Commerce The Key.

New York Times 100 years ago today, April 28, 1913:
    The curious but not incredible story of the surrender of Scutari published by the Paris Temps and reported in our transatlantic dispatches yesterday morning adds another touch of complexity to the Balkan situation. If Essad Pasha, the Turkish commander, himself an Albanian, was allowed to transfer his army, with all its arms and ammunition, to a strong strategic position at Tirana, well within the proposed frontier of Albania, it may make the erection of an autonomous State a much harder task than had been expected. If an understanding exists between him and King Nicholas of Montenegro, they can show a considerable "nuisance value," and, after the style of Rumania, seek substantial "compensation" for refraining from mischief. But while they may change, to their own gain, the terms of the settlement agreed on in principle by the Powers, it is not likely that they can prevent that settlement.
    Of course, there is always the risk that a sudden and unexpected change like this may arouse Austria to pass the line between the bluffing she has so frequently indulged in and aggressive action. That, according to Sir Edward Grey, was avoided, not long since, only by the agreement of the Powers as to Albania. But it is reasonable to infer that the future can be handled as the past was and that peace will be maintained. The glimpse of possibilities which the statesmen of Europe had as they stood on the very brink of a general conflict will, it may be hoped, tend to keep them well away from that dizzy and slippery verge. Nor is it beyond the range of expectation that, face to face with the reality of war, they may find a mode of dealing with conflicting interests that will not only avoid war but make fairly lasting peace practicable. Since no one Power or group of Powers can, without a clash, secure its own exclusive aims, it may be possible to combine to secure and develop the interests of all and to seek the advantage of each by promoting common advantage.
    It is a curious fact that three of the great Powers of Europe, the greatest in territory and population, with steadily increasing resources and enterprise, are barred from free and safe access to the high seas. Russia has no port open the year round. Austria has only Trieste, on the Adriatic, with more or less precarious communication with the Mediterranean. Germany must send practically all her foreign commerce through the English Channel, which in the present condition of naval armaments might readily be closed by British fleets. Russia seeks a free passage from her Black Sea ports through the Dardanelles. Austria seeks more southern ports on the Adriatic and the Aegean. Germany for two decades has been strengthening her navy and shaping her diplomacy to enable her to command the passage of the English Channel and to wrest from Great Britain the control of the ocean. Great Britain — with the nervous system of its vast empire centred in the islands of the United Kingdom — has seen that control of the ocean is her vital and supreme need, and has made and is making tremendous efforts to retain it. The interests of all these nations are real, legitimate, lasting, and in the changing developments of events for at least a half century they have sought to advance them by force or the threat of force. As an inevitable result, Europe is divided into two great armed groups, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente — Germany, Austria, Italy, and Russia, France, Great Britain — and the peace of the world has depended on the fear of each group to attack the other.
    Suddenly there has arisen in the extreme southeast of the Continent another group of nations, each relatively weak and poor, but shown to be very formidable in united action, gallant and effective fighters, capable of rivaling the great Powers in military organization, in planning and in carrying on campaigns. The European balance has been amazingly disturbed. Turkey, the one active element in all calculations for the Near East, has been wiped out. The chancelleries have been immensely puzzled. Germany has treated the situation as one practically of war, and is strengthening her army and navy as if "the enemy were at the gates." France has followed Germany's example. Austria has threatened actual aggression. Only the relative unreadiness of Russia and the singularly wise and calm policy of England have prevented a "conflagration."
    In this anxious and uncertain crisis, when each of the great Powers trembles for its special interests, we believe that it may be possible to replace the contention as to special interests by a policy of united promotion of all interests. If Constantinople and Salonika were made free ports; if Russia had her access to the sea; if all the Balkan States and Greece were united in a zollverein, with provision for order and for development throughout the peninsula, the immediate sources of peril in the Near East would be removed. A like policy on a broader scale would not be impracticable for the larger European interests. Germany and Great Britain could with advantage to both reach an agreement as to German expansion in Africa and the peaceful passage of the English Channel. Austria would have her access to the southeast not by force of arms but through an orderly and gradually prospering land. In the spirit of cooperation and joint effort for the true interests of each the whole of Europe could be transformed from two great armed camps to a congeries of peaceful and progressive nations, each steadfastly and naturally developing its resources. We do not deny that it is an idealistic solution of vexed and difficult problems. But there never was a time when it could be undertaken with more reasonable prospect of practical success.