The Agreement Of The Powers.

New York Times 100 years ago today, January 19, 1913:
    The joint note of the Powers has finally been handed to Turkey. In brief, it urges Turkey to surrender Adrianople and trust the Powers to settle the question of the Aegean Islands, with assurance of safety to Turkey. The note plainly intimates that if this be not done Europe will allow the war to be resumed and will not come to the aid of Turkey, even if Constantinople fall and the Asiatic Provinces are invaded. Turkey's reply is that she cannot surrender Adrianople, but still hopes for some other basis of peace.
    The Powers have gone much further than it was expected they could agree to go, even a fortnight since. There was, up to that time, a general belief, whatever might be the course of the war, that the Powers would not permit the Balkan allies to take Constantinople, and the possibility that they would be allowed to carry the war into the Asiatic territory of Turkey was not dreamed of. Now the Powers have pointed to both these events as consequences of Turkish obstinacy, from which they will not undertake to safeguard Turkey. Their general attitude and spirit plainly have undergone a radical change.
    It may be said that these consequences are very unlikely to occur, that even if the war be reopened and the allies concentrate their forces on the lines of Tchatalja the task of taking Constantinople will be beyond their strength, and an effective movement to the south of the Dardanelles still not feasible. But this is an aspect of the situation which the Powers must have considered, and they can scarcely have sought to bend the will of the Porte by an idle menace of ills that they themselves believe cannot come about. In effect, the note is a statement that if Turkey shall persist in refusing the terms of the allies the Powers will not interfere to prevent Turkey from being driven wholly out of Europe, or even to prevent the disintegration of her Asiatic Empire. That is the most momentous declaration that the concert of Europe has issued during its existence.
    It is quite probable that back of this collective statement there is an understanding between the Powers that Constantinople shall not pass into the hands of the Balkan allies — who, indeed, would be ill-fitted for such a charge — but shall be made a "free city," under civilized administration, insuring open passage for the commerce of the world between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Such a plan would obviously be in the interests of peace and progress. But it would, quite as much as conquest by the allies, involve the extinction of Turkey as a European power and an immense reduction of her prestige as an Asiatic power. And to this result is added the amazing suggestion that "the war may be carried into her Asiatic provinces" and "she must not count on the Powers to preserve her." When we consider the bitterness with which the interests and claims of Germany, of Russia, and, in less degree, of Great Britain in Asia Minor have been discussed for years, it seems incredible that the Powers have joined in this threat to Turkey, with all its implied consequences.
    As concerns the immediate situation, this declaration must have a decided, if not a decisive, influence. It will stiffen the allies and it should have convinced Turkey that her old policy of setting the Powers by the ears is no longer available. Her reply seems to indicate, however, that she will prolong the process of yielding as much as possible, and that her resources of procrastination are not yet exhausted, delay also may arise from the inevitable differences between the Balkan allies over the division of the spoils of their unexpected success. These are not only inevitable, but sure to be many and bitter. But the fact remains that the six Powers of Europe — the three of the Triple Alliance and the three of the Entente — who have for years occupied camps of armed observation over against each other, have announced an agreement upon a most difficult and threatening situation.