Motor Truck May Aid Coast Defense.

New York Times 100 years ago today, January 19, 1913:
How Automobiles Could be Used to Repel the Attacks of Hostile Fleet.
MOBILITY IS GREAT END
Radius of Action in Warfare Would be Widely Extended by Use of Motor Vehicle Corps.
Prepared for The New York Times by an Officer of the General Staff, United States Army.
    It is interesting to study the operations of the civil war and to compare the deliberate moves of the commanders at its inception with the movements of these same commanders during the later period of the war. In its later period and in more recent wars abroad we have seen successful commanders constantly trying to surprise their opponents by striking quick and often with superior force at unexpected places and times.
    War is settled by the outcome of battle. Battles are ordinarily preceded by movements and feints designed to conceal from the enemy the point at which the main or decisive attack is to be driven home. For the purpose of delivering the decisive attack, troops are hold together or massed in large bodies so that the blow when delivered will be effective. At the same time, raiding parties are employed on the enemy's flanks and rear, whenever possible, in destroying his communications, getting information, keeping him worried, breaking down the morale of his troops, and at the same time compelling him to send back for the protection of his rear and flanks troops that could otherwise be used to advantage on the battlefield.
    One of the great natural leaders developed during the civil war is reported to have replied, when asked for a definition of the word strategy, that the commander who "got the mostest men there the firstest" was the commander who would win and, therefore, best understood the practical application of that term.
    This quaint definition of the word strategy is constantly referred to in military textbooks of both this country and Europe. Its practical application is still the watchword of the successful commander.
    It is apparent that the successful conclusion of a war is dependent on the ability to strike quickly and often at unexpected places with a superior force. It follows that the more effective these blows are on the enemy's flank and rear the more troops he will have to send to take care of his communications and the better the chance will be of having "the mostest men there the firstest" at the critical time.
    There were many of our old soldiers, happily many of them still alive, who were skilled leaders or followers in military operations of this character. A few of these leaders with small parties were able to contain, or, in other words, keep constantly employed, great bodies of their enemy's troops, charged with the defense of railroads and supply trains. In some cases a few hundred of these raiding troops kept as many thousand of their enemy constantly occupied away from the battlefield. They were mounted, and therefore able to move quickly to a selected point, say a railroad bridge or tunnel, drive away its small garrison, blow up the bridge or tunnel, and withdraw practically unhurt before a force large enough to defeat them could be sent up.
    These operations made it necessary for the enemy to keep at many points a force each sufficient in strength to defeat the one raiding party; for one raiding party could in less than an hour's time, by the use of explosives, interrupt the operations of an important supplying railroad for a number of days.
    These small raiding parties were controlled by the marching capacity of their horses. The average day's march of hardened cavalry is twenty-five miles. Under an emergency, this distance can be extended for a few days up to some fifty miles at the rate of five miles an hour. The average day's march of small commands of seasoned infantry, on good roads in cool weather, is twenty miles a day. This distance may also be extended in an emergency. The larger the force the shorter will be the march. With a large body of troops accompanied by its trains, we cannot expect to average more than from ten to fifteen miles a day.
    We can, therefore, assume to-day that the radius of action of small bodies of troops is restricted to some fifty miles under the most favorable conditions, and then only for very short periods of time, and that the larger these bodies of troops became the shorter will be the day's march.
    How can we best meet attacks at unexpected places and at unexpected times without weakening our main force for its decisive work on the battlefield? Think  for an instant of the number of mounted men that it would require to guard our coast line, say, for instance, that of New England, from the possible landing of a hostile raiding force. Remember that the average day's march of hardened cavalry is twenty-five miles, and that, therefore, to properly patrol the coast line we would have to have small posts or stations every twenty-five miles along the coast. This patrol would only insure our getting information of the intended landing and would not insure our having the "mostest men there the firstest" at the time of landing. Back of this line of mounted patrols we would have to have reserve bodies of troops ready to move out quickly to repel the landing.
    Think of the time it would take to get the troop trains started, the troops detrained and marched to the threatened place. Would this not mean that we would have to scatter reserves all along the coast, and thus fritter away our strength exactly as our enemy intended we should do? Would not a commander be foolish to even attempt this kind of a defense, and in what kind of a position would he be to meet the enemy if, after sending his troops to repel three or four feints of the enemy at landing, he discovered that they were actually landing in force at a different point? His cavalry would be scattered in patrol work and not, therefore, available for its important functions on the battlefield. His infantry and artillery would also be scattered on wild goose chases. In all probability, before he could gather his force together the enemy would have made and secured their landing with little or no opposition.
    Here comes in the practical, use of the automobile as an aid to military operations. We must also include the autocycle and the aeroplane in this connection.
    Compare the radius of action of these vehicles with the means of locomotion at present employed in the army. Consider for an instant what might have happened in the civil war if its able leaders had had these vehicles at their disposal for getting information for offensive work against the communications of their enemy and for defensive work on their own communications. Consider also what a factor these vehicles will be in our future wars. Take, for example, the New England illustration already given. Our cavalry would not be frittered away on patrol work, for this work could be better and much more economically done by the autocycle and the aeroplane.
    Seventy-five or a hundred automobiles, each carrying from seven to ten soldiers, would constitute a force sufficient to meet and repel almost any feint of the enemy. The radius of action of the reserves would be greatly increased, with a resultant great saving in the number of men required for this work. Our main forces of infantry, cavalry, and artillery could be held together at some central point preparatory to moving against the main body of the enemy when it finally appeared, for the purpose of delivering its blow with all its strength on the decisive battlefield.
    We have in this country many automobile clubs, many of which have listed upwards of a thousand automobiles, all capable of assisting materially in the military defense of our country.
    All the country is interested in good roads and the improvement in this particular within the last few years, due to the efforts of State and municipal authorities, has been most marked. Think of what factors these are to the defense of our country.
    Would it not seem a rational and patriotic step for us to organize now the means that we have at our disposal, so that if war comes we can make the best use of them?
    Would not the automobile clubs or our country be interested in the furtherance of a project of this kind?