Use Of Ideal Motors Can Solve War Puzzle.

New York Times 100 years ago today, January 19, 1913:
Use of Motors Will Reduce Length and Multiply Efficiency of Wagon Train.
OLD U.S. ARMY MULE DOOMED
War Department Analyzes Impediments Involved in Division's Supply — Perfect Truck Not Yet.
Prepared by the United States War Department for the New York Times.
    Mobility spells success. Considering two opposing armies equally strong and skilled, the more mobile of the two or the one that can strike the other oftener and quicker will be the victor.
    A requirement of modern warfare is that troops be massed or held together in large groups until the decisive battles of the war have been fought. This enables the commander to hit his enemy hard and effectively when the proper time arrives. If this is not done, a wideawake commander will take advantage of any dispersion of his enemy's troops, and by keeping his troops massed, will meet and defeat smaller detachments of his opponent's troops one after the other. This has often been done in past wars notwithstanding the fact that the aggregate strength of the troops of the wideawake commander was in many cases far inferior to that of his opponent who had scattered his forces.
    As far as supply is concerned, it is much simpler to scatter troops and to let each detachment look after itself and, as far as possible, live on the country. This simple solution of the supply question to-day is impossible for the reasons given. It follows that when troops are massed in great bodies the local resources will not maintain them and that reliance must be placed on vehicles employed in bringing up supplies from the rear. The greatest difficulties are presented in this operation.

Number of Mules Needed.
    A division, which is the principal fighting unit of the United States Army, is composed of about 20,000 men. To supply this division with rations, forage, and ammunition about 662 four-mule escort wagons are required. These wagons are capable of carrying a reserve of five days' rations and grain and a small reserve of ammunition. This reserve is based on the lessons learned from wars in our country and Europe and is the minimum, that can be carried to-day with safety.
    Even with all these wagons a division can only keep itself supplied from a depot located about two days' march in the rear — a day's march for a large body of troops is not dependent on the distance that can be covered by fighting men, but is dependent on the distance that can be covered by the accompanying transportation. Under ideal conditions of climate and road this distance is estimated at twelve miles for a day's march, or twenty-four miles for two. If this distance be exceeded for any considerable length of time, and if no other means of supply are available, it follows that the fighting men and the cavalry and artillery horses will soon be without food.
    In addition to the 662 four-mule supply wagons there are also required by the division 299 other types of vehicles, i.e., ambulances for the movement of the sick and wounded, caissons for artillery ammunition, wagons for wireless telegraph outfits, picks and shovels, pontoons, &c.
    This aggregates 961 vehicles, with approximately 4,000 animals as the transportation equipment for a fighting division. Notwithstanding all this transportation the division is more or less restricted to a radius of action of twenty-four miles from its base of supplies. If no railway or water routes lead to this base, then it must be kept filled by road vehicles. It requires little imagination to picture the enormous number of additional wagons that would be required for this work alone.

An Estimate of Long Ago.
    The Comte de Paris calculated that an army of 100,000 men would require 10,975 wagons and 65,850 animals to keep it supplied ten days from its base. This calculation was made long before the advent of the modern rapid-fire rifle and field gun. The increased expenditure of ammunition incident to the use of these weapons must be met with a corresponding increase in supply.
    We must now consider the road space that is occupied by all these wagons of the division alone. Each vehicle at present assigned to a division occupies about twenty yards of road space. Therefore, if the 961 wagons be in a column on a single road, the distance from the head to the tail of the column will be some eleven miles. Consider for an instant the military difficulties of defending all this transportation from the attack of enterprising cavalry, and how many troops such defense would require.
    The skilled commander will, of course, march a division whenever possible in two or more columns on parallel roads and this will make it easier of defense. He must, however, have these columns at all times within supporting distance of each other or his wide-awake opponent will mass his troops against one of the columns and destroy it before the others can come up to its assistance. Sometimes he may be able to find such roads, but more often this is not the case, and then he must detach large numbers of troops from his offensive force in front and use them in defensive work in his rear. The fact therefore remains that his freedom of action is restricted to a great extent by the number of wagons he must take with him. As an illustration of the number of wagons required by the Northern army in the civil war, Gen. Grant in his memoirs states that there never was a better organized Quartermaster corps than that of the Army of the Potomac in 1864, and that its wagon train would have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond — sixty miles or more — if marched in single file upon one road.
    We must now consider the load that can be carried by each vehicle of our existing transportation. Under fair conditions of road and temperature the four mules attached to our army wagon can draw a load of 3,000 pounds. There are, of course, many different types of wagons among the 961 referred to as belonging to a division, but the average load of each is 3,000 pounds.

Animals vs. Motor Wagons.
    From the foregoing description of army transportation we arrive at the following conclusions with reference to the present type of animal-drawn vehicles belonging to a fighting division:
    First— The total weight of supplies and impedimenta that must be carried with a division is 2,883,000 pounds, requiring 961 wagons for transportation. Second— The total road space occupied is 961 wagons by 20 yards, or approximately eleven miles. Third— A day's march of a large body of troops in its advance or orderly retreat is controlled by the march of its accompanying wagons. A day's march for a wagon is twelve miles — this includes moving up twelve miles loaded and returning twelve miles empty. Fourth— A division of 20,000 men equipped with 961 wagons is only self-sustaining when the distance which separates it from its base does not exceed twenty-four miles. If this distance be exceeded an enormous number of wagons must be used in moving the base or in keeping it filled when no railway or water route exists for the purpose.
    From the foregoing it is apparent to what an extent the failure or success of an army in war is dependent on the efficiency of its transportation.
    We now come to a consideration of auto trucks and the military advantages of their use. An auto truck capable of transporting say 4,000 pounds over all roads at an average speed of ten miles an hour would have the following advantages:
    First— The mobility of the troops would not be dependent on the mobility of its accompanying supply vehicles, as is the case with the wagon, for, with an average speed of ten miles an hour, the day's march or movement of the auto truck would many times exceed the day's march of the fighting force. Second— A great reduction could be made in the amount of impedimenta and supplies with the division for within say five hours such of these as might be required could be sent up from fifty miles in the rear. In twenty-four hours two return trips might be made from the same point. Compare this with the four-mule wagon, carrying 3,000 pounds, with its maximum march of twelve miles, loaded, to the front and twelve miles, empty, to the rear. Third— Suppose that no reductions were made in the amount of supplies and impedimenta carried with the division, the advantage over the four-mule wagon would be as follows:

Vast Saving of Labor.
    By the use of auto trucks carrying 4,000 pounds, the number of vehicles could be reduced by one-quarter, or from 961 four-mule wagons to 720 auto trucks. The road space required for each moving auto truck would be less than that required for each four-mule wagon. This saving of space can safely be estimated at 25 per cent., or a reduction from about eleven miles for the wagon to about eight miles for the same number of auto trucks. With auto trucks capable of carrying 4,000 pounds, this space could be reduced to about six miles. The radius of action of the fighting troops instead of being controlled by the movements of their wagons and thus limited to twenty-four miles would be for all practical purposes unlimited. Fourth— Imagine what a relief it would be to a commander if, before a battle, he could send back to the rear all his transportation except that required for ammunition and the collection of the wounded. At a distance of from twenty-five to fifty miles, under average conditions, this transportation would be safe from the attack of cavalry.
    His divisions would thus be mobile and stripped for action and would be able to make the most of any tactical errors of his opponent and could strike him when and where he pleased. His tactical dispositions and movements would not be controlled by the defense of great cumbersome wagon trains. These are only a few of the advantages resulting from the use of the auto truck. The transportation problem facing the fighting General and the great advantage of the ideal auto truck over the four-mule wagon has already been outlined. The question naturally arises then as to whether the auto truck has been developed to such an extent as to warrant its replacing the wagon.
    It is a rather curious fact that in this country and abroad the development of the touring car is far in advance of that of the auto truck. Touring cars are built which are capable of going over almost any kind of road, whereas the majority of auto trucks are constructed for use in cities or over metaled suburban roads. With the present development of the auto truck the army can and will employ them in certain possible theatres of operation, whereas in others it must, for the present, at least, employ the four-mule wagon.

Tests Made by the Army.
    Tests have been and are still being carried out by the army with a view to the development of an auto truck for army use which will meet all conditions of field service. The experience gained in practical tests of auto trucks conducted by the army last Summer over all kinds of roads demonstrated a most decided improvement in their efficiency. Indeed this test shows conclusively that the goal of efficiency is within sight The development of the military auto truck goes hand in hand with the development of the auto truck for the farmer and the countryman. The same conditions must be met with each, and what will suit one will suit the other. The military auto truck is simply a conveyance for transporting supplies, and no special design of engine or car is necessary.
    If the farmer's auto truck can transport his potatoes, grain, and flour over good and bad roads, this same car can transport these same necessities for the army under similar road conditions. If efficiency demands a capacity of 3,000 pounds for the farmer, efficiency would also demand the same capacity for the army.
    It would be absurd to consider for an instant the adoption of a special type of auto truck for army use. When war comes, standard commercial types are the only ones that can be purchased or hired in any number, and on these we must rely for the maintenance of our armies in the field. The army does not want to accumulate any more auto trucks than are necessary to meet its actual requirements to-day. It would be ridiculous for the army to go to war, say in 1920, equipped with its reserve auto trucks of a 1912 model, purchased to-day in anticipation of war.
    The practical inducements held out to the wide-awake manufacturer to-day for the development of an efficient military auto truck are as follows:
    First— The Government has in actual use to-day with troops some 2,000 animal-drawn wagons, the majority of which should be replaced by the "ideal" auto truck. Second— If the "ideal" auto truck for military purposes be developed, it follows that the "ideal" auto truck for the farmer has also been developed. Third— If the manufacturers and designers of auto trucks succeed in constructing a commercial vehicle suitable for military purposes, it would seem a rational step that, as in many European countries, advance arrangements could be made so that the Government in war could take over and make use of these trucks.