limited to the present crisis. The need that Italy now feels for peace with Great Britain and France will continue to be felt indefinitely, and it is reasonable to infer that the arrangement by which it is now secured will also continue.
    Still another hopeful consideration. If the situation of Italy be such that she needs general peace, and can impose it upon her allies, those allies will be relieved of temptation to aggressive policies and utterances. To put it bluntly, Germany will be left in a position to deal amicably with Great Britain, since it is the haunting fear of German aggression that has been the source of the long and disturbing rivalry of naval armaments between the two countries. On the basis of the just claims of either country there has not been any cause for this costly competition. Its abandonment would be a blessing for both and for the world.