German Help Needed To Curb Austrian Jingoes.

New York Times 100 years ago today, January 12, 1913:
Dr. Alfred H. Fried, Founder of the German Peace Society, Declares That the Unhealthy Growth of Militarism in Francis Joseph's Empire Has Made It the Most Dangerous Storm Centre of Europe.
    Dr. Alfred H. Fried, author of the following article, is a well-known Austrian writer who for more than twenty years has been in the foremost rank of those interested in the universal peace movement. In 1892 he founded the German Peace Society, and later became a member of the International Peace Institute. He has already written a number of articles and pamphlets on the proceedings of The Hague Conference and other matters relating to the peace movement. The present article was written by Dr. Fried expressly for The Sunday Times.

By Alfred H. Fried.
    In countries possessing national unity the strengthening of the nationalistic idea might produce evils, but it might also tend to a mighty advancement of national solidarity. In countries, however, within which there are people of different nationalities, nationalism can only serve to undermine. No limit is set in such countries to the evil excrescences which such a nationalism may bring; nothing can be done against its luxuriant growth by a mighty democratic opposition interested in the welfare of the State. That which in the former class of country tends to unify and strengthen, tends in the latter to disrupt and weaken, and brings all the consequences to which a nation predestined to such things must resign itself.
    We now have before us the problem of Austria, which, in view of recent happenings, has ceased to be merely an internal problem, and has become one concerning all Europe. The idea of nationalism, which brought unity to the German people, has swept the people of the other monarchy to disruption, even plunged them deeply into it. The idea of nationalism, which a free body of citizens, of the sume way of thinking on political matters, created in the German Empire, has once more brought absolutism into the land of the Danube; it has even obliged the people there to take up the rôle of masking that absolutism. In its worry regarding small and petty national interests, the Austrian people have lost sight of the most important points of view. They have forgotten and betrayed their ideals, and sacrificed the liberties won in 1848 and 1866. The Parliament, elected by universal vote, which in internal political affairs has always been repressed, and which, in foreign affairs, is practically set aside by the delegations that strengthen absolutism, has long since ceased to represent the rights of the people. It has become a sort of nationalistic exchange, in which the welfare of Austria as a whole is placed on the market to be bartered against concessions and advantages to some one of the various nationalities composing the empire.
    The lust for expansion felt by eight peoples, their conception of an unhealthy nationalism, is eating into the State as a whole. The national inbreeding of this group of peoples prevents the growth or a strong democracy and completely clears the way on the one side for the extremists of the proletarian movement, on the other for those destructive elements which are embodied in clericalism and militarism.
    Therein lies the great danger which has made the Austrian problem an international one, which has caused the Austrian monarchy to be a storm centre for Europe. These two outgrowths (one might also add another, based on national unity, which manifests itself in different forms) tend to give practical proof of their existence which reaches over the borders of the empire whenever they are not curbed from within. In such a case clericalism is no longer content to make the people docile toward the Government. It becomes a part of an international power and drives the land on which it exerts the influence into playing international politics in the interests of that power. These tactics of Rome have been so thoroughly laid bare in history that it would be a waste of space to explain the influence of the Papacy on the foreign policy of Austria; it would be superfluous to show how the Italian as well as the Balkan policy of the Austrian monarchy tends to ultramontane principles. As to militarism, it possesses, in all militaristic States, the tendency to become transformed into self-interest. And whereas in the developed democracies of the other European powers it encounters an opposition that works advantageously, in Austria it finds no such thing. Nationaiistic demagogues there have prevented the development of that democracy which is necessary for the bringing of the national life back to health. Militarism has had a free road, and through the rapid development of military competition in Europe, it was destined to grow in Austria to that point where it found itself possessed of the power to act as if the nation were there to protect the army, not the army to protect the nation. Thus it was that wrong-headed nationalism engendered military domination, which at first, by calling attention to one of its aims that was in keeping with patriotism, made the popular representatives and public opinion pliant, but which would surely not hesitate a moment to employ less engaging means if obstacles were met in gaining its ends.
    The danger lying herein is a double one. It is a well-known fact that Austria-Hungary is by no means a rich land. The country suffers heavily from its national debt and its consequences. Commerce and industry are by no means at such a point of development as to arouse pride in a great power, if the position of a great power is to be measured by the degree of welfare enjoyed by its people. In Austria individual initiative is crippled by all sorts of laws that favor laziness and the spirit that tends to form petty cliques. Young men seek by all manner of means to get into some sort of public or private official position which will afford them a sinecure, for the sole reason that they do not wish to be forced to take up the fight for existence.
    Breadth of view is lacking in all walks of life, and the tendency to look to the national Government for help reaches in Austria its most deplorable development. The education of the people is at a low ebb; a frightfully high percentage of the population cannot read and write; educational institutions, which themselves suffer from the effects of the national disruption, are insufficient to cover the needs of a nation of culture, just as is the sanitary organization of the realm, which, in the great cities as well as the country districts, has become so demoralized as to merit being called shameful.
    No matter in what direction one may look, there are voids; there is need even for the barest necessities. On the one side poverty and misery; on the other an effort, becoming repugnantly widespread, which feigns the desire to do away with this evil by enacting the farce of charity. All this constitutes the signs of the times.
    In the midst of this national poverty and inability to find the right course, militarism, now become the pursuit of self-interest, makes its demands felt in a fear-inspiring manner. Each year it increases its exactions, the amount of which it bases solely on the expenses incurred by nations which are able to afford such an outlay on account of possessing great national wealth and an industrious people. In addition to militarism on land, militarism of the sea has arisen, and, finally, militarism of the air, thus causing an ever-increasing stream of millions to be turned away from productive labor and from other purposes to which it should be put if the land os to be regenerated.
    With the exception of the Social Democratic Party, the collective mass of the people resigns itself peacefully to this increasing burden. It does not even seek — as is the case in other countries — to haggle with the military authorities and obtain easier terms. For this reason the new bill for national defense, which was to place upon the people a colossal load, was accepted, without debate by both houses of the imperial Legislature, and for the same reason the latest demand for one hundred millions for the new equipment of the artillery was passed; likewise a practically unlimited programme for the navy. Every bit of criticism is branded as a crime against patriotism, or crippled at the start by the weak policy of the Government toward the nationalistic brokers who constitute the majority in these legislative bodies. Intelligence, insofar as it is not already enlisted willingly in the service of the Government, looks on with indifference at this state of affairs.
    Thus in Austria there is a total lack of forces with which to keep the way clear. A total lack of forces, I repeat, for the opposition of the Social Democratic Party is, collectively, just as powerless as its organization is imposing. Its principle of arraying class against class condemns it to being a mighty driving wheel without a belt. Moreover, there is lacking among the Austrians a strong, progressive party, which might make fast the other end of this belt and transform into realities the healthy postulates of socialism, most especially those which are already ripe.
    The other side of the danger which unopposed militarism brings to the fore concerns international politics. Any organism that is so highly developed must necessarily possess the will to act, if it is not to crumble in upon itself. And the power of this will grows in proportion to the growth of the organization. The motto "Si vis pacem para bellum," which has been placed on the new palace of the War Ministry at Vienna, (in a somewhat shamefaced manner on the rear façade,) was long ago utilized even by pro-militarists as a beautiful phrase. The theory of preventive warfare has been brought to bear by all armies, not only by that of Austria. Finally, it is, after all, only logical that, an institution which demands the greatest sacrifices from the people should be continually bestirring itself to justify its existence.
    Unfortunately, it is exactly this form of activity which is the most costly. For, even if it does not always cause war, it nevertheless always brings on a war scare, after which militarists may always wisely maintain that war was avoided only by the highly efficient state of the army. But that a war scare hurts a country almost as seriously as actual warfare has been most clearly proved by what has happened during the last few months.
    Nor is militarism by any means content with this transformation of an evil into a virtue. In its thirst for self-justification it constantly seeks conflicts. And it is exactly therein that the unending danger lies. For it is a fact that cannot be ignored that the more the world becomes internationalized — the closer relations grow between different countries, the greater technical development and commerce become — the more will causes of international friction increase, the greater the number of conflicts will become.
    A glance at up-to-date national policies, to be sure, will disclose nothing alarming in this; for here also the greatest evil has found the required antidote. In former times it was necessary, whenever a conflict arose, to strike a blow at once and finish up the matter with the sword. But the higher responsibility that is now entailed by such a procedure, the serious damage which it would bring to the entire human race, on account of the more complicated interconnection of the latter, and, finally, the greater risk that it would bring even to the most powerful nation, in view of modern armament and the interrelated nature of modern economy, have reduced the peaceful settlement of political conflicts to a sort of system which is steadily developing itself and offers the most hopeful outlook for the future. Since nations are daily exposed to tangled disputes, but, nevertheless, cannot wage war daily on account of them, they have simply had to patch up their differences without recourse to violence, and have learned thereby that, even for the most desperate cases, an acceptable, peaceful solution may be found.
    In the last two generations Europeans have discovered the possibility of the solution of disputes without fighting and brought it to an important stage of development. Against the dangers arising out of the very nature of things a natural remedy has appeared.
    But this is discarded in a land where there is overgrown militarism, where the democracy cannot reach that stage of development necessary for the curbing of a militarism desirous of justifying itself, and which finds in international political conflicts nothing but obstacles. In such a country the well-schooled diplomacy of peace, which we see successfully at work in Western Europe and America, cannot become strong enough, whereas an old school of diplomacy dependent on militarism still continues active, with its precious mottoes concerning "prestige" and "the position of a great power," with its visionary points of view for the maintenance of certain interests, its political legacies and its formidable limitations of breathing space and elbow room.
    Austria-Hungary is at present confronted by such a dilemma. Instead of seeking, by every means of peaceful compromise and adjustment, to turn the new conditions in the Balkans to its own advantage, it allows itself to be dragged by its justification-seeking militaristic interests into a mailed-fist policy. This policy asserts itself in such a strong, unmodern and bellicose manner that the fist threatens to shiver the table in its owner's house on which it crashes down — the threat of war does almost as much damage to conditions within the empire as would actual war in former times.
    By perusal of the above, readers will find an explanation of a state of affairs which has burst on Europe's ken in a somewhat startling way. The outlook is not cheering, but there is no reason for despair. In this case, also, the evil carries its remedy.
    At present there already exists a Europe which is not merely a geographical term, but a political power, whenever there is a question of assuring the peace and quiet of the family of nations inhabiting the old continent. This new power expresses itself not in any accepted form but by a strongly organized desire for peace, which instinctively opposes any disturbing element. If, therefore, a new storm centre develops itself in Austria-Hungary on account of the reasons herein set forth, the European desire for peace, if only it concentrates itself to resist the danger, will succeed once again in overcoming it.
    Belligerent militarism, which, within the realm itself, finds no obstacles, will find them beyond the boundaries of Austria. It is not to be overcome by a coalition — that, too, is an antiquated method. The friendly working of the present-day system of international Alliances is more efficient than were formerly the cannon of allied armies.
    A nation that has become, or threatens to become, a centre of disturbance lessens its value as an ally. Salvation, it seems to me, depends on guarding against this. The "Nibelungen faith" of the German Empire toward its ally, Austria-Hungary, should be kept now in quite a different way than by backing up the Austrian jingoes. The need felt by Germany for a strong ally — strong not only in arms but in diplomatic and, above all, in economic efficiency — will act beneficently toward allaying the clamor for action arising from uncurbed militarism in Austria. It is incumbent on the common sense and tact of the statesmen of Germany to steer Austria into a policy of international compromise consonant with the times — the only course that will assure a new era of prosperity and new political power to Austria and to Europe, the quiet and orderliness that is unconditionally demanded.