Time Ill Chosen For A Weak Navy.

New York Times 100 years ago today, August 21, 1912:
Admiral Mahan Discusses the One Battleship Conclusion and Its Effect.
To the Editor of The New York Times:
    Those who appreciate the general conditions of international relations at the present time, of which the universal increase of armaments is no mere feature but the distinguishing and ominous exponent, cannot esteem too highly the action of those members of the Democratic Party in Congress who have endeavored to obtain from their associates a competent addition to our battle fleet. The people of the United States, whether they realize it or not, owe them gratitude. Unhappily, the fact remains that they have not been able to carry the party with them.
    Dr. Eliot, till very recently the honored President of Harvard, has just returned from a round-the-world journey which is commonly understood to have been undertaken under the auspices of Mr. Carnegie's crusade for peace. As reported in the newspapers. Dr. Eliot has found that the Governments of the great States while heartily desirous of peace, are not in favor of a reduction of armaments in their own countries; or even of a near stay in the present movement of augmentation. In short, and to repeat what was said above, the increase of armament is simply a direct consequence of existing international conditions, as apprehended by the men responsible for the welfare of the several nations.
    It is the dictate of the simplest common sense that in the practical conduct of life we must accept facts — such as those of the last paragraph — as we find them, not as we wish they were; and must meet them with appropriate measures. To meet the increasing armament of others by decreasing our own is unpractical. Though thus devoid of vision, it is none the less visionary; for it fails to realize that the armaments of other States have a definite object, which object is not war, but the enforcement of National purpose in moments of international crisis by being ready for war if the worst come. Statesmen are arming, not because they, want fighting, but because they consider that conditions of which they nave familiar knowledge render armament necessary, unless their Nation is willing that National policies — such as the Monroe Doctrine, or the safe tenure of the Panama Canal — be violated by superior, power. If the power be sufficiently superior there will be no fighting. Careful observers of international events know how correct this estimate is. The last decade has seen a half-dozen bloodless wars, and decisive victories, effected by adequate armament.
    In the approaching elections the voters of the United States also will have to accept facts as they are, not as they may wish them to be; and, like statesmen, they will have to adapt their measures to what is. There are several important internal questions before them, of which it may be said generally that they are common to most civilized nations to-day, and that, also, in regarding them there are in all countries two great divisions, eternal in the history of mankind — the conservative and the advancing. Between these two schools of thought internal questions take care of themselves; not that they do not need attention and action, but because they naturally get these, for the reason that they come home to every man's dally experience. Therefore they will not be neglected, and our daily papers bear hot assurance that they are not. But in every country, except in moments of excitement, external affairs do not enter the daily round of life, and therefore receive little attention. That is sadly the case with us now.
    In this the Democratic representatives probably reflect the condition of their constituents. The fact remains, and the voters must deal with it, that the Democratic Party has deliberately refused to provide duly for the organized naval force of the country, and that the grudging concession of a half-measure has been reached only under a considerable pressure exerted on the eve of an important election. It is a fair, though sorrowful, inference that if the party be returned to power for two and four years, it will, in security of office and freedom from pressure, pursue the definite policy indicated by this year's course. In that event, the navy of the country will drop rapidly backward during four years.
    The Democratic nominee for the Presidency in his speech of acceptance has refrained from expression of opinion, and is reported to have said, while the matter was in urgent discussion, that he could not with propriety interfere. Yet if elected, as he hopes, the strength of the United States Navy will be a very consequential factor, in the international relations of the country, and these are the very especial charge of the Chief Executive. Apparently Dr. Wilson has no present concern as to the conditions under which he will bear this responsibility.
    The result is the more imminent because in line with the traditions of the Democratic Party. In our Federal system we have two great historical divisions of thought. That which sees first the Nation, and that which sees first the State lines. All of us recognize the necessity of due co-ordination between the two; but the one which sees first the Nation will seek, and historically has sought, to strengthen the power for external action, which in the original compact the people — or the State — committed to the central Government, thus constituting a Nation where before there was none. There seems no reason why the State-rights school also should not wish adequately to strengthen the central Government, which represents the whole country, for its specific action, which is the international efficiency of the State; but, as a matter of fact, to whatever cause due, that school does not so act, and in the instance before us is not now so acting.
    It is not that Democratic Presidents have not had to deal with acute international relations, or have not shown great ability in so doing. Where they have failed has been in preparation, with consequent failure of power in negotiation, where issues of great importance were at stake. The first two, and most eminent, Jefferson and Madison, backed by Gallatin, spent years of fruitless argument with Great Britain over gross outrages to our rights; just because they would not prepare a navy, and the British Government realized that the United States neither would nor could fight. To the same lack of preparation were due the disasters of 1812. I hope I need not here contravene again the impression that that war was on our part other than a miserable failure. It is a sustainable, almost a demonstrable, proposition that the United States between 1801 and 1812 could have maintained a navy of such size that the menace would have forced Great Britain to seek an accommodation of differences. Some days ago Everett Wheeler cited in your columns the concession of Great. Britain to Mr. Cleveland's demands as an evidence of the needlessness of a strong navy. The evident reply is that the Venezuela dispute was intrinsically of small account to England and that her reluctance to arbitrate was due rather to the truculence of Venezuela than to disinclination to please us. The questions now before the world are of a very different import and the powers interested much more in earnest than ever Great Britain about the Venezuela boundary. They will not desire war with us. but if they see us unprepared they will insist on their demands. In that case we will either yield or be beaten. The result in either case is the same.
    For the past half century, and now, nation after nation is emerging into international life with intensified powers, manifested in greater armament._ The movement is ill-chosen to weaken the effectiveness of the American Nation, which alone from its intrinsic powers, if properly organized, can maintain the separateness of the American continents from exterior molestation, from the .transference hither of conflicts arising elsewhere.
            A. T. Mahan.
            Quogue, L. I., Aug. 19, 1912.