Abrogating The Panama Treaty.

New York Times 100 years ago today, August 31, 1912:
    The latest phase of the "American" position on the Panama tolls question is the assertion that the United States can do as it pleases because there never was any Hay-Pauncefote treaty. We are told that it was void from the beginning because it violated the Constitution in that it made a contract which derogated from the National sovereignty. This applies to any and all treaties which bind the Nation to anything, for the Nation cannot bind itself without limiting its freedom to act inconsistently with its obligation. If the position is well taken the United States is the only Nation which cannot make a treaty. It would become a pariah among nations which assume and keep obligations, and take pride in doing so. If we persist in this attitude there is not a nation in the world which will be our friend in times of peace and which will not rejoice in war to give aid and comfort to our enemies, of whom there will he many hereafter, although it has been our honest boast that the United States was the only country in the world which all envied and none hated.
    We are to take this position in order to free ourselves from an undertaking which prevents our subsidizing an interest to which we have given a monopoly by law, and whose rates are such as may be imagined from the fact that they are not regulated by law. The inducement seems too small to some, and the consequences are more serious than the ingenious author of the idea may have imagined. If there is no Hay-Pauncefote treaty, then the Clayton-Bulwer treaty is not abrogated, and England is our partner in all transit across the Isthmus. That is to say, we lose our monopoly, after having assumed and spent the entire sum necessary to provide ourselves with it. This, strictly legal view of the matter leaves out of consideration the fact that even if there is no Hay-Pauncefote treaty we have acted as though there were up to this moment. That is to say, we have accepted the goods, and are bound to pay their worth, even though there were no bargain. But the fact is that if there is no bargain there ought to be for reasons of selfish interest which dwarf whatever value there may be in freedom to do the foolish thing for which freedom of action is sought.
    The supporters of this proposal seem to think that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty consists entirely of our obligation. The fact is that the consideration for the assumption of our obligation is worth all it cost, on the strictest calculation of self-interest. In consideration of our promising and giving commercial neutrality the rest of the world bound itself to political neutrality. There was no other way in which we could secure political neutrality, for we never could make an entangling political alliance with nations whose primary interests are so different from our own. So long as we do not discriminate commercially against nations using the canal on terms fixed by ourselves, it is provided that the canal never shall be attacked in any war in which we can have no interest because of our geographical detachment, and because we have no allies, and can have none. In other words, the Hay-Pauncefote treaty's great merit is that it gives us a monopoly at Panama on terms which exempt us from the cost and trouble of protecting it in any wars except our own. The only consideration which we pay is the commercial equality of treatment which we ought to give in common decency, and for reasons of self-interest as well as self-respect. Germany builds warships, and England outbuilds Germany, in defense of the sacred right of destroying private commerce in war. If it were possible to place private property at sea beyond attack by, means of a treaty similar to the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which places our canal beyond attack, the naval rivalry between England and Germany might cease. Those who abrogate the Hay-Pauncefote treaty therefore impose upon the United States a greater naval burden than that assumed by England and Germany. So long as the canal is neutralized we need a navy only for our own purposes. When the canal becomes a prize of war we shall need a navy as big as those of any alliance. England builds against two nations. We should have to build against any three at least, and conceivably against all nations, since we make it an object for all to attack the canal.
    Just as the example of England and Germany in preserving freedom to attack private property at sea sets us as example to avoid, so the Hay-Pauncefote treaty shows them a way out of their competition of armaments. And there are gentlemen at Washington who are allowed without reproof to suggest that it is "American" and desirable to fasten upon this continent the burdens f militarism from which the Hay-Pauncefote treaty measurably delivers us. The establishment of the law of maritime brigandage upon this continent is too much to pay for the privilege of subsidizing a monopoly which would be all the better for a little reducing, or at least regulating, of its profits.