Russia's Remarkable Plan For Dismembering China.

New York Times 100 years ago today, January 19, 1913:
Significance of Russo-Mongolian Treaty Now Apparent Kept Secret for Nearly a Month Until Protocol Was Signed Giving Plenary Powers to Russia. Blow to American Commerce.By Walter Littlefield.
    In the Sacred City of Urga, in Northern or Outer Mongolia, there was a remarkable treaty signed on Oct. 11. Nearly, a month later, Nov. 3, an equally extraordinary protocol was signed at the same place, and by the same negotiators — the Russian Plenipotentiary. M. Korostovetz, and certain, potentates representing the Gheergan, or Living God of the Mongols.
    Both treaty and protocol have been for weeks almost ignored in those quarters which are most vitally interested. They were supposed to deal merely with commercial questions in Northern Mongolia, which country being pierced by spurs of the Trans-Siberian Railway, might or might not jeopardize British and American trade in China.
    The truth is that the whole of Mongolia, a territory of over half a million square miles, equaling in area that part of the United States east of the Mississippi, has been taken from the young Republic of China and placed under the "protection" of Russia. The texts of both treaty and protocol, which will herewith be presented, scarcely admit of any other interpretation. Commercially Mongolia is to-day part of the Russian Empire. Politically, she enjoys the fiction of autonomy.
    Thus the dismemberment of China has apparently actually begun and is likely to continue indefinitely. It is inconceivable that China in its present state of republican adolescence can hope successfully to cope with Russia. Its only salvation lies in the possibility that the commercial interests of the United States and Great Britain are sufficient for these powers to request and require that the territorial entity of China be preserved and its longstanding treaties with them be kept intact.
    Mongolia, a vast, ill-defined territory in Central Asia, and quite as much a part of the old Chinese Empire as any of the latter's vice-regal States, is, like ancient Gaul, divided into three parts: Northern or Outer Mongolia, Central Mongolia or Gobi, and Southeastern or Inner Mongolia. The first is one of the most fertile countries in the world; the second is a barren, sandy, rocky desert; the third is like the second save that its approaches from either the Manchurian or Chinese side along the Khuigan chain of mountains are rich in pasture lands and minerals.
    In the Russian policy which has resulted in the covenant in question there is nothing new. It has been the same wherever it could, by international complications, find expression — in Manchuria, in Persia, in the Balkans — an outlet southward for the enormous, yet scarcely tapped, resources of the Empire of the Czar.
    But what is this treaty which has brought consternation to the Government at Peking, joy at St. Petersburg and Tokio, and grave forebodings at London and Washington? Its text runs as follows:
    In consideration of the unanimous popular desire of the Mongolians to preserve the historically evolved organization of their country the Chinese troops and authorities were removed from Mongolian territory, and Djebzun-Damba-Khutukhta has been proclaimed Sovereign of the Mongolian people. Thus the former relations between Mongolia and China have been terminated.
    At this moment, in view of the above-stated facts and the mutual friendship which has always existed between the Russian and Mongolian people, and the necessity to define exactly the order governing mutual Russo-Mongolian trade, Mr. J. Korostovetz, the Plenipotentiary of the Imperial Russian Government, and
    Prime Minister of Mongolia, Protector of 10,000 teachings, Sayn novn-khan Nampan Surun,
    Plenipot. Minister of Interior, Chingsuzukhutu tsin-yang lama Tsering-Chimit,
    Plenipot. Minister of Foreign Affairs, having rank of Khan-erdeni dai-tsin-vang Khan Dorji,
    Plenipot. Minister of War, Erdeni Dalai-tsiun-vang Gombo-surun,
    Plenipot. Minister of Finance, Tushtsu-tsin-vang Chak-dorjab, and
    Plenipot, Minister of Justice, Erdeni tsiunvang Namsarai, being invested with full powers of the Sovereign ruler of the Mongolian people, Mongolian Government, and the Prince rulers have agreed to the following:
    Art. 1. The Imperial Russian Government shall give its assistance to Mongolia, for the preservation of the autonomous organization established by her, and also the right to maintain her national troops, not to admit into her territory either the Chinese troops, or colonization of her lands by Chinese.
    Art. 2. The Sovereign of Mongolia and the Mongolian Government shall grant, as formerly, to Russian subjects and to Russian trade enjoyment in their (Mongolian) territory of the rights and privileges enumerated in the protocol annexed hereto. It is understood that there shall not be granted in Mongolia to other foreign subjects more rights than those enjoyed there by Russian subjects.
    Art. 3. Should the Mongolian Government find it necessary to conclude a separate treaty with China, or any other power, that new treaty shall not in any case infringe or modify the clauses (provisions) of the present, agreement and, of the protocol annexed thereto without the consent of the Russian Government.
    Art. 4. The present friendly agreement shall come into operation from the date of its signature.

    Vague rumors of this treaty, with more or less authentic details as to its terms, trickled through diplomatic sources into the press and were variously commented on through November and December. But it was, to all intents, a secret treaty, and was to remain so until the Mongolian Princes had signed the protocol. By Nov. 1, 1912, this had been done, and then, on the third, the following instrument, was duplicated in Russian and Mongolian and copies exchanged between the Russian Plenipotentiary and the Gheergan:
    In accordance with Art, 2 of the Russo-Mongolian agreement, signed to-day, the Russian Plenipotentiary, M. Korostovetz, and the Mongolian Plenipotentiaries authorized for the purpose by Mongolian Sovereign Princes have agreed on the following in regard to the rights and privileges of Russians in Mongolia and of Mongols in Russia:
    1. Russian subjects shall, as in the past, have the right freely to live in and travel in all parts of Mongolia, to conduct business, establish factories, and arrange affairs with all individuals or companies, official or private, whether of Russian, Mongol, Chinese, or other nationality.
    2. Russian subjects shall, as in the past, have the right to import and export at all times products and manufactures of Russia, Mongolia, China and other countries duty free, and to conduct free trade exempt and companies.
    3. Russian banks shall have the right to establish branch banks throughout Mongolia and conduct banking business with all individuals and companies.
    4. Trade can be conducted for ready money or on credit, but in the case of credit transactions the Mongol Princes or the Treasury cannot be held responsible for the credit of private individuals.
    5. No monopoly can be established either in commerce or manufacture. The Mongolian authorities shall not prevent Mongols or Chinese from doing business with Russian subjects, nor prevent their employment in Russian commercial or industrial enterprises.
    6. Russian subjects shall have the right to lease or buy land in all towns and cities throughout Mongolia, and establish commercial enterprises and manufactures, build houses, stores and go-downs, and lease vacant land for agricultural purposes. Pasture lands and places set apart for religious purposes are not included.
    7. Russian subjects are free to arrange with the Mongolian Government concessions regarding mining, forestry, fishing and other business enterprises.
    8. The Russian Government shall have the right to establish Consulates in Mongolia wherever it is deemed necessary after consultation with the Mongolian Government. The latter shall have a corresponding right to appoint Mongolian representatives along the Russian frontier.
    9. Wherever Russian Consulates are established or Russian business is conducted Russian trade settlements can be established, which will be under the administration of Russian Consuls; or, where there are no Consuls, under the administration of the senior Russian merchant.
    10. Russian post offices can be established throughout Mongolia, with postal service to the Russian frontier, at the cost of the Russian Government.
    11. Russian Consuls shall have the right to use Mongolian post stations without charge, provided that the number of horses to be furnished by the Mongols shall not exceed 100 monthly, nor the number of camels thirty.
    12. All Mongolian rivers flowing into Russian territory and the branches thereof are open to navigation by Russian subjects with Russian vessels. The Russian Government will assist the Mongolian Government in the conservation of these rivers and the improvement of navigation by buoying and lighting, and Russian subjects shall, in accordance with Article 6, be granted areas on river frontages as stopping places for Russian vessels, and can there build wharves and go-downs.
    13. Russian subjects desiring to transport goods and live stock shall have the right to use rivers and roads in Mongolia, and with their own money can build bridges; establish ferries and collect fees from the people using these bridges and ferries.
    14. Grazing lands in Mongolia shall be reserved for the use of flocks belonging to Russian subjects when migrating, and such lands can be used for three months without payment, after which period charges can be made.
    15. All rights and privileges enjoyed hitherto by Russian subjects along the frontier for hunting, fishing and the cutting of grass in Mongolia are confirmed.
    16. In regard to the procedure to be followed in connection with business and other agreements between Russian subjects, and Mongols and Chinese, it is provided that property transfers must be written, and that the contracts must be submitted to Mongolian officials and the Russian Consuls for approval. If a dispute arises in a case, it must be submitted to arbitration. If it is still unsettled, the case must be sent before a mixed tribunal, which shall be permanent where a Russian Consul is stationed. In other places a temporary tribunal shall be organized by a Russian Consul and the Mongolian Prince in whose territory the defendants reside, each side engaging to execute the findings of the Court, the Russian Consul on Russian subjects and the Mongol Prince on the Mongols or Chinese.
    17. The. protocol takes effect from the date of the signature.

    The curious thing about both treaty and protocol is that no distinction is made between Northern Mongolia, which signed the treaty, and the rest of the country, whose representatives apparently signed the protocol. It would seem that the autonomy of Northern Mongolia, recognized by Russia on Oct. 11, became identical with the autonomy of the whole of Mongolia, recognized on Nov. 3, and then passed with that distinction under the suzerainty of the Czar. For that is practically what it means, since every explanation that Russia has made on the subject tends to leave in doubt both status and area of "Mongolia."
    For example, the Russian Legation at Peking has categorically stated that while the broad term of Mongolia is used in the Convention; it only applies to Outer Mongolia, excluding Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang, but it considers Kobdo to be in Outer Mongolia, while the question of Altai region and also the general delimitation of the boundaries of Inner and Outer Mongolia are main matters, needing settlement by discussion in Peking. This explains the conflicting statements made by the Russians and Chinese regarding the presence of Chinese troops in Outer Mongolia. The Chinese assert that they have no troops in Outer Mongolia, whereas the Russians say there are some 2,000, which, approximately, is the number of Chinese troops at Kobdo.
    For many weeks Peking as well as the Chancelleries of Western Europe were kept in complete ignorance of the full significance of what had been done at Urga, Berlin almost completely ignored the subject. Paris, while congratulating St. Petersburg, betrayed its ignorance of the whole affair. Only a few days ago, in replying to an interpellation in the House of Commons, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, said that it would seem that the Russo-Mongolian agreement was merely intended to confirm rights and privileges for Russian subjects which existed under previous treaties and generally to secure the status, practically amounting to autonomy "which is the normal condition of Outer Mongolia."
    In Washington particular concern was at first felt for American trade owing to the representations made there by envoys of the Chinese Republic, but this feeling has now apparently subsided. American merchants, who have large interests in China and are believed to be well informed as to Washington diplomacy, tell me that their trade has nothing to fear from Russian domination in Mongolia, because in Manchuria it flourished until Japan ousted Russia therefrom. It is to be feared, however, that they are as ignorant of the true state of affairs as Sir Edward Grey is.
    It seems proper to ask at this juncture whether the signing of the Urga Convention has influenced the Washington Government indefinitely to postpone its recognition of the Chinese Republic.
    Probably it has, although from departmental sources I learn that such postponement should not be construed into unfriendliness toward the republic — quite the contrary. According to State Department officials, who are unwilling to be quoted, the reason why the Washington Government is rushing defense preparations at Pearl Harbor is to be found in the vexed Mongolian situation, and not because of fears that Japan is meddling in Mexico.
    It is stated that President Yuan Shi-Kai has appealed to the United States, through Minister Calhoun, not to see the "open-door" policy guaranteed by President McKinley and Secretary Hay violated through the intrigue of Russia and Japan.
    It is understood that President Taft and Secretary Knox are watching the Mongolian developments in China, and that certain protests arising out of Japanese acts in Manchuria are also to bring investigation.
    If the facts are as alleged it is expected that a United States remonstrance will be conveyed to Tokio and St. Petersburg, while at the same time China will be formally advised that the United States is absolutely determined to uphold the policy of the "open-door" with a friendly interest in the integrity of China.
    The authentic details of the ultimate result of the Urga negotiations were not made known to the Peking Government until the arrival at the Chinese capital in December of a deputation of Princes of Inner Mongolia, consisting of Duke Ner-Mu-Erh and the Chinese Governor of the Kirin province, Chun. After a prolonged interview with the President Mr. Yuan Shi-Kai instructed Governor General Chang that the Government had its own definite policy in regard to Mongolia, and in case the Government decided to have recourse to arms, the Governor General would be further notified. Until such time the Governor General was requested to refrain from starting any movement that would brew further international complications. In accordance with the instructions, Governor General Chang has conferred with military and civil authorities under his command and decided on the following points:
    1. Due consideration should be paid to the maintenance of cordial relations with Russia, refraining from any hasty measures.
    2. To defend Outer Mongolia and protect Inner Mongolia.
    3. To complete preparations for war.
    4. To prepare for action upon the order of the Government at any moment.

    Of somewhat milder import are my advices from St. Petersburg, which are to the effect that the Chinese Minister there is negotiating with the Russian Government on the following bases:
    1. To conclude a Russo-Chinese agreement before giving recognition to the Russo-Mongolian agreement.
    2. To recognize all the rights of the Russians in Mongolia.
    3. It is not necessary for Russia to withdraw all her troops in Uliassutai, Kobuto, Koulon, and Kiakhta.
    4. The Russians shall have the right to build railways in Mongolia.
    5. Russia shall have the mining rights in all Mongolia.
    6. The right to construct telegraphs, telephones and other means of communications in Mongolia shall be conceded to Russia.
    7. Russians shall have freedom of travel in the interior of Mongolia.
    8. Russians shall have freedom of action.

    Up to Jan, 5, however, the Peking Government had not given any definite instructions in regard to these negotiations.
    In Peking the French Minister, who is acting as intermediary between Russia and China, is said to be disappointed at the ambiguous attitude of the Chinese Government. From this source of information the idea of the Peking Government is to cancel the Russo-Mongolian Convention and not to recognize Mongolia's autonomy, but to accept the Russian claims for certain privileges in Mongolia. Therefore, when the Russian Minister visited the Foreign Office the other day, the Chinese Government simply requested the cancellation of the Russo-Mongolian Convention, but offered no concrete plan for the negotiations.
    At a recent secret session of the Chinese National Assembly the Premier and the Minister of Finance were present and made the following statements in connection with the Mongolian question:
    1. Neither Russia nor China shall station troops in Mongolia.
    2. Russia claimed that Mongolia should employ foreign military advisers for the training of her troops, but as all military affairs should be placed under the control of the Central Government, Mongolia cannot be permitted to train her own troops, though she can form corps.
    3. China has agreed to the free importation of Russian goods into Mongolia.
    4. China has refused the Russian request for right of constructing a railway line connecting Urga with the Trans-Siberian line.
    5. Russia has requested that both Urga and Kiakhta be opened to trade and leased to her, but China has refused to lease these places to Russia while agreeing to open them to trade.

    The latest authoritative view of China's position has been received from Prince Kalaching, Director of Mongolia and Tibet. He writes:
    When the republican régime was inaugurated it was decided to join the five races of China into one nation, and the Mongolians were one of the five races. The Mongolian Association demanded good treatment, and the preservation of the territorial, religious, and hereditary rights of the Mongols. These demands were agreed to by the National Council and embodied in nine articles for the special treatment of the Mongols. These articles were welcomed by most of the Mongolian Princes, because they realized that Mongolia must remain a part of China. Not only should Mongolia not become autonomous, it really could not become autonomous.
    The beginning of the trouble at Urga was due to the cruelty of the Chinese Amban, who was stationed there two or three years ago. The Chepisundampa Hutukiu thereupon became angry and attempted to throw off the yoke of the absolute monarchy. With a few Princes, who acted hastily in quick temper, he declared the independence of Outer Mongolia and drove away the Chinese officials stationed there. This gave the Russians an opportunity to mislead the Mongolians. By using pleasing words, and undertaking to supply the Mongolians with money, provisions, and munitions, the Russians under the pretence of supporting the Mongols really attempted to annex Mongolia.
    In the recent secret treaty with the living Buddha in Urga, the Russians unjustifiably employ the word Mongolia, which is wrong because the living Buddha cannot claim to represent the whole of Inner and Outer Mongolia. When negotiations were opened at Urga only two Mongol Princes and two Dukes participated, the majority of the Princes and nobles being opposed to the negotiations. Some of them were compelled, by force, to agree to the convention. The four Khalkha Leagues, and the Khans, Princes, and Dukes did not in their hearts desire autonomy. Moreover, even if they had agreed, the Inner Mongols and the tribes of Ili and Chinghai were not consulted and knew nothing about the convention.
    Therefore the use of the word "Mongolia" cannot be justified. If you will read the contents of the agreement you will perceive that it really constitutes an attempt on the part of Russia to annex Mongolia. Under the pretence of protecting Mongolia the Russians are breaking international law and endangering the peace of the Far East, and consequently the world.
    The Mongolians regard the conventions as confiscating their territories and infringing their liberties. They fear that Mongolia will now become a second Poland or Korea, the laughing stock of all the nations of the world. Most of the Mongolians are not enlightened, but they cannot tolerate such unlawful acts. No people in the world will willingly submit to the loss of its territory. As far as the Mongolians can see. Russia is trying to confiscate their territory.
    Russia's statement in the form of a communiqué published in the Novoe Vremya of St. Petersburg is as follows:
    Since April 13, (26.) 1912, when the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs made in the Duma a statement of the aims of Russian policy in Outer Mongolia, Russian diplomacy has been making strenuous efforts to secure from the Chinese Government an engagement to respect the original organization of that country. According to the said statement of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. the Russian Government has pointed out to the Chinese three conditions which, in its opinion, would constitute guarantees of the inviolability of that organization, namely, abstention on the part of the Chinese Government from introducing in Outer Mongolia Chinese administration, from stationing there Chinese troops, and from colonizing its lands with Chinese.
    The Chinese Government, however, was not willing to enter into consideration of the proposals of the Russian Government, based on the above stated principles, while the Government which had just been formed in Urga did not express any intention to be reconciled with the substitution in China of the republican form of government in place of the imperial authority.
    Concurrently with this, the Russian Government came to a conclusion that the Chinese Government either could not or did not wish to enter into negotiations for the revision of the Russo-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1881, and consequently considered itself entitled to notify China that the said treaty must be recognized as remaining in force for another ten years; that is, until 1921. Thus a question arose as to what right Russian trade and Russian subjects may enjoy in Mongolia, where the Chinese authority has been (de facto) superseded by the authority of the Government of Urga.
    In consideration of the above stated facts, Mr. Korostovetz was dispatched in September, 1912, to Urga with instructions to ascertain the conditions whereby could be defined the relations between Russia and the practically autonomous Mongolian Government and commercial rights of Russian subjects in the territory which is under the sovereignty of the said Government. The pourparlers between Mr. Korostovetz and the Mongolian Government resulted in the signing on 21st October, (3 Nov.,) 1912, in Urga by the Russian envoy and the Mongolian Plenipotentiaries of an agreement by virtue of which the Russian Government promises the Mongolians, * * *
    The Japanese point of view is frankly and uncompromisingly Russophile — so much so, indeed, that one may be permitted to believe that St. Petersburg and Tokio have reached a definite understanding as to their independent and mutual interests in China. Naturally, the Japanese Government will make no communication on the subject, but the opinion of the official press of Tokio is substantially as follows:
    China's right to Mongolia is no greater than the right of the Mongolians themselves to China, for if the later Manchu dynasty annexed Mongolia to China, the Mongolians had previously possessed both China and Manchuria, while the Manchus in their turn seized China. Diplomacy and ethics are not convertible terms, but if the principle of interference by one
    State in the affairs of another can be justified in any circumstances then we shall have to admit that Russia, as Mongolia's next-door neighbor, is not without warrant for the practical interest she is manifesting in the concerns of the latter.
    "Nor do the atrocities," says the Nippon, "perpetrated by Chinese punitive columns in rebellious East Mongolia tend to engender the silent tear of 'sacred pity' for the curtailment of Chinese authority in these directions. All that is left for the republic is to reckon with the actualities of the situation."
    "It is in vain," adds the Japan Advertiser, "to consider seriously the possibility of successful armed resistance from China to Russo-Japanese pretensions, at least for a term which need not be reckoned in the calculations of practical politics, and we are, therefore, safe in prophesying that the new republic can reach a modus vivendi with its powerful neighbors only by reconciling itself to the loss of Mongolia, North and South Manchuria." Even adhering strictly to the letter of the Urga convention there is opened a vast vista for Russian political and industrial activity, which is bound to affect China and consequently her trade relations with the Western World. In spite of the optimism of American merchants there is no reason to believe that the fate of China under rapidly growing Russian domination will be different from that of Manchuria under Japanese.
    In accounting for Japan's enthusiasm over Russia's policy, it should be remembered that at Changchun, a flourishing town in Inner Mongolia, the Russian and Japanese railway systems meet. The Russian system will presently be expanded by connecting Myssovaya, which is only 230 miles from Irkutsk, with Kiachta, and later on with Kalgan, from which one may reach Peking entirely by rail. Thus when the products of European Russia, via the Trans-Siberian line, shall be brought overland into the heart of China, of what benefit to Western merchants will be the treaty ports of the coast, even supposing that Russia would allow them to remain "open"?
    Yet, there is another view, another explanation of it all, which is interesting. If only for the fact that it tends to demonstrate that Japanese enthusiasm is ill-timed. It is entertained by a well-known Russian publicist, who was a soldier in the Russo-Japanese war and knows the country thoroughly. It is to the effect that Russia desires Northern Mongolia merely as a buffer state in order to protect Siberia from any Chinese aggressions that maybe attempted by the Republic of the future, with or without Japanese inspiration.
    Russia, he declares, has at present 250,000 soldiers in garrison along the Trans-Siberian between Irkutsk and Vladivostok. These men are there for a purpose, and that purpose is not to coerce China, whose present difficulty with Russia will be settled amicably and by diplomacy. Thus, he concludes, at Urga was forged the first link in a chain which, when completed, will bring the Russians and Japanese into conflict again. For this conflict, which will be developed by conflicting interests in Mongolia, Russia is prepared.
    Whether this hypothesis be right or not, one thing is pretty certain: Interesting and far-reaching events may be expected any day.